# EU CP – BFHR

### Notes

#### There are three versions of the CP

1. The EU unilaterally acts – internal net benefit of EU cohesion
2. The EU works with NATO – China net benefit
3. The EU works with the US – external net benefits

#### There are some aff answers, but tbh the best answers are probably the built in US-NATO coop key warrants in each aff.

#### All the DAs produced at camp so far are probably net benefits to most versions of the CP, so there’s a lot of flexibility as to what you want to go with it.

#### A lot of the solvency stuff can be taken from one module and applied to the other two – creative highlighting solves!

#### Thanks to Archan Sen from Eagan, David “🐱‍👤” Sanico from Calvert Hall, Stephen Lewis from Damien, and Guy Bloom and James Donovan from Bronx Science for producing the file.

# EU CP

## 1NC Shells

### 1NC—EU Unilateral

#### Text: The European Union should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### The CP solves the entirety of case, revitalizes lagging EU leadership, solves CMR, and spurs innovation.

Csernatoni 19 [[Raluca Csernatoni](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6#auth-Raluca-Csernatoni), PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2\_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

Less than a century ago, Edmund Husserl’s warning words about Europe were more than farsighted: “the gravest danger menacing Europe is its lassitude” (quoted in Bauman 2014). Applied to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), his words ring even truer. In the current climate of fiscal and economic austerity, recent debates on the EU’s security and defence capabilities have centred on Europe’s clear lag, warned against cuts in national defence budgets, and called for a new level of ambition and ‘pooling and sharing’ strategies for enhanced defence cooperation at the European level. Nevertheless, the case for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy is even harder to endorse in domestic debates over resources and priorities, especially concerning high-tech security technologies. The European defence sector contends with public finances under pressure from growing pension burdens, shrinking recruitment pools and states increasingly cautious about interventionist military operations or unwarranted military capabilities spending.

This chapter looks at the EU’s recent impetus to fund for serious military capacity build-up through dual-use and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous robotics. According to the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) “go beyond what is known!” and “[v]isionary thinking can open up promising avenues towards powerful new technologies” (FET 2018). FETs have been allocated a provisional budged of €2.696 million under the Horizon 2020, having three complementary lines of actions: FET Open funding projects on new ideas for radically new future technologies, including unconventional research and innovation collaborations and practices; FET Proactive nurturing emerging themes and establishing a critical mass of European researches in order to build new interdisciplinary research communities; and FET Flagships that are “1-billion, 10-years initiatives where hundreds of excellence European researchers unite forces to focus on solving an ambitious scientific and technological challenge” (FET 2018). The Work Programme of 2018–2020 (FET 2018–2020) under the Horizon 2020 started in 2016, highlighted among others a new generation of robotics technologies, human-machine interfaces and cooperation, cognition and AI as well as quantum computing and its advantages to solve challenging industrial and scientific problems such as the development of protocols, controls and benchmarking for real life applications (FET 2018–2020, pp. 34, 38).

The framing of FETs is particularly significant, because such technologies and the inter- and multidisciplinary research and innovation synergies that are prioritised by the European Commission are expected to transform “Europe’s science base into a competitive advantage”, as well as “initiate new lines of technology through unexplored collaborations between advanced multidisciplinary science and cuttingedge engineering” (FET 2018). Most importantly, they can have spill over effects in the areas of security and defence and in the case of civil-military applications in the security continuum between internal and external security in Europe. They likewise express an undeniable technologisation trend to push for high-tech multidisciplinary Research & Development (R&D) in areas of strategic and global competition. This is reflected in the EU’s policymaking that has been actively pursuing neoliberal strategies to also revamp a lagging behind European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the proliferation of discourses regarding the strategic and economic advantages of frontier or game-changing dual-use technologies (Csernatoni 2018, p. 190). To this end, the underlying goal is to ensure that Europe will have a leadership role “early on in those promising future technology areas able to renew the basis for future European competitiveness and growth” (FET 2018).

The EU is poised to tackle challenging global phenomena and major mutations engendered by a so-called fourth industrial revolution and a new age of ever more sophisticated technologies like cyber technologies, autonomous robotics and AI. Such game-changing technical advancements have important civilian and military applications in different areas, by creating new markets, triggering new cooperation in key industrial domains and transforming civil-military relations in Europe and the world. They galvanise a variety of actors and different levels of analysis, intertwining multidisciplinary research approaches and different technical, socio-political, economic and security fields. In this regard, scholarship should be focused on evaluating the geopolitical, policy, social, ethical and legal challenges of such technologies in a world increasingly driven by digital and automated technologies in all aspects of activity, including security and defence. ‘Big Tech’ and major leaders such as the USA and China, with Canada, Israel, France, Russia and the United Kingdom holding key positions in these fields, are currently driving the innovation agenda and arms race in AI-enabled and autonomous security technologies. However, a balance must be reached between such innovations and future technological artefacts that comply with democratic and legal requirements, social norms and ethical values and the EU could play a significant role in their meaningful governance.

In the last few years, the emergence of new technologies has stimulated worldwide debates on their uses, risks and potential benefits. Emerging autonomous technologies are a set of smart technologies that are rapidly converging and are often interrelated, connected or fully integrated, such as AI, machine learning algorithms, deep learning, cyber networks and robotics (European Commission 2018a, p. 5). Such technologies are creating new synergies in key industrial domains at national, European and transnational levels, encompassing a host of implications for both civil and military objectives. In the European context, EU institutions and agencies such as the European Commission, European Parliament and European Defence Agency (EDA) have been taking part in discussions surrounding their R&D and governance, by creating the impetus to strengthen market growth, competitiveness, innovation and regulation in these sectors.

#### EU strength prevent global conflict and transnational threats---extinction

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In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism.

Strategic autonomy’ and ‘complementarity with NATO’ usually appear in the same sentence in the European debate – the latest doctrinal iteration to be found in the EU Global Strategy of June 2016. The ensemble reflects Europe’s need to rely on its transatlantic relationship for security and territorial defence, empowering it to carry out foreign policy too. The EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement of enlarging to Central Europe after the Cold War, pursued in tandem with NATO expansion, is testimony to this pairing.

Since the end of 2016, the US President’s international preferences undermine directly or indirectly Europe’s security. Whether it is the insistence on greater burden-sharing, US action in the Middle East, or trade disputes with China, current US policies put Europe’s security – already challenged by Russian action in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – at risk.

European leaders have started to question whether the transatlantic relationship needs to be preserved no matter what, or whether Europe should emancipate from it. The debate on ‘strategic autonomy’ is animating recent efforts in the field of security and defence. It refers to the ability to make and carry out decisions on defence, to conduct military operations autonomously, and to have the industrial capabilities to do so. Even if this level of strategic autonomy were agreed upon, it would take a generation for Europe to affect the world stage.

The focus on strategic autonomy speaks to present insecurities in European societies, but not to the EU’s international legitimacy where, possibly, the European Union has better opportunities to develop means of political autonomy which befit its history and international identity. The emerging debate on economic sovereignty is addressing for the first time the degree to which the EU can make political use of some of its economic and financial tools, such as the Euro as an international currency. After all, the EU and its Member States remain the world’s largest trade bloc and donor.

On the multilateral stage, Europe faces an increasingly hostile environment but remains the best hope to pursue universal principles, such as human rights and the rule of law, which underpin the resilience of that multilateral system. How to partner with other countries and actors around the globe to push back on attacks to international order is no longer a second order priority.

If the way ahead appears clear, achieving it is a tall order. The rationale for collective action for the EU seems obvious – the ‘politics of scale’, or to be stronger together rather than weaker apart – but historically difficult to achieve. The multiple threats and risks on Europe’s doorsteps have only minimally bridged the strategic divergence that continues to beset the continent, and the rise of the populist radical right is beginning to undermine existing European external policies, not to speak of a higher level of ambition.

Looking at global politics from a non-European perspective, how Europe’s friends and partners around the world will welcome a bid for greater autonomy – politically, economically, and strategically – still needs to be seen. The EU’s worldview that it has acted as a ‘force for good’ is not uncritically accepted. After all, that ethical stand was also possible thanks to the EU’s belonging to a stable and hegemonic West.

If Europe wants to engage with the world and simultaneously strengthen its strategic identity it needs to square some circles. Without giving into the facile critique that realism and geopolitics render multilateral principles obsolete and warrant hard-nosed politics, Europe should leverage its assets, which are irrevocably embedded in multilateralism and cooperation. Climate change, conflict prevention and mediation, and an open and fairer international trade system are among the assets that the EU can concretely work towards globally.

To do so it needs to engage flexibly with global actors, focusing more on multilevel networks including civil society rather than on the traditional partnerships between governments, some of which are no longer benign or useful. Both will require a dose of humility in listening to non-European world views and of pragmatism in seeking appropriate strategies and paths forward.

Last but not least, if Europe wants to imagine its own history of prosperity, democracy and peace as still relevant to the debates taking place in the rest of the world, it also needs to think about the global future sustainability of welfare, taking progressive politics outside national boundaries and engaging in a more global and open debate about public common goods.

### 1NC—EU-NATO Coop

#### Text: The European Union should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### EU-NATO coordination relieves semiconductor dependencies on Asia via coordinated security efforts from the EU.

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Such an approach to procurement could prove particularly helpful given the rising threats coming from vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled Western countries’ strong dependency on Chinese supplies, both in the medical and technological fields (though the supply issues around personal protective equipment were addressed relatively rapidly).75 A recent study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies identifies 103 categories of electronics, chemical, mineral/metal, and pharmaceutical products in which the EU is critically dependent on imports from China.76 At the same time, as economies worldwide have started to recover from the pandemic and embark on ambitious investment plans to boost innovation in their national industries, the demand for semiconductors — crucial for building microchips, which are essential in any modern technology — has increased and become one of the central issues of the U.S.-China competition. This issue is further complicated by geopolitical concerns; a large proportion of semiconductor manufacturing occurs in Taiwan.77 The U.S. and the EU have recently begun initiatives to increase the domestic production of microchips. In June, the U.S. Senate passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, which allocates $52 billion toward the effort.78 And the EU followed suit with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen committing to a similar amount.79 The U.S. and EU discussed the issue during their inaugural Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in September 2021.80 These discussions represent a first step toward breaking the ice on trans-Atlantic cooperation, particularly related to developing new technologies that are vital for enhancing geopolitical and economic security. But the main takeaways are that the U.S. and the EU are facing the same challenges and that the EU has increased its geopolitical ambition and range of interests. So far, there is no similar dialogue platform between NATO and the EU — a fact that hinders inter-institutional cooperation in the procurement domain. In fact, if NATO and the EU develop different standards, it could lead to duplication and hinder logistical and strategic interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space. For this reason, it is especially important for NATO and the EU to establish deeper communication on procurement and the definition of common standards. Increasing connections and synergies between industrial clusters within the trans-Atlantic space, particularly for materials such as semiconductors and microchips, would decrease dependence on geopolitically risky supply chains. Moreover, developing common standards when it comes to procurement, data privacy, and weaponry components would facilitate technological exchanges as well as the interoperability of equipment (be it artificial intelligence or more traditional military supplies) across the NATO-EU space. Given the increasing importance of new technologies for economic development, industrial advancement, and innovation, the only alternative to a shared approach in the trans-Atlantic space would be increased competition among allies and reduced interoperability — which would inevitably create more advantages for competitors to exploit.

#### Asian control over semiconductors causes Chinese tech leadership.

Maire 21 [Robert Maire is the last man standing in terms of writing with tremendous depth and breadth about the art of making computer chips. There is no one else communicating the issues of the industry with his level of expertise and perspective., 10-07-2021, "The U.S.-China battle for dominance will be determined by the virtually invisible semiconductor chip — The Technology Letter", Technology Letter, https://www.thetechnologyletter.com/the-posts/the-us-china-battle-for-dominance-will-be-determined-by-the-virtually-invisible-semiconductor-chip, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

Much as atoms are the building blocks of matter, semiconductors are the fundamental building blocks of the modern technology world. Chips enable and compose the internet, computers, smart phones, transport, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and all the world’s data.

The ability to lead and control the design and manufacture of chips determines who dominates globally in all of these areas, and new, yet unknown, applications. Wars today are won by information, command and control. He who has the best information and the ability to use it, wins.

Intelligence gathering and analysis is increasingly based on technology assets and artificial intelligence rather than humans. That includes facial recognition, satellites, drones, data mining and encryption.

Advanced airplanes, ships, submarines and space operation are all dependent on advanced semiconductors for their war-fighting systems. Having the newest generation of AI chip will make the win/lose determination in a dogfight, code breaking, and data mining.

The entire internet, from optical cables to routers and satellites, runs on semiconductors. Today we are worried about an externally sourced hacking of the network, but what if the internet were hacked from the inside out by the very chips it is composed of? Nefariously changing a few transistors out of billions in a chip would be an attack against which one would be defenseless.

All of today’s advanced telecommunications chips are made in Taiwan, a short boat ride from China, which has aspirations to be dominant in semiconductors. While there is significant argument about control of 5G networks, the reality is that 5G does not work without advanced semiconductors. Control semiconductors and you control 5G by default, rendering the discussion moot.

#### Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” *BAS*, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war>)

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

### ---Defense Autonomy NB

#### EU-NATO coordination is possible now — but US intervention via security cooperation wrecks it — link alone turns case.

Bergmann et al. ’21 — Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. James Lamond is a fellow at the Center. Siena Cicarelli is a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center. June 21, 2021; "The Case for EU Defense"; *Center for American Progress*; <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/>; //CYang

This is a major structural shift that Washington and NATO simply must reckon with. But, instead of seeing this development as a challenge to the current structure of the NATO alliance, it should in fact be seen as a huge opportunity. The once seemingly impossible task of integrating European forces and addressing fragmentation and redundancies has now been made possible through Europe forming a political union.

Yet U.S. policy has consistently opposed EU defense efforts since the late 1990s, arguing that EU defense efforts would undermine NATO. State Department officials’ oft-repeated claim, virtually unchanged over the past three decades, is that an EU defense structure would “duplicate” NATO, making the treaty organization obsolete. Democratic and Republican administrations have repeated the mantra “no duplication” so often that it has become U.S. policy doctrine.5 But rarely, if ever, is the concern about possible duplication actually unpacked and assessed.

This report rejects the notion that NATO and EU defense are incompatible and at odds. Supporting EU defense does not mean choosing the EU over NATO. This is a false choice and a faulty premise. The EU and NATO are not opposing organizations. They are, in fact, fundamentally tethered. Implicit in U.S. opposition is a fear of a powerful EU that could supplant NATO and become a thorn in America’s side. But the EU is not divorced from the 21 NATO member states that make up the EU. If the EU and United States became rivals, then NATO would itself be obsolete, as it would be divided against itself. Such fanciful scenarios would not be the result of the EU developing a defense capacity but the result of a massive diplomatic breakdown. Such a breakdown is highly unlikely, and U.S. foreign policy should be doing everything possible to avoid this scenario.

As this report argues, the EU could significantly strengthen NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Integrating European forces, acquiring key capabilities, rationalizing and harmonizing the sprawling EU defense sector, and investing in cutting-edge research are some of the areas where the EU could play a critical role. As the EU develops its own defense capabilities, there would inevitably be some institutional overlap and duplication with NATO, just as there is with any other national military. But even if the EU’s defense efforts were to create some overlap and institutional friction, this would be a rather small bureaucratic concern — one that could easily be addressed by better EU-NATO coordination. Yet the bureaucratic worry over duplication has been elevated to such an extent that it has become untethered from its actual significance, which is quite minor. Instead of fretting over bureaucratic trivia, the United States and NATO should focus on incorporating the EU defense effort into NATO and embedding the EU in the Atlantic framework.

Skeptics will scoff at the potential for EU defense, pointing to the limited and highly bureaucratic nature of current EU defense efforts. But Washington’s opposition has created a feedback loop that has blocked progress on EU defense. U.S. opposition makes putting forth bold or ambitious defense proposals unrealistic, leading the EU to propose niche initiatives that are often highly constrained bureaucratic endeavors with little ambition. This then reinforces the view in Washington that the EU is incapable of doing defense. The limited nature of current EU defense efforts is no doubt the fault of the EU. But the immense agency the United States has on European defense questions is also undeniable. Since the 1990s, the United States has wielded its influence, often by mobilizing EU members that are most dependent on U.S. security guarantees to block or constrain EU efforts.

### 1NC—EU-US Coop

Text:

#### U.S. and EU should cooperate over emerging tech --- that formalizes cooperation in other areas and blunts Chinese economic competition AND tech hegemony

Atkinson ‘21

(Robert, PhD from UNC, is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based technology policy think tank. He is also author of the book, The Past And Future Of America’s Economy: Long Waves Of Innovation That Power Cycles Of Growth. He has conducted ground-breaking research projects on technology and innovation, is a valued adviser to state and national policymakers, and is a popular speaker on innovation policy nationally and internationally. Previously, Dr. Atkinson served as the first Executive Director of the Rhode Island Economic Policy Council. Prior to that, he was Project Director at the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. While at OTA, he directed The Technological Reshaping of Metropolitan America, a seminal report examining the impact of the information technology revolution on America’s urban areas. He is a board member or advisory council member of the Alliance for Public Technology and the Information Policy Institute. Dr. Atkinson was appointed by President Clinton to the Commission on Workers, Communities and Economic Change in the New Economy. He is also a member of the Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, “Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation,” pg online @ <https://www.theglobalist.com/boosting-transatlantic-technology-cooperation/> //um-ef)

Today, in what could become a second Cold War, this time with China, the U.S. and Europe need to put great emphasis on cooperating economically. The reason for this is straightforward: From the vantage point of each of the transatlantic partners, China poses a threat to our economic competitiveness. More transatlantic technology cooperation needed As such, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and the EU to build upon the initial steps of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The goal must be, first, to reduce economic tensions between the two regions and second, to foster formal cooperation. This is especially true with regard to supporting advanced and emerging technology development and production. China: Unfair, state-directed capitalism As Barry Naughton notes in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, China has not only become the world’s manufacturing workshop. It is also seeking to be the world leader in emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence and others. What’s more, China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism. To be sure, both the EU and the United States have industrial policies – but these policies mostly support foundational elements like workforce training, infrastructure and R&D. China looking for dominance In contrast, China’s predatory regime, especially subsidies to industry, goes way beyond what is considered acceptable industrial policy. On top of that, the Chinese Communist Party compels technology transfer for market access, encourages intellectual property theft and operates tax and regulatory policies that discriminate against EU and U.S. firms. That, combined with real strengths of the Chinese economy – a massive domestic market that lures in foreign investment, a massive technical and scientific labor force and improving research universities – mean that China is gaining rapidly technologically. At the expense of EU and U.S. That gain has and will come at the expense of the EU’s and U.S.’s global market shares in advanced technologies. The result of that shift cannot be underestimated. Initially, China systematically assembled the components needed to be the manufacturing workshop of the world. This systematic approach has made it hard, even with the Trump tariffs and measures by Japan and other countries, to move production out of China. Silicon China? Now, China is seeking to establish the same robust innovation ecosystem that will give it strong reinforcing strengths. China wants to be not Silicon Valley, but Silicon China – and not just for IT, but for every advanced technology. The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT. If China were to achieve this leadership position, its lead will become self-reinforcing as competitors weaken and China’s advantages (e.g., capital, STEM workers, patents, tacit knowledge) improve. Not another Asian tiger If China were simply following the path of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), there would be less to worry about. All of these countries, as well as Japan, only sought comparative advantage in some industries – as opposed to absolute advantage in most industries. More crucially, they were (or quickly became) democracies that did not seek to challenge long-standing principles of the rule of law and human rights. A Maoist global hegemon? China not only seeks absolute advantage in most if not all advanced and emerging industries. Under the leadership of President Xi, it has become clear that China is reverting to its Leninist and Maoist authoritarian origins. If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon. That would give China the ability to hold the West hostage for key products and supplies. What to do? Three steps There are three key steps the United States and Europe should take. First, stop fighting each other economically. Resolving the long-standing Boeing-Airbus feud and focusing on the real challenger – China’s Comac – was a good first step. The United States eliminating its steel and aluminum tariffs on EU imports was a good second step. For its part, Europe, including member states like Germany and France, needs to dial back its “digital sovereignty” agenda which is targeted at the United States and U.S. companies. Second, both regions need to ramp up cooperation against unfair Chinese economic practices, including cooperation on cybersecurity, investment screening, bringing trade cases before the WTO and cooperative export controls. Time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation Finally, and most ambitiously, it is time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation. In a world where the development of technology has become much more technologically complex, neither region is large enough to specialize in all major technologies. Therefore, each region should allow the other region’s companies to participate in government-funded industry research programs, like the EU’s Horizon 2020 program and similar U.S. programs that agencies like the National Science Foundation operate. Moreover, as the governments roll out or expand specialized technology programs in technologies like 6G, energy storage, battery technology, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU firms, universities and governments. Finally, governments should review and minimize or eliminate regulatory barriers to science and technology cooperation, including enabling easier cross-border work of scientists and engineers. Conclusion The sooner the EU and the U.S. can stop seeing each other as the competition and work to address the real technology competitiveness challenge – China – the more likely both regions can ensure their economic futures, while upholding critical values.

#### Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” *BAS*, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war>)

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

## Perm/Theory

### Block – A2: PDB – Generic (NATO version)

#### Europeans are skeptical over US approaches on AI.

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Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

Differing views on China

As noted, only a few European states look at AI through a geopolitical lens, and EU efforts on this matter focus primarily on strengthening the EU as a global player. This means that the American interest in using transatlantic cooperation as a means to curb Chinese power is likely to have only limited traction in Europe. And US companies, rather than Chinese ones, currently remain the primary ‘other’ for Europe to measure itself against. European regulation efforts still concentrate on US companies rather than Chinese firms. In light of recent changes in language on China in both NATO and the EU, which describe the country as a “strategic competitor” and “systemic rival”, European and American views of China may converge eventually. But, at the moment, Europeans do not feel the same urgency as the US when it comes to pushing back against China. Unfortunately for those in the US who favour greater transatlantic cooperation, the European nation that most often thinks in geopolitical terms, France, is among those most sceptical of the US.

### Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

#### US and European interests are mutually exclusive---including the US trades off with EU autonomy.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/#why-work-together-disagreements-and-shared-goals>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation.

Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies.

European digital autonomy

The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation.

#### U.S. will control tech if they are driving the cooperation --- undermines the net benefit

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Today’s major powers engage in comprehensive global technology politics. The weaponisation, mastering, and control of digital technologies is the new ‘Great Game’. These power dynamics are helping shape technological spheres of influence. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – but also in central Eastern Europe and the Balkans – have fallen or may soon fall under Chinese or Russian technological influence or dominance. China is luring countries into technological dependencies to undermine their political sovereignty through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. Beijing also shields its own citizens from foreign influence with its ‘great firewall’ and develops industrial strategies to secure its technological autonomy from the West. It uses digital disinformation to influence public opinion in other countries, mounts cyberattacks and cyberespionage to strengthen its industrial base, strategically deploys attractively-priced 5G technologies abroad to gain control of telecom networks, and tries to impose its technical standards through international organisations. Together with Russia, China is attempting to ingrain authoritarian values into the global cyberspace. Russia is also leveraging and restricting mass media and social networks to protect its interests, shielding its population from democratic temptations, and waging an information war against the West and its allies with the aim of undermining citizens’ faith in democracy. Meanwhile, the United States tries to offset Chinese and Russian influence, seeks to maintain its cutting-edge advantage on military artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and backs and protects the interests of its major technology companies globally. It also denies other nations access to key technologies, monitors critical investments in the technology sector to avoid security risks, seeks to secure and control critical supply chains (especially of semiconductors), and imposes export controls and even embargoes on sensitive technologies.

#### EU overreliance on the US creates weak points which turn NATO deterrence---the CP increases EU coordination which solves defense autonomy and the AFF.

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A weak European military European defense spending, specifically related to nations falling short of the NATO 2% of GDP target, has been a major issue in U.S.-EU relations. While Barack Obama’s administration exerted diplomatic pressure, Donald Trump’s engaged in open confrontation on this issue. Neither administration obtained significant results, however; and as Afghanistan has shown, Europe is still far too reliant on the military protection of the United States — an issue that weakens NATO’s posture. Over the past few years, the EU has strengthened both its legal and financial mechanisms to be more competitive on the security side. In December 2017, under articles 42.6 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council established a Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism to deepen cooperation between willing member states. These states have agreed to binding commitments on investment, planning and management to advance their defense capabilities in the service of both national and multinational operations (including those of NATO and the UN). PESCO currently has 46 projects in several domains, from training to maritime and land exercises to cyber and military mobility.33 Through the European Defense Fund, the EU also has allocated 7.9 billion euros (roughly $9 billion) for the 2021-2027 period to research innovative defense products and technologies through collaborate development projects.34 But while these initiatives represent a step toward better European coordination on defense issues, they are completely reliant on political will and inter-governmental coordination — as security is not a competence of the EU but an inalienable prerogative of its member states. In fact, many of the PESCO projects appear to be severely delayed.35 U.S. experts interviewed for this research also point out the bad shape of European defense and more broadly its dependence on the United States for even more reachable defense objectives. A report from the Center for American Progress mentions the example of France’s anti-terrorism operation in the Sahel, where the U.S. ended up supporting basic air-refueling and surveillance flights.36 A detailed study by the Clingendael Institute points out that if the EU wants to be a credible actor in crisis management, primarily in its neighborhood, then it should be able to operate crossspectrum in the air, land, sea, cyberspace, and space domains — which cannot be done without more serious investments in European defense.37 The case of Afghanistan — where Europeans decided to leave after the U.S. withdrawal despite the predictable consequences on migration and political instability — offers a concrete example of such shortcomings.38 As Brookings expert Michael E. O’Hanlon points out, Afghanistan operations did not require high-tech equipment or massive resources; but the fact that European countries involved in NATO operations in Afghanistan did not step up to preserve a military presence in a crucial theater for European security speaks to their unpreparedness in terms of stockpiles of equipment and inability to conduct such operations without the help of the United States.39 Germany’s defense capabilities are also emblematic: Despite having more fiscal leeway and being at the forefront of European technological innovation, Berlin has not invested in its military, which still lacks critical equipment such as body armor, night vision gear, and helicopter spare parts.40 In this regard, evidence suggests that integrating and strengthening European defense would undoubtedly offer more openings for specialization, boost resource allocation and more broadly improve readiness. Yet such opportunities are highly contingent on building trust between allies and increasing political will, which will inevitably take time and be achieved in different ways. Recently, some inter-governmental initiatives outside of the EU and NATO frameworks were taken to tackle these shortcomings. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) with the aim of deepening military cooperation between like-minded European governments sharing a strategic culture. Through intelligence sharing, scenario planning, joint planning and exercises, its 13 participants are working to strengthen their military cooperation so that they can offer rapid responses in case of a crisis. The E2I is particularly relevant because one of its members is the United Kingdom, which is not currently part of any PESCO projects. The U.K’s involvement signals the importance of the relationship and responsibilities that the it shares with European partners on security. While limited, the initiative is an example of how Europe and the U.K. can strengthen their security cooperation. As the U.K. has left the EU, stronger defense cooperation between the U.K. and the EU would also positively impact NATO through fostering synergies and interoperability. However, while relevant, these initiatives are insufficient for Europe to play a credible role as a security actor in its eastern and southern neighborhoods. And such weaknesses endanger the deterrence power of the NATO alliance against Russia and ultimately reduce the opportunities for the EU more broadly to defend its security interests.

**Perm fails- strategic autonomy’s a precondition to EU sovereignty**

**Grevi 19** (Giovanni Grevi, a Senior Associate Fellow of the European Policy Centre, 7-19-2019, European Policy Centre, "Strategic autonomy forEuropean choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power" )//guyB

Paul Timmers frames strategic autonomy as “the ability, in terms of capacity and capabilities, to decide and act upon essential aspects of one’s longer-term future in the economy, society and their institutions.”28 This paper’s author has argued that **strategic autonomy requires** “the ability to set objectives and **mobilise** the necessary **resources in ways that do not primarily depend on the decisions and assets of others**” and that it rests on four pillars, namely the Single Market, the euro, the capacity for technological innovation and the capacity to provide for Europe’s security.29 In a recent contribution, Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro propose to replace the concept of strategic autonomy with ‘strategic sovereignty’, which subsumes geoeconomic and geopolitical issues within an overarching approach and **allows “Europeans to decide their policies for themselves** and bargain effectively within an interdependent system.”30 Pursuing **strategic autonomy** is therefore part of a renewed effort to **strengthen the basis for European sovereignty**. Taking a step back, the political, institutional and functional components are common to practically all the definitions of strategic autonomy and are relevant to all areas where it can be pursued. Politically, strategic autonomy requires a common understanding of large goals, which is predicated on mutual trust and a sense of shared destiny. In a political system of 28 countries, the EU’s adequate institutions are also crucial in enabling decision-making, setting rules and managing pooled resources in flexible, effective and legitimate ways. The functional dimension includes both the material and immaterial resources that are to be aligned to fulfil major goals and enable autonomous action when necessary, whether they be adequate funds, military capabilities or cutting-edge technological expertise. 11 **Strategic autonomy should also be related to the question of European sovereignty and considered a precondition for it**, with the understanding of sovereignty as “the ability to control outcomes and respond to the fundamental needs of the people”.31 This is the heart of European integration: sharing sovereignty in some domains to become more effective in its exercise. Pursuing strategic autonomy is therefore part of a renewed effort to strengthen the basis for European sovereignty in changing international and domestic contexts. Given the serious internal and external challenges to Europe’s cohesion as illustrated in this Discussion Paper, the requirements for European sovereignty are not those of the past. In this sense, strategic autonomy contributes to sovereignty in **three ways**: in terms of **responsibility, resilience and peer partnership**. Firstly, advancing strategic autonomy implies taking responsibility for Europe’s future to a further extent than is the case today. This requires creating the conditions for Europeans to make shared decisions about critical issues (e.g. the application of new technologies, a sustainable development model, major foreign policy matters) and be equipped to implement them. q Secondly, strategic autonomy is about strengthening the EU’s own resilience to the challenges of globalisation (from financial shocks to massive migration flows) as well as to the political and economic tactics employed deliberately by others to divide Europe. q Thirdly, strategic autonomy is not about isolation, but rather building a stronger platform for cooperation and partnership. In a world where big powers are more assertive, strategic autonomy is necessary to enter into peer partnerships with the heavyweights; and to avoid asymmetric relationships, where isolated EU members lack bargaining power. Concerning the scope of strategic autonomy, this should be assessed against the background of the large shifts and challenges outlined above. As the EU faces multilevel competition – of which economic statecraft, technological prowess and hybrid tactics are critical dimensions –, delimiting the pursuit of strategic autonomy to defence and security affairs is out of sync with the new strategic environment. Strategic autonomy entails the mobilisation of all relevant EU resources to strengthen Europe’s global role, which is, in turn, essential to meet the needs and expectations of its citizens. Two final elements must be stressed to articulate the concept of strategic autonomy as applied to the EU. For one, autonomy is not a binary concept but a matter of degree. Full autonomy is, in many cases, unachievable and not necessarily desirable, but progress can be achieved to make Europe more self-reliant in advancing its interests and values. For another, strategic autonomy takes time. Where Europe lags, such as in completing the Single Market, developing some technological sectors or defence capabilities, it will of course not catch up overnight. However, a clear sense of direction should drive efforts over time, and its progress should be regularly and seriously assessed. Bearing that in mind, some of the building blocks of strategic autonomy are illustrated in the following sections. 4. Strategic autonomy across the board A meaningful approach to Europe’s strategic autonomy should encompass three principal domains – the economy, technology, and security and defence matters. Progress in all three is essential in order for Europe to take more responsibility not only for its security and prosperity, but also for a stable, rules-based international order. The EU agenda for the next five years and beyond should focus not only on advancing strategic autonomy in distinct areas or policy fields but also, and crucially, on taking an overarching approach to strategic autonomy, assessing how progress in some fields (or lack thereof) impacts others. For example, it is hard to envisage the EU maintaining its economic clout and therefore regulatory power if it falls behind the curve of technological innovation. Likewise, the capacity to protect critical infrastructures from cyberattacks is essential not only to the defence and security of the Union but also to its broader economic resilience and competitiveness. Adequate military capabilities to uphold stability in Europe’s extended neighbourhood and protect the openness of the global commons – notably the sea, outer space and cyberspace – are also critical to the security of the flows that Europe depends upon for its prosperity and stability. Furthermore**, it is only by taking an encompassing view of strategic autonomy that the EU will be able to leverage it for a larger, positive global agenda** and narrative in support of rules-based cooperation.

**Specifically true in tech regulation**

**Grevi 19** (Giovanni Grevi, a Senior Associate Fellow of the European Policy Centre, 7-19-2019, European Policy Centre, "Strategic autonomy forEuropean choices: The key to Europe’sshaping power" )//guyB

Technology has always been a primary source of prosperity and power. Today, new and emerging **technologies are reshaping the domains**, terms **and tools of cooperation and competition on the international stage. Technological innovation is simultaneously accelerating and increasingly diffused**. The acceleration of digital innovation particularly creates unprecedented opportunities for sustainable human development and well-being, civic and political participation, and international cooperation. However, it also affects the distribution of power at all levels, expands the grounds for economic and political competition and creates new vulnerabilities. The diffusion of technological innovation to new economic powerhouses and the major advances made by China in key sectors, from fifth-generation mobile technology (5G) to AI, will carry far-reaching implications for economic growth, normative reach, political influence and security in different parts of the world. As noted above, much of the current competition between the US and China is about employing technological primacy as an enabler of international leadership**. The EU will fail to advance towards strategic autonomy if it is not at the forefront of both technological innovation and the efforts to regulate the applications of new technologies in ways that are consistent with its interests and values**.49 As a recent paper by Timmers put it, “mastery of digital technologies is an essential capability for future competitiveness, protecting society’s values and bridging the ‘sovereignty gap’.”50 From this standpoint**, the capacity for technological innovation is also a major requirement for Europeans in order to be able to make basic choices on their future economic and social models**, as opposed to living with the choices made by those who drive innovation outside of Europe. For example, in 2018 the European Commission launched a series of initiatives to shape a European 14 approach to AI, directed to not only support technological development but also deal with the impact of AI on labour markets, develop talents and skills, and shape a governance framework for the multiple applications of this emerging technology. The Commission has established a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), tasked with supporting the evolution of the EU approach to the ethical, socioeconomic and legal implications of AI. This Group delivered a report on ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI in April 2019 and another on policy and investment recommendations, including on a suitable governance framework, in June 2019.51 These are the first steps in shaping a distinct European approach to AI, which is essential both to enable Europe’s future competitiveness and to prevent dangerous uses of this technology, such as for mass surveillance. According to some estimates, the application of AI could raise global GDP by 14%, or $15,7 trillion, by 2030. In particular, the economic impact of AI would lift China’s GDP by 26%, that of North America by 14.5%, that of Southern Europe by 11,5% and that of Northern Europe by 9,9%.52 The EU holds strong assets in facing the technological innovation challenge, such as excellent research institutions, a wide pool of talent and a large internal market. According to the Reuters’ list of the 100 most innovative universities in the world, 46 (and eight of the top ten) are in the US, 27 in Europe and 23 in Asia.53 However, there is a need for urgent action in preserving and expanding these assets. Europe has failed to meet the objective of spending 3% of its GDP on research and development (R&D), with investment at around 2% (about the same share of GDP as in China) in 2017; compared to 4.2% in South Korea, 3.3% in Japan and 2.8% in the US.54 The competition for global talent is in full swing between academic institutions and corporate actors, while the Single Market is failing to deliver its full potential, whether through larger access to venture capital or the free flow of digital services. Besides, the EU is falling behind major competitors in the US and China on various fronts of innovation.55 The EU holds strong assets in facing the technological innovation challenge, such as excellent research institutions, a wide pool of talent and a large internal market. China is leading in setting the standards for 5G, even though EU companies such as Nokia and Eriksson have a strong track record too. Furthermore, China benefits from the largest domestic market in the world, which will in turn generate massive volumes of data, further empowering Chinese companies in the digital economy. Europe’s delay in the development of a competitive 5G industry implies that EU countries will face problems concerning both the security of their networks – as the current controversy surrounding Huawei shows – and the control of the data generated by hyper-connected economies and societies.56 These are both central requirements for strategic autonomy. **When it comes to AI, China and the US are leading in R&D** and host the largest shares of high-value AI start-ups by far. The more advanced AI is, the more performing the millions of devices connected through the IoT will be. In 2018, the EU was home to 132 of the 500 most important IoT companies in the world, while 236 were based in the US and 27 in China.57 Low levels of venture capital are another major obstacle. Despite growing quite fast in the last five years, venture capital in Europe stood at only $17.6 billion in 2017, against $71.9 billion in the US and $70.8 billion in Asia.58 Besides, the average size of venture capital funds in Europe is €60 million – half the US average – and they mostly operate within individual member states.59 The scarcity of growth funding for companies past the launch phase is particularly problematic, as promising European digital start-ups are often acquired by non-EU (mostly American) companies and funds. Supporting Europe’s technological leadership and therefore strategic autonomy will require decisive action at three levels: Firstly, Europeans should decide what priorities to concentrate their resources on, from fundamental research to the full innovation cycle. A recent report by the High-level Strategy Group on Industrial Technologies has updated a previous list of six “key enabling technologies”, defined as the essential technology building blocks underpinning EU industrial leadership. The new entries on this list are AI, digital security and connectivity.60 In parallel, the work of the Strategic Forum for Important Projects of Common European Interest – identifying and supporting strategic European value chains – is one of the vectors of Europe’s fledgling industrial policy approach. Alongside areas of ongoing cooperation on batteries, high-performance computers and microelectronics, six additional areas have been selected for pooling resources. q Secondly, larger resources must be available to support innovation policies. 61 Member states will soon face a moment of truth in the next phase of negotiations on the upcoming MFF, when they will have to decide on the Commission’s proposal to raise the share of the budget dedicated to innovation, including Horizon 2020 (H2020), by over 40%. While this is necessary, it will be equally important to ensure that the EU and national funds and initiatives work hand in hand to maximise impact. This will require better coordination between national strategies concerning the major sectors of technological innovation (e.g. AI), which are often developed in separate national silos. There will also be a need to build on the pilot experience of the European Innovation Council to target the most promising start-ups for funding under H2020. Crucially, Europeans must devise tools to provide more flexible financing to EU firms, particularly 15 high-potential start-ups that struggle to move from the research phase to market access. q Thirdly**, the regulatory framework must be updated or even established to enable the deployment and leveraging of new technologies** and maximise the advantages of the Single Market, while ensuring security and seeking to establish a level playing field with external partners. As mentioned above, the EU’s experience with the regulation of the free flow of data is a case in point. Besides, the AI HLEG’s recent report fleshes out recommendations for a European approach to the governance and regulation of this crucial set of technologies. It calls for shaping regulation according to different types and levels of risk, reviewing existing legislation across various domains (from civil and criminal law to consumer protection and competition), expanding institutional capacity and expertise and fostering a Single Marker for trustworthy AI in Europe.62 Additionally, building on the March 2019 Commission recommendations on the cybersecurity of 5G networks63, a much stronger pan-European regime should be established to ensure that all member states and providers meet high security requirements.

### Block – A2: PDB – EU Unilat

#### The cp sets regulations that spill-out globally --- the perm undermines EU push for leadership and autonomy and breeds dependence on the U.S.

Sherman and Komaitis ‘21

(Konstantinos Komaitis and Justin Sherman, Justin Sherman is a fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative, “US and EU tech strategy aren’t as aligned as you think,” pg online @ <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/us-and-eu-tech-strategy-arent-as-aligned-as-you-think/> //um-ef)

The geopolitical shifts of the past four years have caused many in Europe to value strategic self-determination and limiting dependence on foreign powers. In a March letter to von der Leyen, four European leaders, including Germany’s Angela Merkel, articulated this desire: “We believe that Europe needs to recharge and complement its current digitisation efforts with a self-determined and open digital policy which includes digital sovereignty as leitmotif.” The statement is notable for several reasons: It abandons the phrase “cyber sovereignty” and its evocations of Chinese and Russian internet control; positions Europe as the exporter and not consumer of policy; and expresses a willingness for a European leadership role regarding internet governance questions. Europe might be the first to set the rules of the online game, but this alone cannot win the game. Because the internet is founded on and continues to create interdependencies between nations, eliminating dependence on other countries is not just challenging but to some extent contradictory. For instance, European Union privacy rules and limits on cross-border data flows have necessitated the establishment of adequacy decisions and other agreements to enable data to continue flowing across borders. Interconnections and interdependencies between countries have become pervasive and will relatively remain so in a globally interoperable system. Given this limitation, Europe has focused on regulation and, over the past few years, has managed to establish itself as the de facto global regulator for the internet on a number of issues. When it came into force in 2018, the GDPR represented the world’s most ambitious privacy regulation. Its impact was felt globally, so much so that some 80 countries around the world have implemented GDPR-like statutes. The recently released Digital Services Act package, which addresses rules and responsibilities for online platforms and rules on competition policy, continues the trend of European rule-making leading the way internationally. Meanwhile in Brussels, the digital policy agenda is crowded with issues that range from online terrorism to cybersecurity, data governance, and encryption. All this policy activity has placed Europe at the heart of internet governance discussions, but not necessarily in a way that fully satisfies either Europe or its allies. Regulation alone is not enough. Many European observers have adopted the view that in order to be competitive in the tech sector, Europe needs to invest in infrastructure. In the past year alone, Europe has embarked on a series of activities that hint at its wish to become an infrastructure pioneer, while also building the legal framework to support it. GAIA-X, the federated Franco-German cloud initiative is an example; proposals for a European DNS—no matter how poorly thought out they are—are another. In and of itself, building infrastructure is not bad: It could contribute to increased innovation. But many key questions remain, especially the feasibility of such grand ideas in practice. Europe’s main challenge is that it continues to be technologically dependent on both the United States and China, placing it in the middle of a technology conflict that will most likely continue and may escalate. Europe faces two different dependency hurdles. The first is its dependence on China. The EU’s economic links with China’s tech sector are pervasive, and Chinese software and hardware are used throughout the EU internet ecosystem. Europe knows that China’s cheap equipment and financial promises come with attachments and tradeoffs that Europe is struggling to make in a coordinated fashion. For example, Europe’s indecisiveness and lack of a harmonized strategy among its member states with regards to the deployment of 5G equipment from Huawei, is a case in point. Germany and other countries seem keen to continue some sort of collaboration with China, albeit within limitations, whereas countries like Italy have prevented national operators from making deals with Huawei. The second dependency hurdle is with the United States. European policymakers understand it is impossible to cut ties with America’s digital companies altogether. Instead, they are focused on how these companies should behave within its borders. By taking advantage of its economic standing, Europe drafts regulation that aims to shape the business models of big technology companies. The impact of this can be quite profound if one considers the opportunities it creates for Europe as a global regulator. However, this also raises a number of questions for cooperation with the United States. When member states are focused on regulation in ways that are still notably different from counterparts in the United States, it begs the question of just what kinds and degrees of internet strategy cooperation are most realistic for the U.S.-EU relationship. This approach seems to be paying off, but not without hiccups. Europe’s experimentation with regulation allows it to set the agenda on complex internet governance questions. Despite its unintended consequences, the GDPR continues to be the most influential privacy regulation in the world. In contrast to the chaotic debate in the United States over Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the DSA at least provides some clarity on how regulators envision the roles and responsibilities of online platforms. With both the DSA and the GDPR, European policymakers have resisted regulation that aims to make sweeping changes to the internet’s core properties. But this is not a guarantee for the future. As Europe becomes more inward looking, it may push further in its approach to asserting a measure of online sovereignty. Similar to other countries around the world, Europe is facing some hard facts. The internet is becoming less—less global, less interoperable, less open. The internet remains unable to resist the centralization of economic power to a few big players and has become increasingly weaponized through such activities as disinformation campaigns. This type of behavior will most certainly intensify and, as it does, Europe will need to make some crucial choices. What kind of an Internet does it want? Sooner or later, the United States will face inevitably the same dilemma. This is a point where both allies will converge: recognizing that historically hands-off approaches to the internet no longer suffice in an age of harmful company behavior, internet insecurity, and authoritarian affronts on the open internet. But, ultimately, the biggest obstacle for collaboration will be their divergent views on how regulation should shape the internet: the United States will most likely continue to insist on a market-based approach, perhaps with some minimal interventions, while Europe will persist in a more institutional-oriented process. This schism will be difficult to bridge because it is part of the countries’ historical and cultural background. Yet, it can also act as an opportunity. Realizing this difference should encourage both actors to turn their attention to the internet itself. Their common, shared goal can be to rally behind the values that have defined the internet since its early days: its architectural design. The critical properties of the internet can become the starting point and the shared understanding in moving forward, regardless of which approach each decides to follow. This would place both allies in stark contrast to countries like China and Russia.

### Block – A2: PDCP

#### Severance is a voter for clash evasion – we PIC out of USfg action.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

### Block – International Fiat

#### Talking about international countries are important.

Matanock 20 [Aila M. Matanock, Department of Political Science, University of California 2020, "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals", Annual Reviews, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033504, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

International actors at times seek to help bring peace, democracy, and human rights. Studies of how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents are proliferating. They show that opposition groups have trouble trusting incumbents to adhere to the political bargains they strike because incumbents can use their familiarity with state institutions and can use their asymmetric hold on power during bargain implementation to violate terms by retaining more of the status quo than agreed. International actors can overcome these “reversion problems,” however, by using monitoring mechanisms (often focused on electoral campaigns) and incentives conditioned on compliance. Reversion problems, and enforcement by international actors as a solution, are common across issue areas—arising when domestic actors try to end civil conflict, open elections, and reduce repression—but the literatures in these issue areas have largely remained segregated. This review proposes advancing this research agenda by unifying them and (re)examining the conditions under which this solution works best.

### Block – CP Good

#### Learning about EU policies is critical for policymaking education.

AYSPS 13 [Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 07-30-2013, "Students Compare/Contrast U.S. and European Union Policies During Study Abroad", https://aysps.gsu.edu/2013/07/30/students-comparecontrast-u-s-and-european-union-policies-during-study-abroad/, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

While immersing themselves into their new surroundings, the students were expected to demonstrate a basic knowledge of EU history and institutional structures, including comparing and contrasting EU and US policies as well as their strengths and weaknesses. This was accomplished through assigned readings, goal statements, case studies, group presentations and position papers.

“My favorite part of the experience and what I learned most about was how Europe recognizes that climate change is a serious issue and how they are working to combat it,” says Ryan Forman, an MPA student. “Europe is so far ahead of us in terms of working to reduce greenhouse gases and using renewable energy. When we were driving through Germany, we didn’t have to go far to see a wind turbine.”

The trip is appealing and eye-opening for students because it provides a cornucopia of cultural exposure.

“The students learn a lot about the EU, its institutions and its struggles,” says Searcy. “It allows them to understand different cultures, which is important for the development of future policymakers and analysts.”

In addition to climate change policy issues, students learned about Europe’s political and decision-making process when voting on a variety of policies in transportation, cultural diversity, economic development, environmental issues and health. They also toured sites like the German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt; the Burg Eltz Castle in Munster, Germany; the International Chamber of Commerce and the Louvre in Paris; the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg; the European Commission in Brussels; and Nazi concentration camps in Germany.

## EU Unilat Solvency

### Block – Solvency – Regulations

#### Continued EU development of emerging tech development strategies is critical to solidify the EU’s model as the global standard for tech regulation

Ringhof & Torreblanca ’22 – Julian, Visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations through Mercator Stiftung’s *Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs*programme., Jose Ignacio, Senior policy fellow and head of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a position he has held since the launch of ECFR across Europe in 2007., (The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player”, 5/17/22, pp. 5-8, <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-geopolitics-of-technology-How-the-EU-can-become-a-global-player.pdf>) – sel

The EU: a geo-technology player in the making

In the last decade, **the EU has** gradually **woken up to the geopolitical implications of digital tech**nologies. This awakening can be linked to a series of events beginning in 2013 with the disclosures by former NSA employee Edward Snowden followed by Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, the Brexit referendum, the 2019 European Parliament election, and various EU member states’ national elections. The Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 helped put the spotlight on big US technology companies and the need to better regulate them. Similarly, the onset of international discussions over the Chinese 5G provider Huawei that same year raised greater awareness of EU technology vulnerabilities. In parallel to this, **the global impact of the EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation** (GDPR), even if unexpected, **turned the EU into a** global technology actor **and showed it the way to leverage the attractiveness and power of its internal market.** **Equipped with** these influential regulatory tools, **the EU is now seeking to become the global leader in the regulation of digital tech**nologies. EU digital legislation is no longer just inward-looking. **The union** now **proactively seeks to leverage its regulatory capacity and nurture digital partnerships and alliances to globally project its values**. Building on previous successes, **the EU is now in the process of implementing innovative regulatory regimes for** AI, data governance, **and** digital platforms **that**, like the GDPR, **have the potential to go global.** This **new geopolitical logic underpins several new EU geo-technology initiatives**. In the EU-US TTC, launched in 2021, the union and the US are currently negotiating enhanced cooperation in technology and standards development, digital regulation, connectivity investments, and the security aspects of advanced technologies. The swift and harmonised EU and US export controls on advanced technologies imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February this year are the first success story of this new transatlantic technology cooperation. Beyond the EU-US TTC, **the EU has announced a new TTC with India**, **launched its first digital partnership with Japan**, **while negotiating additional partnerships with Singapore and So**uth **Ko**rea. With the Global Gateway initiative, **the EU seeks to link digital development investments in lower income countries with values-based digital regulation and geopolitical thinking.** The **EU** has also **taken steps to reduce its tech**nological **vulnerabilities and asymmetric dependencies through investment in technological capabilities**. These efforts have been heavily influenced by China’s technological assertiveness, the US-EU technology clashes during the Trump administration, and most recently the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Along these lines, **the EU has developed new** instruments **and** cooperation **mechanisms**, **such as the Toolbox for 5G security and the Joint Cyber Unit, to secure EU cyberspace** To further strengthen its technological capabilities and reduce its asymmetric dependencies, **the union is decisively investing in the development of critical tech**nologies **including** semiconductors, through the European Chips Act; supercomputing, through the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking; **and** 6G development, for example, through the Hexa-X project. Moreover, **the EU has rolled out a host of strategies addressing issues at the nexus of digital tech**nology **and geopolitics**, **including the 2030** Digital Compass**, the** Strategic Compass**, the** Cybersecurity Strategy, **and the** Standardisation Strategy. The breadth of the issues addressed in these various efforts underscore the ubiquity of geo-technological dynamics across diverse policy fields. While the EU was building its digital standing, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time. As so often, war became an accelerator of existing trends. Long before Russia’s invasion on 24 February, Ukraine had become ground zero for Russian digital and hybrid warfare, with hundreds of thousands of cyber-attacks and mass disinformation campaigns intended to destabilise the country, undermine Ukraine’s democratically elected government, confuse Western public opinion, and ensure the global south will rally around Russia. In its response to the war, the West has deployed massive sanctions on advanced technologies with the intention of paralysing Russia’s industrial base and weakening its military capabilities. And while the Kremlin has prohibited and blocked several foreign digital platforms in Russia to impede the flow of outside information into the country, many other Western technology companies independently decided to cease operating in Russia. Both developments foreshadow a new digital iron curtain. The **war in Ukraine has** already **demonstrated that digital tech**nologies now **shape the response to international conflict.** The legislative and policy measures taken so far by the EU are commendable. However, there is still much to do. The EU continues to be a technology research powerhouse, but its success in the commercialisation and the securing of significant market shares in digital technologies has been limited. Today, Europe is lagging in the development of advanced technologies including semiconductors, AI, and cloud and high-performance computing. As the EU rolls out initiative after initiative, a cohesive strategy is missing to tie these measures together to improve coordination, set priorities, and identify gaps. Due to a lack of information, resources, and engagement the union is currently not realising its full potential – and not reaping the full geopolitical benefits of its digital policy efforts. Because such an overarching framework is lacking, important information is not flowing between the relevant Brussels and member state institutions and towards the EU delegations around the world that play a crucial role in forwarding European digital foreign policy interests. Both the European Commission and the member states have identified these challenges. The commission’s 2030 Digital Compass, approved in March 2020, said that the EU needs a “comprehensive and coordinated approach to digital coalition-building and diplomatic outreach”. This is a position shared by the member states, which at the 12 July 2021 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) called for the EU high representative and vice president (HRVP) and the commission “to formulate a comprehensive, ambitious European external digital policy in coherence with existing internal policies”. The diagnosis is clear. If the EU wants to become a global technology actor, it must develop and deploy digital diplomacy tools. The next three sections spell out in detail how to deliver on this mandate and propose a policy approach along three dimensions: values, security, and markets. More precisely, they lay out a path: 1. to promote a human rights-focused and rules-based global technological order; 2. to secure the EU, its partners, and other like-minded countries in the analogical and digital worlds; 3. to promote fair, open, sustainable, and inclusive digital markets.

### Block – Solvency – Norms

#### The EU can shape multilateral norms, especially in emerging tech---JCPOA proves.

Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

4.2 EU Strategic Sovereignty, Partnerships and Multilateralism The case of the JCPOA provides evidence of how multilateralism is functional to European strategic sovereignty, but it is also illustrative of how the EU can effectively use its strategic partnerships, especially the one with the US, and multilateralism to mutually reinforce one another. If the E3/EU have done so on an issue of high politics over which they only have limited influence, there surely is much potential for the EU to shape multilateral norms, institutions and regimes in policy areas in which it wields more power, such as trade and regulations.53 The fact that great power competition increased as the crisis with Iran unfolded creates structural incentives for the EU, the US, the UK and other like-minded countries to seek convergence. By closing ranks with its allies, the EU increases its ability not just to resist pressure from systemic rivals such as Russia or China but also to engage them from a position of strength. Containment of Russia’s geopolitical sway in Europe, countering information warfare and protection from the political use of China’s investment policy and technology exports are structural interests around which the EU can build a renewed partnership with the US and others.

### Block – Solvency – Generic

#### EU security cooperation solves for every reason NATO fails. NATO expansion allows adversarial overreach into European markets. Flip the script on solvency deficits.

Ellehuus 21 – Rachel Ellehuus is the Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO., 7-21-2021, "NATO Futures: Three Trajectories," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories, accessed 6-20-2022 – OBERTO!

AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PARTNERS

The European Union proves a more effective actor than NATO in countering the security challenges that most concern European NATO allies (i.e., migration, terrorism, climate, and nationalism). Thanks to some European allies’ efforts to limit NATO’s role in cybersecurity and defense, building resilience, and managing emerging and disruptive technologies, the European Union has also become a viable security actor in these areas. European allies move away from hedging their security bets between NATO and the European Union to prioritizing EU defense and security arrangements outside of NATO. Perceiving the alliance’s loss of relevance even among its own members, like-minded Indo-Pacific partners disengage with NATO in favor of the European Union or select EU member states.

ADVERSARY INFLUENCE

Sensing NATO’s weakness and U.S. disengagement, China mounts a new charm offensive to secure access to European markets. Looking to boost their own struggling economies through trade with China, European countries are receptive. Russia, sensing its moment to secure sanctions relief and undercut NATO’s raison d’être, behaves more agreeably toward allies that seek a more cooperative relationship with it in order to reduce their security burden. This lulls many Europeans into a false sense of security, and they calculate that—with the United States disengaging and disinvesting from NATO—the time is ripe for a “grand bargain” with the Kremlin that involves dissolving the alliance in exchange for a new, more comprehensive security arrangement. This arrangement precipitates U.S. military withdrawal from Europe.

### Block – Solves NATO

#### Creates a stronger NATO.

FOE 21 [Friends of Europe, Peace, Security & Defence Summit 2021 — Autumn 2021. “Strategic foresight: a zero-sum game? The EU Strategic Compass and NATO 2030” <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PSD-summit.pdf> DOA: 6/24/2022 //ArchanSen]

Stronger EU = stronger NATO

Those words dovetailed with Fries’ assertation that: “By getting stronger, the EU will be a better partner for NATO. It is a mutually reinforcing partnership.”

Among the wide range of government and international officials, military commanders, private sector players and independent experts who participated in the 4.5-hour event, there was consensus that a fast-evolving range of threats showed the need for NATO and the EU to work closely together, and for Europeans to strengthen their security capabilities to the benefit of both organisations.

As the summit was taking place, that need was emphasised by the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine’s eastern border prompting fears of a new invasion, as well as the standoff on the EU’s frontier with Belarus where the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko despatched thousands of migrants from the Middle East in what Western nations have denounced as an attempt to divide the EU and destabilise the region.

“When we look at what is unfolding on the borders of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania that are faced with a brutal hybrid attack by the Lukashenko regime, every day we see that sending a sign of us being united is important but, more importantly, we also see a clear need for NATO and EU cooperation to respond effectively to the sort of crisis that we are seeing,” said Kadi Silde, Undersecretary for Defence Policy at the Estonian Ministry of Defence.

“Adversaries don’t just pick military tools or civilian tools, they pick a mix of tools and we in the West need to adapt ourselves to this sort of challenges,” she added. “Expanding and strengthening and deepening EU-NATO cooperation is the way to go.”

#### Only the CP can bolster NATO – it’s a power multiplier.

Belin 19. Celia Belin – Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe. “NATO matters, but the EU matters more,” April 2, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/02/nato-matters-but-the-eu-matters-more/

As it turns 70 this week, the Atlantic alliance has no shortage of champions in Washington, even if it lacks one in the Oval Office. Yet, the focus on NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—alone can be misleading by magnifying the importance of the defense alliance in the European project. In reality, the trans-Atlantic community has relied on two pillars: a successful defensive alliance and an even more successful project of European integration. Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later—and 16 new members later—the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans. Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group—as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations. The neighbors of the European Union are no fools. Those who seek prosperity and stability hope to join the EU club. Those who reject the model set by the West and liberal democracies feel threatened by the European Union—it is the prospect of Ukraine moving into the EU’s orbit through an Association Agreement that triggered Russia’s hostility and ultimate aggression, not NATO. The power of attraction of the European Union, at least as much as the security guarantees of NATO, has helped stabilize Eastern Europe. Despite these realities, Americans often indulge in a scornful disregard for the EU. Recently, benign contempt has taken an ugly turn. Since taking office, President Trump and his administration have attacked the European Union and individual member states repeatedly, with near impunity. At first sight, American complaints appear to be centered on the issue of Europe’s trading power, which rivals that of the United States. For Donald Trump, the EU was created to “take advantage of” the United States and it is “worse than China.” Early in his mandate, the American president pushed for tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatened to go after automobiles, until a meeting with EU Commission President Juncker put a brake on the downward spiral. However, a deeper look reveals a fundamental ideological contention: The brand of nationalism and populism that defines this administration stands in direct contradiction with the very existence of a liberal, supra-national body such as the European Union. As laid out by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Kiron Skinner in December 2018, the administration holds the view that “international institutions have steadily encroached on the rights of sovereign nations” and that “nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests”—an indictment of the EU’s very existence. The ideological clash is reminiscent of older times. Addressing a crowd in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump likened the European Union to the Soviet Union, criticizing a similar “steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people,” an equivalency popular in conservative circles. Similarly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested in a December 2018 speech in Brussels that EU bureaucrats were not really working for the interests of European citizens. By making no secret of his personal support for euroskeptic forces, Donald Trump has become an active political opponent of the European Union in its existing form. He celebrated the Brexit vote, expressed support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen ahead of the French presidential elections, disparaged Angela Merkel repeatedly, and appeared to rejoice at the Yellow Vests protest movement. He criticized Theresa May for negotiating a “soft” Brexit, and even recommended to Emmanuel Macron that France leave the EU. The American president has nominated ambassadors famously critical of the EU, and his administration demoted the EU ambassador’s status without notification, before reversing under criticism. As Donald Trump torments both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, all rush to NATO’s bedside, and few worry about the EU. Truthfully, Atlanticists love to love NATO. It stands for values, valor, unity, solidarity. NATO won the Cold War. Celebrating NATO is celebrating the military. It is much harder to love the EU, the bureaucracy, the politics, the regulations. The EU lacks democratic appeal, and its slow-moving decisionmaking process create many frustrations. Unlike in NATO, the United States sits on the sidelines, it does not control who enters, or who stays in. The EU is also an economic peer competitor, a tough trading partner, and a sovereign international actor, at times non-compliant with American demands. Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO—or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake. In a world where the strongmen are striking back, Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond.

#### EU defense cooperation is critical to NATO’s effectiveness

Garamone 17 – (Jim, “NATO Secretary General Stresses Change, European Union Integration”, US Dept of Defense, 12/20, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1401214/nato-secretary-general-stresses-change-european-union-integration/)//AK

NATO is evolving and adapting to changing times, and part of that evolution must involve the European Union, the alliance secretary general said at the French Ecole Militaire yesterday. Jens Stoltenberg told students at the illustrious university in Paris that NATO has proven its ability to evolve to face changing threats. “Our history has taught us that our ability to adapt is crucial to our success,” the secretary general said. “Again and again, faced with a changing world, the alliance has evolved.” The alliance formed to combat the Soviet Union and ensure Western Europe’s freedom and independence. It evolved when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. It evolved again with the al-Qaida attacks on 9/11, with NATO taking a lead role in Afghanistan. Three years ago, the alliance had to change again when Russia illegally annexed Crimea -- the only time since World War II that a European country has seized part of another by force. And in the Middle East, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria captured Mosul and Raqqa, and declared those cities as parts of its so-called caliphate. “As a result, NATO has to both strengthen our collective defense at home and manage crises beyond our borders,” Stoltenberg said. Deter, Defend In Europe, NATO allies “have implemented the largest reinforcement of our deterrence and defense since the Cold War,” he said. The NATO Response Force tripled to 40,000 troops, including a high-readiness force, ready to move within days. The alliance also stepped up military exercises and enhanced air policing in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. “We have deployed almost 5,000 troops in four multinational battle groups to the east of the alliance,” he said. Those battle groups are in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. And the allies are continuing to increase defense spending, he said. “NATO’s actions are defensive, proportionate and in line with our international commitments,” the secretary general said. “Our aim is not to provoke conflict, but to prevent conflict. We don’t want a new Cold War, and we don’t want a new arms race.” Russia is a neighbor and the alliance approach to Russia combines strong defense with meaningful dialogue. But Russia is only one problem that must be dealt with. “Since 9/11, NATO allies have stood together in solidarity against terrorism,” Stoltenberg said. “In Afghanistan we have transitioned from combat operations, to the training and advising of local Afghan forces. But we are now increasing the number of troops serving in our mission to 16,000 NATO soldiers in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.” The alliance is also a full partner of the global coalition to defeat ISIS. NATO assets -- such as the AWACS capability -- and NATO expertise are on display throughout Iraq, the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. NATO Stronger With EU “NATO is strengthening its collective defense and, at the same time, projecting stability in its neighborhood,” Stoltenberg said. “Both of those are more effective when NATO and the European Union work together.” Stoltenberg had one big statistic to back up his claim: About 94 percent of the EU’s population lives in a NATO member nation. Talks continue and the two alliances have made progress. “We have boosted our cooperation on cyber defense, maritime security, fighting terrorism and countering hybrid warfare, among many other things,” the secretary general said. “Neither NATO nor the European Union have all the tools to tackle the challenges alone, but together we are a formidable force for good.” He called on France, a founding member of both NATO and the EU, to play a key role to ensure the coherence of these efforts. “I am convinced a strong European defense is good for the European Union, it is good for Europe and it is good for NATO, as long as it respects three key principles,” he said. Build, Strengthen, Compliment The first is to build the necessary capabilities: spending more and spending better. That means tackling the fragmentation of the European defense industry. “The U.S. has one type of main battle tank, while Europe has 17 different types,” he said. “The U.S. has four types of frigates and destroyers; Europe has 29. The U.S. has six types of fighter planes; Europe has 20.” He does not want to eliminate competition, but he does want to see some coherence, interoperability and cost savings in the process. “Second, a stronger European defense also needs to involve non-EU allies to the fullest possible extent, of course respecting the autonomy and integrity of the European Union,” he said. Stoltenberg said nations on both sides of the Atlantic continue to be engaged in European security. “For the first time in years, the United States and Canada are increasing their military presence on our continent,” he said. “And, after Brexit, non-EU allies will account for 80 percent of NATO defense spending, and three of the four battle groups in the eastern part of the alliance will be led by non-EU allies.” There is no way the EU can replace NATO, he said, but it could strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. Finally, a stronger European defense needs to compliment, not duplicate, NATO’s own efforts. “On duplications, for instance, NATO already has a well-established defense planning process,” Stoltenberg said. “We’ve had it for decades, and as part of that process, we identify in detail the capabilities that each ally needs to deliver to ensure the alliance has the tools it needs to do its job. It would be a mistake for the EU to duplicate that process. Capitals should not be faced with two conflicting lists for capability requirements.” “We share 22 members, so to compete would be like competing with ourselves,” he continued. “That makes no sense. Our roles are distinct but mutually reinforcing. We must work together in a coherent way.”

#### They misunderstand NATO – only the CP solves.

Bennet 18 (Kirk Bennett, 7-5-18, retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer., American Interest, "NATO and European Security in the Trump Era," https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/07/05/nato-and-european-security-in-the-trump-era/, [AB])

**Much of the traditional American reserve toward European strategic autonomy has emanated from a concern that it would be EU-centric and would undermine NATO without actually creating any robust, effective EU alternative**. Judging by recent statements from some American officials, this concern persists. **It is misplaced, for a number of reasons. First, Western security simply requires a stronger European component, and the question of whether that component wears an EU or a NATO hat is tertiary.** Indeed, because of the overlap between EU and NATO membership, there is no reason it could not be dual-hatted. **It would be far better, especially for Washington, to have EU-centric security arrangements that could handle a Balkan crisis than to have an impotent NATO-centric Europe that relied completely on the United States for all hard-security measures. Second, European strategic autonomy could hardly undermine NATO more than the resentments engendered by the current imbalance in capabilities and political will. Third, if the Europeans manage to wreck NATO without creating any capable alternative, it is they, not the United States, who will bear the consequences.** Donald **Trump** seems to grasp these considerations, and for all his bluster and seeming hostility toward America’s European allies, he **is instinctively the greatest friend of European strategic autonomy ever to sit in the White House.**

**The rise of Trump prompted the intriguing idea of proclaiming Angela Merkel as the new leader of the Free World. Realistically, however, Germany’s atrophied military capabilities make such a suggestion risible. I remember some 15 years ago hearing Germany described as the Sick Man of NATO. Well, the patient hasn’t shown any improvement in the interim.** In the absence of German/European strategic autonomy, Merkel’s devotees might aspire at best to elevate her to the leadership of some postmodern fantasyland devoid of hard-security challenges. Unfortunately, the real-life Europe—with an assertive Russia, unstable borderlands, disruptive immigration, and terrorism—bears little resemblance to such a vision. Moreover, **with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, selfless German multilateralism is very much taking a back seat to German economic interests, at the cost of seriously undermining both the economy and security of Ukraine and Germany’s easternmost EU partners.** “Germany First” might not be the slogan, but at least as far as Nord Stream 2 is concerned, it is the reality.

In fact, **the Free World would be best served not by having a leader at all, but by having a partnership. It need not be a fully equal partnership with respect to every facet of security, but something must replace the current relationship of radical disproportion and dependency, which is both corrosive and unsustainable. Instead of the United States taking the lead on European security and relying on its European allies as a force multiplier, we need to see Europeans safeguarding European security and calling on the United States as a force multiplier**. We must dispense with the pernicious American conceit that Europeans cannot be trusted to manage their own security, and we must rid ourselves of the pernicious European illusion that Europeans need not be bothered to manage their own security. If Donald Trump manages to push us in this direction, he will have earned a hallowed place in Euroatlantic history.

### Block – Solvency – Diplomacy

#### The EU’s diplomatic and crisis management expertise solves better.

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While NATO is reinventing itself in the face of pressing challenges like China and climate change,58 the EU has advanced in tackling cybersecurity, regulating and exploring new technologies and developing its Indo-Pacific strategy.59 The EU’s advantages over NATO in the diplomatic and economic domains, especially when it comes to crisis management and political pressure, should be taken into account in broader discussion of NATO-EU coordination.

### Block – Solvency – Modelling

#### EU regs get modelled around the world – overcomes any deficits because all of NATO will adopt the plan, BUT not through NATO, so it avoids the DA.

The Economist 21 [The Economist, 04-24-21, "The EU wants to become the world’s super-regulator in AI", Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/24/the-eu-wants-to-become-the-worlds-super-regulator-in-ai, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Most laws are local—except in the digital realm. When the European Union comes up with some new tech regulation, it can quickly spread around the world. Global companies adopt its typically strict rules for all their products and markets in order to avoid having to comply with multiple regimes. Other governments take more than one page from the EU’s rule book to help local firms compete. The textbook example for what has been dubbed the “Brussels effect”, is the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which went into force in 2018 and swiftly became the global standard.

#### Countries follow on --- clearer EU stance on tech regs galvinzes broader support for EU leadership

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What Europe needs to do ECFR has put forward recommendations on how to address all these sources of vulnerability, from 5G and undersea cables to military AI. The EU needs to improve its data sovereignty by adopting strict regulations on data privacy and ensuring that these are exported to countries and companies that access Europeans’ data. EU member states should create an ecosystem in which smaller 5G players that focus on software and virtualisation can scale up their operations and cooperate effectively with larger European and US companies. The EU should heavily invest in exporting technologies and practices that protect democracy and help achieve technological sovereignty, and in learning from others’ experiences in this realm. But more important than these individual fixes is deeper engagement with the external implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states. Outreach to partners The EU needs a global strategy for improving its partners’ access to reliable and safe technology. Otherwise, the bloc will leave a space that others will fill. Democracies would be further weakened and impoverished. Autocracies would thrive. Europe would be wrong if it thought it could set out its own rules and standards and let the rest of the world adapt. The Brussels effect, by which Europe silently exported its data privacy regulation to the rest of the world, will not easily repeat itself. GDPR happened when technology was still under the geopolitical radar. Now, technology has been (geo)politicised and both governments and industry actors know how closely intertwined power, technology, and regulation are. Both China and the US are reaching out to third countries. The US has programmes such as The Clean Network, which aims to help its allies end their use of Chinese 5G. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative includes a digital component. And Chinese firms, with governmental support, export facial recognition and surveillance techniques to autocracies around the world. The challenge for the EU is in working with like-minded countries and multilateral bodies – such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also regional arrangements such as those in Latin America, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – to develop fair, open, and values-driven technological standards. The EU should deploy the incentive of access to its digital market to strengthen its alliances. The bloc should use its financial institutions to incentivise EU firms to invest in countries that are seeking to adopt these critical technologies but, at the same time, want to reduce their technological dependence on China. The EU should also consider establishing a comprehensive and compelling tech package that would allow it to become a geopolitical player in the area. This ‘tech compact’ should include: upgrading existing or prospective trade agreements to grant improved access to the EU digital services market to countries that comply with EU standards in areas such as data flows, privacy, and AI; offering technical assistance to governments and parliaments wishing to align with the EU on regulatory issues; offering funding guarantees for connectivity investments; coordinating positions on technical standards in multilateral organisations; and offering cyber security and democracy-protection packages. In contrast to other great powers, whose tech offers are often based on coercion and the exploitation of weakness, the EU should stand for a principled approach based on partnerships, mutual interests, consent, and solidarity. Also, as it is already doing, the EU should continue scanning its internal market for vulnerabilities in critical technological sectors, identifying high-risk vendors, and ensuring reciprocity in market access to these technologies for countries that restrict or curtail digital trade. It will not be sufficient for the EU to merely approve internal regulations in the expectation that others will accept them, such as in the case of the GDPR. For example, the bloc is already operating on bilateral agreements with like-minded countries such as Japan to implement data privacy clauses that ensure the free and safe flow of data. But this is not enough in itself. The EU should aim higher – through multilateral institutions such as the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, or through groupings such as the G20 – to establish a global data privacy regime whose standards are valid for most democracies, if not for all countries (as those ruled by authoritarian regimes may opt out). A key component of this is the transatlantic relationship. A major agreement on data privacy with the US would help break the current dynamic of regulatory fragmentation, helping both the country and the EU jointly take on China and other illiberal regimes. The importance of cooperation between the EU and its member states The European Commission and other Brussels institutions are positioning the EU as a powerful actor in the global debates about tech regulation. But not all member states appear to feel the same sense of urgency. As of today, 21 member states have now published AI policy documents in which they identify areas of focus, develop recommendations, and decide funding priorities. These strategies reveal that most EU member states primarily see AI through an economic lens. Almost all the strategies were written by or under the leadership of economics ministries (or variations thereof) or, less often, ministries of innovation. With very few exceptions – such as France – most EU countries do not engage with the challenges posed by the way that the development and use of AI might affect the international balance of power. Even fewer discuss or even mention the impact of AI on defence. If the EU moves forward on technology issues without the support of its member states, it risks losing credibility and the capability to influence others. Worse, it could leave empty spaces in Europe that external actors fill. But, if the EU and its member states work together closely on technology issues, the bloc will be strengthened – and will lead by showing that its rules and regulations, such as those on privacy or trustworthy AI, work at home. In this, the EU can benefit from member states’ diplomatic reach in various regions. It is crucial for Europe to recognise and consider the international second- and third-order effects of any actions it takes in the technological space. It needs to acknowledge that these actions have an impact on its geopolitical power. They influence the EU’s soft power as a role model, its positioning relative to other major players’ plans, and its geopolitical room for manoeuvre.

#### The EU can set global tech norms---DSA, DMA, and Denmark prove.

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Earlier this year, Denmark became one of the first countries in the world to release a tech diplomacy strategy. The strategy comes at a time when governments across the world are clashing with “Big Tech.” On the one hand, democratic governments are seeking to mitigate the threat that digital technologies pose to the fabric of their societies, as the EU’s announcement of its Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) demonstrates. On the other, authoritarian governments like Russia and China are further cracking down on tech companies and using digital surveillance tools to limit opposition voices and further cement their rule. The coming years will be critical to define global rules and norms on digital speech, surveillance, internet governance, the digital economy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), among other issues. To ensure a leading role in this effort, the United States should develop its own tech diplomacy strategy. This strategy should include the appointment of a U.S. tech ambassador at large and should be centered on close transatlantic cooperation.

The rise of TechPlomacy Recent events have demonstrated the need for a comprehensive Technology Diplomacy Strategy. From reports that several U.S. social media companies took down posts of government critics in India, to the Burmese military’s use of Facebook to incite ethnic violence, the power of digital technologies and the companies that control them is increasingly a cause for concern. The Danish government has led the field in making technology policy a core diplomatic objective. In 2017, it became the first country in the world to appoint a tech ambassador, with offices in Silicon Valley, Brussels, and Beijing — three regional hubs that are already shaping the international technology order, albeit in different ways. Unlike traditional diplomats, the ambassador’s work is not limited to one country or international organization, but on issues that connect tech hubs globally.

In its tech diplomacy strategy, Denmark outlines its efforts to achieve “a more just, democratic and safe technological future.” The strategy rests on three pillars — responsibility, democracy, and security — and charts Denmark’s priorities on issues including digital taxation and the digital economy, data privacy, social media influence operations, and cybersecurity. The call for tech ambassadors is not new. Others have pointed out that the leading tech companies possess “country-like” powers that warrant high-level diplomatic attention. And about a dozen countries have already followed Denmark’s model and appointed tech ambassadors. So far, the United States has not followed suit.

But the appointment of a U.S. tech ambassador is not an end in itself. It should be part of a comprehensive tech diplomacy strategy that provides a roadmap for how a U.S. tech ambassador would engage with tech companies and other governments to shape the global technology order according to U.S. interests and values. What should define a U.S. tech diplomacy strategy? First, the strategy should be comprehensive. It should outline the United States’ objectives on key emerging technology issues ranging from 5G, AI, cybersecurity, data protection and privacy, and digital surveillance. All of these issues are interconnected, but current U.S. government efforts to address them are too compartmentalized. For example, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues primarily deals with cybersecurity and does not address how these issues interact with AI and privacy. Similarly, the Global Engagement Center leads the government’s response to (online) disinformation but does not deal with the tech policy issues driving the spread of disinformation. The proposed, bipartisan Cyber Diplomacy Act seeks to reorganize the State Department’s cyber office and to elevate its head to the level of an ambassador. This recommendation is a good starting point, but this new post should be a U.S. tech ambassador at large who holds responsibilities that extend beyond cybersecurity, and who coordinates with other initiatives such as the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Office, launched by the Trump administration. U.S. presidents have appointed ambassadors at large for a number of issues in the past. These ambassadors are not stationed in a specific country but rather represent the U.S. government on specific issues that transcend national boundaries — there are currently ambassadors at large on global women’s issues and international religious freedom, for example. Second, a U.S. tech diplomacy strategy should focus on transatlantic cooperation. The EU is already pressing ahead to set global technology standards, including through the DSA and the DMA and its recently published AI strategy, and several EU member states, including France, have now prepared digital or technology strategies. If the United States wants to help set the global tech agenda, it should closely cooperate with the EU. A good start would be to accept the EU’s invitation to join an EU-U.S. Technology Council, where a U.S. tech ambassador would take a leading role. Close cooperation with the EU would also ensure that standards for the use of emerging technologies are grounded in democratic, rather than authoritarian values.

### Block – Solvency – AI – Generic

#### EU MUST lead on AI

Boulanin et al ’20 – Vincent, Senior Researcher leading SIPRI’s research on emerging military and security technologies., Netta Goussac, Associate Senior Researcher within the Armament and Disarmament research area with particular expertise in legal frameworks related to the development, acquisition and transfer of weapons., Laura Bruun, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies., Luke Richards, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies.,(“ RESPONSIBLE MILITARY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Can the European Union Lead the Way in Developing Best Practice?”, 11/20, pg.3-4, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/responsible_military_use_of_artificial_intelligence.pdf>) – sel

II. Strategic autonomy, interoperability and more effective collaboration at the European Union level

**There are** also **very practical reasons for a more substantial intra-European conversation about responsible military use of AI**, mainly **internal to the** economic **and** military **future of the EU**. These **relate to the EU’s** ambition **regarding its strategic autonomy**, the **interoperability of EU armed forces** and the **progress of European research and industrial collaboration**. The **notion of** **strategic autonomy in Europe** has **recently gained greater salience** with**in European political discourse**, **due to increased global instability and** geopolitical **tensions, and the idea that Europe can no longer rely on global institutions and partners** as it has done in the past.13 Yet the concept remains vague and contested within Europe.14 It **rests on the perceived need for the EU to protect and develop its** technological, industrial, defence and economic interests.15 **Access to tech**nology **is one central aspect of the debate around Europe’s desire to gain strategic autonomy**, **and the** development of AI **can fall within this**.16 A **coherent EU position around** the **responsible use and development of AI for use within the military** could **feed into** this **wider debate.** Historically, the competence of the EU institutions on defence has been limited, but now the EU and its member states are committed to fostering greater cooperation between its member states in this area.17 In 2016 the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, known as the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) was released and EU members states’ **commitment to work together on defence** matters **has increased alongside an evolving EU common security and defence policy**.18 **EU member states have increased cooperation in a range of measures, from the creation of the EDA in 2004 to the activation of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in 2016.** **Given the EU’s competencies much of the work is led by member states rather than the European Commission or other EU institutions.**19 Such **cooperation allows member states to** coordinate **their views on** capability development needs**,** prevent duplication **and** reduce the cost of European **intellectual and industrial** investments **related to defence innovation and work on projects that will foster greater interoperability between EU armed forces.** **AI already plays a role—and is bound to play an even larger one in the future, as it is considered a** key domain—in projects conducted by the EDA and PESCO.20 Alongside this, the newly established EDF, under the responsibility of the European Commission, will look to bolster European defence research and industrial projects.21 **EU guidelines about** what constitutes **responsible military use of AI** could **aid the AI-related**

### Block – Solvency – AI regulation

#### The EU has the capacity and motivation to get ahead on AI regulation --- EU regulation is critical to ensuring fail-safe mechanisms that prevent unpredictable AI

Boulanin et al ’20 – Vincent, Senior Researcher leading SIPRI’s research on emerging military and security technologies., Netta Goussac, Associate Senior Researcher within the Armament and Disarmament research area with particular expertise in legal frameworks related to the development, acquisition and transfer of weapons., Laura Bruun, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies., Luke Richards, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies.,(“ RESPONSIBLE MILITARY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Can the European Union Lead the Way in Developing Best Practice?”, 11/20, pg.13-16, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/responsible_military_use_of_artificial_intelligence.pdf>) – sel

Ethical acceptability: Defining shared principles for human-centric artificial intelligence in the military

Human agency as a central issue in responsible military use of artificial intelligence

AI raises many different ethical issues that are relevant in both the civilian and military sectors. These issues range from how data serving the development and training of AI systems is sourced, used and protected, to the biases and assumptions that appear in AI programming, to the potentially dehumanizing effect of reducing the real world to data points, to the consequences of non-transparent or inexplicable decision making for accountability and responsibility.50 Many of these issues feed into a higher-level discussion on how AI is challenging human agency. In this regard, the EU member states seem to already agree on the fundamental premise that human agency—be it in the civilian or military sector—is necessary for responsible use of AI. Finland is one EU member state that has given this issue a lot of thought. In its submission to the GGE on LAWS 2020 it stated, for example, that ‘the easier an advanced technology is to apply, the easier it will be to use it for harmful purposes. In the future, we might well see armed autonomous civilian capabilities used for military purposes’, arguing for the necessity of establishing a framework for human involvement.51 AI should remain a tool for humans to make decisions, and it should not strip humans of their obligation and ability to do so. That principle is a cornerstone of the strategy of the European Commission on ‘human-centric AI’.52 Members of the European Parliament also agreed in 2018 that the litmus test for determining if an autonomous weapon would be acceptable is whether it remains under ‘meaningful human control’.53 In the context of the GGE’s debate on LAWS, EU members states also supported the adoption of the guiding principle which states that ‘human responsibility for the decision on the use of force must be retained’ (see box 2.1).54 Many of the EU states have made the concept of human control a pivotal point of their national position in the debate on LAWS, such as Germany that has stated for instance that ‘no weapons system may, on the strength of its algorithms, entail the risk of overriding a human de-activation command’ (see figure 3.3).55 While EU members agree that meaningful human control should be maintained throughout the entire life cycle of the weapon, the question of how human agency needs to be exercised in practice, however, remains unresolved.56 While some proposals have been made in the context of the discussion of GGE on LAWS, they are limited in scope as they do not have the intent to guide other possible military uses of AI, from logistic and maintenance to mission planning, training and recruitment of personnel.57 The general principles and recommendations laid out by the AI HLEG could, in this regard, provide a useful baseline to think about how human-centred AI could look like in the military sector, beyond the sole case of LAWS. EU member states would have a lot to gain from engaging in an intra-European expert discussion on human control. First, on the issue of legal compliance for example, it would allow them to discuss, deepen, align or, at least, remove the potential for conflict in their reflections on the case of LAWS. Second, it would allow them to find a clear direction and to determine their limits in developing collaborative defence acquisition projects. Fostering intra-European discussion on human-centred artificial intelligence in the military Deliberations on human-centred AI in the military could take place in different forums at the same time. The choice of forum should be guided by concrete political aims. The Council of the EU already has a number of preparatory bodies that would allow delegates from member states to coordinate their views on human control in relation to discussion on LAWS at the UN in Geneva, namely, CONOP, CODUN and EUMCWG. The regular meeting of these bodies provides an opportunity for the EU External Action Service to identify the current common position of EU member states on this issue. The meetings, however, are meant to cover a wide range of topics every time, which limit the possibility for states to discuss topics at a very granular level. It could be meaningful in that regard to organize a series of extra meetings specifically dedicated to the issue of human control. When it comes to developing more general political guidelines or technical standards for the development of joint defence acquisition or capability development projects involving AI, then the EDA and the European Commission could both play a role. EU member states could task the EDA to coordinate an expert reflection on human-centred AI for defence, which would require technical, military and arms control experts. Such an initiative would need to connect with both the work on human-centred AI in the civilian sector and with the discussion on human control within arms control forums. The European Commission could utilize the EDF to support multidisciplinary research projects that would explore issues around human control at a more technical level and feed into the development of AI systems that can be deployed responsibly It would also be valuable if EU member states could engage in the issue at a higher political level and grapple with more fundamental ethical and political issues. Such a discussion could take place in the context of an ad hoc expert group of the European Parliament and directly at the level of the ministers of foreign affairs and defence and the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the European Council.

#### NATO not the only actor in AI governance --- EU can act

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ‘22

(Zoe Stanley-Lockman was previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and contributed to this chapter in a personal capacity. Lena Trabucco is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Both authors contributed equally to this chapter, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” pg online @ <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69> //um-ef)

To be sure, NATO is far from the only institution that impacts military AI governance and its security implications. Indeed, international technology governance is inherently complex because it includes diverse stakeholders in a system of “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” with a shared interest and responsibility in a given issue-area of world politics.9 Existing discussions of the impact of AI on international security have looked to nation-states, regional institutions like the European Union (EU), or international bodies like the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) for discussions on the military governance of AI.10 Without expanding on the role of these other stakeholders, this chapter begins to explore pressing questions for NATO and international relations scholars that illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance, which has not had a comprehensive analysis.11

### Block – Solvency – Ethical AI

#### EU can coordinate AI.

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European Union: The European Union, like the United States, intends to leverage AI’s potential as a strategic and transformative technology.17 However, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in trustworthy, human-centric, ethical, and values-based AI,18 in comparison to the US government’s emphasis on the need for AI innovation to protect American values, civil liberties, and privacy. The EU recognizes that it trails behind the US and China in terms of volume of investment and maturity of its tech industry.19 Nonetheless, the EU believes it can capitalize on its underlying structural strengths (e.g., academic and innovation record) and on its values to compete globally and reaffirm its digital and technological sovereignty.20 Starting with its 2018 Communication: Artificial Intelligence for Europe,21, 22 the European Commission (EC) has launched a coordinated effort promoting AI.23 Policies include increasing public and private investments from $5.6 billion to $22 billion annually;24 coordinating research and innovation across Europe; devising ethical guidelines; fostering digital skills in its workforce; and promoting public and private sector adoption of AI.25 To support and counsel these efforts, the EC has established the High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG) comprising 52 experts who advise the Commission on policy and regulatory changes.

### Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

#### The EU has a solid structure to set norms on cybersecurity and disinformation.

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Sharpened cooperation on disinformation and cyber The countering of disinformation is one key area where the European Union offers added value to international security. Since 2014 — and particularly following the disinformation operations carried out by Russia-sponsored media during the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections in 2016 as well as the French presidential elections in 2017 — the EU has set up a solid structure to monitor, detect, and counter disinformation. The EU was the first to establish a dedicated task force, the EU StratCom, within the European External Action Service (EEAS) to combat disinformation in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Subsequently, the European Commission established ground rules for online platforms and the advertising and social media industries, including a Code of Practice on Disinformation and guidelines on accountability obligations.60 The EU also has set up important monitoring activities, such as the Digital Media Observatory and the COVID-19 monitoring and reporting program, to function as a European hub for fact-checkers. A crucial part of these efforts is included in the Action Plan Against Disinformation that sets up a Rapid Alert System to facilitate information sharing and a unified response across the European institutions.61 Compared to the EU, NATO’s approach to combatting disinformation is less robust and limited in scope. NATO has set up tracking and monitoring activities — which offer fact-checking findings and counternarratives, including in the Russian language — but it has mostly relied on its Public Diplomacy Division which only monitors NATO-related material. For example, during the first few months after the outbreak of COVID-19, the division set up a section on its website called “NATO-Russia: Setting the record straight”; the website addresses the top five myths circulated by Russian propaganda regarding NATO’s connection with and reaction to the spread of COVID-19.62 Also established by NATO — but operationally independent — the StratCom Center of Excellence (COE) in Riga, Latvia brings together civilian and military stakeholders to conduct research on the use of modern technologies and to develop virtual tools for analyses, research, and decisionmaking. Hence, the center has produced valuable material for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. In addition, the StratCom COE has worked with the EEAS StratCom task force to train EU staff on how to respond to simulated disinformation attacks and responses. More recently, in 2019, the EU and NATO started exchanging information through the inclusion of NATO’s international staff in the EU Rapid Alert System, as well as through dialogues, staff and information exchanges and training exercises, including briefings between the EEAS StratCom and NATO Public Diplomacy Division.63 These are important efforts that highlight NATO and the EU’s openness to dialogue and mutual learning experiences. But they are nowhere near enough to keep up with the network of disinformation, where techniques are rapidly evolving and taking advantage of artificial intelligence. While China and Russia are reinforcing each other’s narratives through multiple channels, the effects of malign foreign influence in the disinformation domain are now being compounded by homegrown disinformation networks using the same pattern of exploiting people’s fear and vulnerability. Evidence of this occurring includes the spread of anti-vaccination propaganda as well as antidemocratic propaganda (which helped spur the assault on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021).64 Given the growing vulnerabilities in the trans-Atlantic space, NATO and the EU should join forces and expand their activity from countering disinformation to a preventing effort. The EU can add value in increasing the involvement of the private sector, and NATO can add value in using its intelligence capabilities in the counterterrorism domain to identify troll factories and disinformation sources. More broadly on cyber, despite advancements in their own jurisdictions, the paths of NATO and the EU have not crossed much yet. The two organizations have a different approach to cyber issues: While the EU aims to develop resilience against cyber threats, NATO has a broader and forward-looking approach that aims to prevent cyberattacks and to use cyber as an offensive tool to tackle threats and create deterrence.65 For example, the EU is seeking to strengthen its cyber posture through an EU Cybersecurity Strategy. The first piece of corresponding legislation, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (EU 2016/1148), established substantial cybersecurity standards that member states must adopt to protect critical sectors.66 Meanwhile, in its latest summit communiqué, NATO stated that “a decision as to when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis,” thus highlighting the increased awareness of the security implication of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.67 Despite their different approaches, both NATO and the EU included cyber in their 2016 cooperation frameworks and started a series of joint exercises between the EU’s 2017 Parallel and Coordinated Exercise and NATO’s 2017 Crisis Management Exercise, as well as more recent exercises like those conducted through the CYBERSEC 2019 forum.68 However, while incredibly valuable, such exercises have not gone much beyond staffto-staff interactions and joint workshops. Understandably, cybersecurity cooperation implies a significant amount of intelligence sharing, which is ultimately impeded by a lack of trust stemming from political tensions and by the national security concerns of individual member states. In addition to establishing a more substantial channel for intelligence sharing to immediately warn allies about a cyberattack and prevent domino effects, other smaller steps could help increase cooperation and strengthen resilience in the trans-Atlantic space. For instance, the establishment of common standards related to threat and resilience capabilities could, in the event of a cyberattack, facilitate talks between allies and improve the interoperability of infrastructure. Within the United Nations, there are already two working groups trying to advance international legislation and standards covering the cybersecurity space.69 In line with these efforts, NATO and the EU could adopt similar standards that also help integrate and reinforce their complementary cybersecurity strategies. In particular, NATO could look at the existing EU regulatory framework and adopt similar strategies and resilience practices across the alliance, and the EU could benefit from NATO’s vast military experience and capabilities that are relevant to the cyber domain in order to bolster the security aspect of the EU’s cybersecurity strategy.

### Block – Solvency – AI Logistics

#### The EU needs to establish a clear framework to support AI logistics

Franke ’20 – Ulrike, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London, where she works on emerging technologies in warfare.,(“Europe needs a plan for AI in the military realm”, 2/20, <https://www.the-security-times.com/europe-needs-plan-ai-military-realm/>) – sel

In Europe, 2019 was the year of artificial intelligence (AI). Governments put together expert groups, organized public debates and published national strategies designed to grapple with the possible implications of AI in areas such as health care, the labor market and transportation. European countries developed training programs, allocated investment and made plans for research cooperation. In 2020, the challenge for governments will be to show that they can fulfill their promises by translating ideas into effective policies. But despite attempts to coordinate these efforts – most notably that of the European Commission, which called upon member states to maximize cooperation through the publication of AI strategies – there is one AI-relevant area in which Europe lacks coherence, and which generally receives too little attention. In fact, an analysis of official documents from various European countries suggests fundamental differences that may be difficult to bridge. This area is the use of AI in the military realm. Despite a marked growth of work on the economic and societal consequences of the increasing use of AI in various areas of life, the use of AI in the military is largely absent from the public discourse in most European countries. In Germany in particular, officials seem uncomfortable discussing the subject, unless the focus is on whether and how to ban “killer robots,” or AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In other countries – most notably France, but also the UK – there is more expert work on the topic, but this does not translate into a broader societal debate. Similarly, the academic discourse on AI in the military focuses on developments in the United States and China, and tends to overlook Europe. This neglect is not helpful. It means that little information is available about European thinking on AI in the military, and that there is scant discussion of how European armed forces plan to use AI. Yet the fact remains that European companies are already developing AI-enabled military systems. It would be a bad idea for Europe to try to sit this development out – or to approach it with an exclusively national focus. While no one can predict exactly how revolutionary it will be, AI is likely to have a considerable impact on how militaries operate, and on how wars are waged. As Europeans discuss plans for strategic sovereignty – both in the military and in the technology sector – military AI, which is relevant to both areas, deserves more attention. One of the problems of the European, particularly German, debate on AI-enabled military systems is the focus on LAWS. These systems can carry out the critical functions of a targeting cycle in a military operation, including the selection and engagement of targets, without human intervention. The potential use of LAWS comes with a range of legal, ethical and political problems that are rightly being discussed in the United Nations. But while concern over LAWS, and work toward regulating them, is to be praised, European policymakers should not forget that military AI goes beyond killer robots. AI is, for example, famously good at working with big data to identify and categorize images and texts. In a military context, AI can help sift through massive amounts of video footage, such as feeds recorded by drones. Or it can examine photographs to single out changes from one picture to the next – a useful function to indicate the presence of an explosive device hidden in the time between the photos were taken. Other intelligence-relevant AI applications include image and face recognition, translation, image geolocation and more. AI can also support military logistics through predictive maintenance based on the analysis of various sensory inputs. AI-enabled weapons are also likely to be deployed in cyberspace where it allows actors to both find and patch up cyber vulnerabilities. Due to cyberspace’s relative lack of physical limitations, and given that fewer organizational changes are required for it, AI-enabled weapons could be introduced comparatively quickly into the cyber realm. In many areas, AI can make processes faster, more efficient and cheaper. Such efficiency gains are important, especially for cash-strapped militaries. But technologies are truly groundbreaking only if they provide new capabilities or allow for tactics that go beyond what already exists. Artificial intelligence might be able to provide this in the areas of swarming and autonomous vehicles – including, but not limited to, LAWS. Swarming refers to the combination of many systems – such as drones, unmanned boats or tanks – that can act independently but in a coordinated manner. Military swarms could provide new capabilities, such as flying sensor networks, flying minefields or coordinated and automated waves of attacks that deny the enemy a massed formation to fight. Given these extensive areas of application and, judging from past efforts to predict the impact of technologies, there is a good chance the most important changes to warfare caused by AI are not featured in the list above, Europe cannot afford to disregard these developments. Of the big three European states – Germany, France and the UK – France has shown the most interest in military AI. Defense was designated as a priority AI sector for industrial policy in the French 2018 national AI strategy. In 2019, France became the first European state to publish a military AI strategy. The country’s approach to AI is clearly geopolitical and driven by concerns over Europe and France becoming tech colonies of the United States and China. The UK has published neither an overarching national nor a military AI strategy, but a range of documents, most notably from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), and the Defence Ministry’s in-house think-tank, DCDC. However, these publications appear to primarily target the expert community. Among the big three, Germany is the outlier. In its 2018 national AI strategy, the military, security and geopolitical elements of AI are notably absent. Defense is mentioned only in one sentence, which implicitly shifts all responsibility for this area to the ministry of defense. As this ministry traditionally publishes few doctrinal or strategy documents, it is unlikely that a German military AI strategy will see the light of day. More importantly, the German political realm, spearheaded by the foreign ministry, seems to have taken the decision to deal with military AI primarily from an arms control angle. As a consequence, the German expert community focuses mostly on AI arms control and disarmament. Given the extent to which this angle dominates the debate, and how different it is from the French approach, it poses questions for joint French-German projects like the new Future Combat Air System fighter jet, which will rely heavily on AI elements. Given the changes expected to be caused by AI in the military realm and given the level of attention paid to the issue in other countries – most notably the US, China and Russia – as well as European yearnings for strategic sovereignty, Europeans should pay closer attention to military AI. It is counterproductive to let valid concerns about LAWS marginalize the debate on all military AI.

#### Don’t need NATO --- existing alliances can access

Konaev and Chahal ‘21

(Margarita Konaev Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst, Husanjot Chahal, “The Path of Least Resistance,” pg online @ <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf> //um-ef)

While there are notable technical, bureaucratic, and political barriers to multinational cooperation in AI, especially for military purposes, AI applications for logistics and sustainment represent both a promising and critical area for collaboration between the United States and its allies. There are many ways allies can work together in this space, including by developing joint standards for data sharing, investing in collaborative R&D programs, advancing multinational public-private partnerships, and integrating AIenabled logistics and sustainment technologies into joint military exercises. Depending on allies’ interests and capabilities, these efforts can take place within existing alliances, on a bilateral basis, or through a new and separate consortium dedicated specifically to cooperation on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies. Working together with allies on this set of AI technologies will help advance shared security interests, promote interoperability, and ultimately, pave the path toward the ethical and responsible use of AI in military systems and missions

### Block – Solvency – Ethical AI

#### EU guidelines on AI regulation maximize ethical guidance and competition

Smuha ’19 – Natalie A., Legal scholar and philosopher at the KU Leuven Faculty of Law, where she examines legal, ethical and philosophical questions around Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies., (“The EU Approach to Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence”, Computer Law Review International Vol. 20; iss. 4; pp. 97 – 106.) – sel

1. The Revival of AI Ethics It is becoming ever more clear that, contrary to the hope some may hold, AI systems are not a miracle solution to all our problems. Rather, much like any type of technology, they represent a double-edged sword that can be used both in a beneficial and in a harming way. To offer but a few examples; AI systems can be used to help us achieving more objective decisionmaking, yet they can also perpetuate and even exacerbate unfair biases. AI systems can be used to offer us more personalised and qualitative services, yet they can also hamper our decisional autonomy. And while AI systems can be used to enhance our security, they can also be deployed as a means of illegitimate surveillance and stifle our freedom. The multifaceted impact that AI systems (along with other modern ICTs) have on our lives – which is not only ethical, but also legal, social, economical, political, cultural and psychological in nature – enables those systems to shift more than one paradigm in our society. The transformative force they exert on the world may not be as brisk and theatrical as some movies portray, but is rather expected to generate changes in more slow and subtle ways, which nevertheless have the potential to alter our habits, processes and lives profoundly. Governments and policy-makers around the world are starting to wake up to these important concerns. Besides adopting national strategies to boost the development and uptake of AI systems to reap their benefits, they are also assessing the technology’s potentially harmful impact and exploring which policy measures are best suited to address it. This occurs not only at national, but also at European level. Indeed, given that the concerns raised by AI do not stop at national borders, coordinated action is needed to tackle them. 2. Europe’s Response In April 2018, following an invitation by the European Council to put forward a European approach to AI5 , the European Commission presented its strategy for AI in the Commission Communication “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”.6 The strategy evolves around three pillars, aiming to tackle AI’s challenges and opportunities through a holistic approach: (1) boosting investments in AI, (2) preparing for socio-economic changes and (3) ensuring an adequate ethical and legal framework. At the same time, the strategy emphasised the need for coordination with Member States, so as to leverage joint efforts and maximise the impact of individual states’ action. This resulted in the adoption of a second Communication in December 2018, containing a Coordinated Plan on AI that sets out around 70 actions that Member States and the Commission have committed to undertake in order to implement the European strategy. 7 To ensure continuity of action, the Plan will be updated on an annual basis. Both of the Commission’s Communications stressed the need to assess the adequacy of existing legal rules to protect individuals from potential adverse effects of AI systems, and to establish ethical guidance to ensure that the development, deployment and use of AI systems do not occur at the expense of fundamental rights and European values. It is against this background that in June 2018 the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) was established. Bearing in mind the holistic approach of the European strategy, the AI HLEG was tasked with the preparation of two deliverables: (1) AI Ethics Guidelines and (2) AI Policy and Investment Recommendations.8 The documents are meant to complement each other. While the Guidelines provide guidance to AI practitioners9 on how they can bring their AI systems in line with ethical principles (on top of any legal obligations they already have), the Recommendations are addressed to European institutions and Member States, offering them advice on which policy measures to adopt in order to ensure Europe’s competitiveness in AI as well as an adequate regulatory framework, beyond ethical guidance. On 8 April 2019, the AI HLEG published its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. On the same day, the Commission adopted its third Communication on AI within a year, in which it welcomed the work of the AI HLEG and expressed its support for the ethical framework it put forward. 10 This paper focuses on the creation of the AI HLEG “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI”, starting with a contextualisation of their aim and purpose (II). Next, some insights on their drafting process are provided, which spanned not only expert group deliberations, but also over 500 comments received through an open consultation (III). Particular attention is devoted to the questions on the respective role played by ethics and law (IV.), and to the challenges that had to be overcome throughout the drafting process (V). Subsequently, the Guidelines’ next steps are set out (VI), and their relevance against a background of international AI policy-making is examined (VII). Finally, some concluding remarks are offered (VIII).

### Block – Solvency – OCOs

#### It solves – empirics proves.

ECA 19 [European Court of Auditors, March 2019. “Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy. A briefing paper.” <https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/BRP_CYBERSECURITY/BRP_CYBERSECURITY_EN.pdf> DOA:6/24/2022, //ArchanSen]

In recent years, as cyberspace has become increasingly militarized 22 and weaponized 23, it has come to be seen as the fifth domain of warfare 24. Cyber defence shields cyberspace systems, networks and critical infrastructure against attack by military and other means. A Cyber Defence Policy Framework was adopted in 2014 and updated in 2018 25. The 2018 updates identifies six priorities, including the development of cyber defence capabilities, as well as the protection of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) communication and information networks. Cyber defence also forms part of the Permanent Structured Cooperation Framework (PESCO) and EU-NATO cooperation.

### Block – Solvency – A2: GMOs hurt cred

#### GMOs ban provides opportunity to cooperate, AND proves NATO says yes.

Giddings 22, L. Val Giddings is a senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Giddings joined ITIF after nearly three decades of experience in science and regulatory policy relating to biotechnology innovations in agriculture and biomedicine. He works with ITIF to bring intellectual leadership to the examination of the constraints inhibiting innovations in these areas and devising remedies to those constraints., (Val, “Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective”, Information Technology and Innovation Forum, March 11, https://itif.org/publications/2022/03/11/prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-biotech-policy-us-perspective/) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone.

### Block – Solvency – A2: Overlap Deficit

\*also a solvency advocate for coop between EU and NATO

#### No impact to overlap and the plan links too.

Bergmann et. al. 21, \*Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focused on Europe, Russia, and U.S. security cooperation. \*\* James Lamond is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Previously, he was the Managing Director of the Moscow Project and a Resident Fellow at the Center for American Progress (CAP), where he covered trans-Atlantic relations, the European Union, U.S.-Russia relations, and countering malign foreign interference. Lamond previously served as the Director of Research and Policy at the National Security Network, where he led a team of analysts examining a wide range of national security and foreign policy issues. \*\*\* Siena Cicarelli is a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at American Progress. Prior to joining American Progress, she worked for the National Democratic Institute on their Central and Eastern Europe team, where she focused on strengthening political parties in the Western Balkans. She previously interned at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of European Affairs., (Max, James Lamond, and Siena Cicarelli, “The Case for EU Defense: A New Way Forward for Trans-Atlantic Security Relations”, Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Yet U.S. policy has consistently opposed EU defense efforts since the late 1990s, arguing that EU defense efforts would undermine NATO. State Department officials’ oft-repeated claim, virtually unchanged over the past three decades, is that an EU defense structure would “duplicate” NATO, making the treaty organization obsolete. Democratic and Republican administrations have repeated the mantra “no duplication” so often that it has become U.S. policy doctrine.5 But rarely, if ever, is the concern about possible duplication actually unpacked and assessed.

This report rejects the notion that NATO and EU defense are incompatible and at odds. Supporting EU defense does not mean choosing the EU over NATO. This is a false choice and a faulty premise. The EU and NATO are not opposing organizations. They are, in fact, fundamentally tethered. Implicit in U.S. opposition is a fear of a powerful EU that could supplant NATO and become a thorn in America’s side. But the EU is not divorced from the 21 NATO member states that make up the EU. If the EU and United States became rivals, then NATO would itself be obsolete, as it would be divided against itself. Such fanciful scenarios would not be the result of the EU developing a defense capacity but the result of a massive diplomatic breakdown. Such a breakdown is highly unlikely, and U.S. foreign policy should be doing everything possible to avoid this scenario.

As this report argues, the EU could significantly strengthen NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Integrating European forces, acquiring key capabilities, rationalizing and harmonizing the sprawling EU defense sector, and investing in cutting-edge research are some of the areas where the EU could play a critical role. As the EU develops its own defense capabilities, there would inevitably be some institutional overlap and duplication with NATO, just as there is with any other national military. But even if the EU’s defense efforts were to create some overlap and institutional friction, this would be a rather small bureaucratic concern—one that could easily be addressed by better EU-NATO coordination. Yet the bureaucratic worry over duplication has been elevated to such an extent that it has become untethered from its actual significance, which is quite minor. Instead of fretting over bureaucratic trivia, the United States and NATO should focus on incorporating the EU defense effort into NATO and embedding the EU in the Atlantic framework.

### Block – Solvency – A2: Trade Impact Turn

\*also a solvency advocate for defense integration

#### No trade relations link---EU-US defense integration and strengthened defense market check.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards.

## EU Leadership INB

### Block – A/O – NoKo

#### EU leadership prevents a North Korean arms race and escalation.

Boris Toucas 17, Visiting Fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “North Korea: The European Union Could Help Break the Diplomatic Stalemate”, Beyond Parallel – CSIS Blog, 1/5/2017, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-the-european-union-could-help-break-the-diplomatic-stalemate/

North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear and missile programs remains one of the most significant challenges to the international community. This is why the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that closes an important sanctions loophole and imposes closer scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic activities sends a strong, if late, message of unity and international resolve. But what comes next? There are a variety of options: Diplomatic normalization? This could trigger a regional arms race. Military intervention? This could plunge Northeast Asia into chaos. Unfortunately, prospects for negotiations are bleak, and unofficial discussions between North Korea and the United States are unlikely to succeed as in previous rounds.

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. —Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950

I recently argued that North Korea isn’t the only actor responsible for the international community’s fatigue in addressing a dangerous security dilemma. In fact, the Six-Party Talks–only framework may have undermined prospects for exploring other types of negotiations when these talks failed. Such a situation is counterproductive as it convinces North Korea to continue its destructive behavior to achieve a new outcome. By contrast, introducing more actors into the talks could potentially reduce tensions between the main parties and could help Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo reframe the discussion. Mongolia, Singapore, Malaysia or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could be potential participants, but what about the European Union and its member states? While the European Union will never be the main actor in resolving the North Korean crisis, there is an argument for Europe’s increased participation in the debate.

The European Union’s Potential Added-value on North Korea

The European Union’s multiple-layered diplomatic approach represents a unique tool for placing pressure on troublesome countries: besides members states’ bilateral channels, the European Union is also a vehicle aimed at undertaking coordinated action once political consensus has emerged. Twenty-six out of twenty-eight EU members maintain diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), six of which have diplomatic offices in Pyongyang (France only has a humanitarian and cultural office). These bilateral ties are diverse, with some dating back to the Cold War. They are of crucial importance to the North Korean regime, as part of its narrative on legitimacy and its appetite for international recognition, which may be attractive to them. Washington would certainly benefit from having the European Union and its members more proactively using their own diplomatic influence on the regime and its clients.

Furthermore, EU expertise in proliferation crises is often underrated. The European Union was a party to the negotiations with Iran, as was France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Most member states actively take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), intercepting illicit trade flows across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the European Union has implemented one of the most comprehensive restrictive measures regimes against North Korea, which has evolved into a comprehensive strategy directly targeting the civil and military proliferation chain, as well as strategic economic sectors. Finally, the 2016 decision to put an end to hosting the DPRK’s overseas workers also represents a laudable attempt to tackle financial flows that indirectly support proliferation activities, which sets a precedent for the activities of Russia, China, and several of North Korea’s clients in Africa and the Middle East. However, outreach among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union on these practices has been limited so far, preventing full harmonization of national policies among the like-minded.

As an external actor to the region, the European Union could play a particular role in unlocking negotiations. First, it has a better record on implementing restrictive measures than, for example, some potential new Asian players, whose stance is more ambiguous. Second, it is a bureaucratic machine that has the unique capacity to build consensus among partners even when their interests are at odds. Paradoxically, the ability to observe North Korea from afar might give the European Union an advantage over the participants of the Six-Party Talks where the six countries have different vital interests at stake. In this regard, the European Union is detached just enough to dare to make innovative proposals.

#### Nuclear war

Timothy Graves 17, Master’s Degree in Creative Writing from Birkbeck, University of London, “Is The World On The Brink Of Nuclear Armageddon?”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/timothy-graves/nuclear-armageddon\_b\_14789678.html

Since Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration last month, sales of dystopian fiction have soared. Novels that have flown off the shelf, or recently made it into Amazon’s top ten best-selling books chart, include George Orwell’s 1984, Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale and Huxley’s Brave New World. The resurgent interest in fiction that depicts a bleak totalitarian and authoritarian society reflects the fact that we are now living in a much more volatile and dangerous world. I do not think it is scaremongering to say that in recent years humanity has faced a number of catastrophic or even existential threats. From climate change and the rise in international terrorism to the prevalence of biological and chemical weapons, our capacity for warfare and destruction, and what the poet Robert Burns called ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, is self-evident.

But I believe the most pressing and immediate threat is that posed by the arsenals of nuclear weapons that have been stockpiled by the nuclear-armed states of the world who take false refuge in the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (MAD). In light of President Trump’s comments about nuclear weapons, last month atomic scientists in Chicago moved the hands on the Doomsday Clock to the closest it has been to midnight for sixty four years. Midnight represents global nuclear war.

With the ushering in of what some are already calling The New World Order, there are currently several flashpoints across the globe which could trigger a nuclear war. With a realignment in U.S.-Russian relations and Trump’s commitment to NATO in question, if Putin were to invade one or more of the Baltic States the situation could easily escalate and potentially trigger a nuclear strike. Russia itself is preparing for nuclear conflict. In October last year, the Russian government launched a nationwide nuclear training exercise with forty million people. It also unveiled Russia’s latest ‘super-nuke’, aptly dubbed ‘Satan 2’, which has the power to wipe out most of Britain, Northern France, the Netherlands and Belgium in a single strike. This month Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian air force to prepare for a ‘time of war’.

Other potential geo-political flashpoints include North Korea and the Pakistan/Indian dispute over Kashmir. A few days ago, in violation of United Nations resolutions, North Korea successfully test-fired a new type of medium to long-range ballistic missile. Kim-Jong-Un, supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, has warned the West that he will soon have nuclear weapons capable of targeting the U.S. Whether this is true or not, it seems highly likely that North Korea already has the capacity to put a nuclear warhead on a medium range missile which would be in easy striking distance of South Korea or Japan. This, in turn, increases the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.

### Block – A/O – Democracy

#### Democracy is collapsing now – EU tech leadership solves.

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

The future of the EU also depends on its capacity to sustain democracy and democratic institutions, both at home and abroad. However, for 15 consecutive years, democracy has been in decline around the world, both in the number and in the quality of democracies. Coincident with this decline, both born-again and long-standing authoritarian regimes are growing stronger and more challenging. Misuse of digital technologies has contributed to these trends. This not only serves to undermine democracies by fuelling political polarisation and providing the tools for foreign influence operations, but it also helps authoritarian governments cement their grip on their citizens. Countering these trends is not only a moral necessity for the EU but also essential to securing its global interests.

The vision behind EU digital policy should thus be to secure and promote both its economic power base and its political model, at home and globally. To achieve this vision, the EU needs to act strategically. Acting strategically means that in designing its means and ends, the union needs to understand what other countries and powers are doing and how it plans to compete and cooperate with them. China and Russia have started a process of decoupling from the West, to which they seek to attract other countries. The rules-based order is being replaced by a power-based order. Geoeconomics (or sheer mercantilism) is back. States are using economic and technological interdependencies to impose their views and secure their geopolitical interests. It is a new world order – and in that world, technology becomes a key element of power, sovereignty, and survival.

To secure its interests, values, and global standing, the EU should embed its open-market and human-centric approach to technology in its alliances, partnerships, and the multilateral organisations to which it belongs. In a world where technology is disputed and weaponised, the more technologically sovereign like-minded countries are, the more the EU’s own sovereignty and its global geo-technology standing are assured; the more allies are protected against foreign influence operations, cyberattacks, and coercion derived from technological vulnerabilities, the more alignment and cooperation with the EU at the global level will be facilitated. The EU should therefore aim not at technological independence but at mutually reinforced and shared technological sovereignty with its allies.

### Block – A/O – China Tech

#### **EU tech autonomy is key to check back against Chinese tech supremacy.**

Larsen 20 (Henrik B. L. Larsen, PhD and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, “Europe’s Awakening to China’s Tech Dominance,“ Harvard International Review, October 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/europe-awakening-china-tech-dominance/)//JRD

The **EU** must be a **tech** **superpower** in its own right with a far larger number of large companies [than it has today](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2019/05/15/worlds-largest-tech-companies-2019/#58ac0dac734f). The tech industry operates in an oligopolized world market with a handful of suppliers. Europe in most technologies faces a choice between either China or the United States. An exception is 5G where Europe has its own technological superstars, Nokia and Ericsson (the United States, by contrast, has no significant 5G market competitor). The increasing number of country decisions to discard Huawei already gives the two companies a strong foundation on the European home markets.

The EU must come to the realization that the **only** **way** to make **European** **tech** companies able to **compete** **globally** is to allow them to grow into **global** **champions** that can innovate at scale. **China’s** mercantilist methods and proactive promotion of its national tech champions **compel** a **revision** of the EU’s original focus to create the best possible conditions for competition on the internal market. It was arguably a strategic mistake when the European Commission [blocked a 2019 merger](https://www.ft.com/content/6e344f6a-29fd-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8) between a German and a French rail manufacturing company (Siemens/Alstom), a manifestation for the EU’s laggardness in prioritizing global competitiveness. The European Commission's decision is especially disconcerting when taking into account the risk of **global** **dominance** of **Chinese** state-owned or state-subsidized **enterprises** as well as China’s restriction of foreign access to its own domestic market. China-like subsidies can hardly come into question. However, Europe’s consolidated aerospace industry with Airbus stands out as a successful example of the use of infrastructure support, beneficial loans, and the advancement of research and development to gain global competitiveness.

Similar support measures today could boost European tech and manufacturing hubs, beginning with the existing telecom giants that need to remain competitive [beyond 5G/toward 6G](https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/leak-eu-charts-6g-future-in-ambitious-industrial-plan/). **A**rtificial **i**ntelligence **requires** both **EU** and national investments to [**narrow** **the** **gap** with the US and China](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%203%20AI_0.pdf#page4) and should aim to [consolidate the fragmented European market](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/09/europe-and-ai-leading-lagging-behind-or-carving-its-own-way-pub-82236), whose strong regulations in favor of ethics and human rights distinguishes it from especially China. The COVID-19 crisis has [elevated the debate](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-european-union-and-the-search-for-digital-sovereignty/) about Europe’s digital sovereignty to the level of shortcomings of its own industrial-technological base that hinder its ability to innovate and compete at the global level. Building on this awareness, export control should become more strategic to prevent a proliferation of [dual-use technologies](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op80.pdf) where the EU still has an edge over China.

Battle over Global Standards

The **geopolitical** **implications** of China’s forwardness on 5G caught the Western community by surprise, even though China openly declared its ambition to pursue [high-tech leadership](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade) five years ago. Chinese innovation is fast—in addition to the allocation of [$1.4 trillion](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-20/china-has-a-new-1-4-trillion-plan-to-overtake-the-u-s-in-tech) to its high-tech sectors over the next five years, Beijing later is set to release its new plan ‘China Standards 2035’ to influence [the next generation of technologies](https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-standards-2035-and-plan-world-domination-dont-believe-chinas-hype): the Internet of things, artificial intelligence, and 5G. The **EU**, the European countries, and their tech communities need to be **forward-looking** and understand that the **competition** with **China** is also a **competition** **over global standards**. Whereas China developed its own 3G and 4G standards to protect its domestic market from external competition, it clearly [turned this ambition outward](https://itif.org/publications/2020/04/27/us-national-strategy-5g-and-future-wireless-innovation) with 5G for its own mercantilist advantage. The **importance** of **global** **standards** cannot be stressed enough: the standards for the Internet we use today were **set** **by** the leading **US** companies like IBM, Intel and Microsoft in the 1990s.

Recognizing the importance of standard-setting, the Chinese government and Chinese companies have [stepped up their efforts](https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2018-annual-report-congress) in contributing to and leading the global standards-setting bodies, notably the UN’s International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the industry-led 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), a key player in 5G. On the one hand it is positive that China, which has [the largest share](https://www.13d.com/landing-pages/fiveg/#nutshell) of the 5G “standard-essential” patents, is engaged in the global bodies to set common standards. On the other hand, China could potentially [**politicize** the **global** **standardization** processes](https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-telephones-race-5g-and-evolution-telecom) to give its **own** **companies** **first**-**mover** and perhaps a **permanent** **advantage**. The Chinese companies are under [strong pressure](https://itif.org/publications/2020/04/27/us-national-strategy-5g-and-future-wireless-innovation) and [state coordination](https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/technical-standardisation-china-and-the-future-international-order.pdf#page%2023) by the Chinese Communist Party to vote against technologically superior standards when they disadvantage the Chinese industry. Shedding light on and pushing back against China’s practices requires global leadership. **The** **EU**, its member states, and tech companies need to [**step** **up** their **efforts** and internal **coordination**](https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/technical-standardisation-china-and-the-future-international-order.pdf#page%2029) in the **standardization** **bodies** to maintain their still strong positions and **ensure** that the **processes** are **politically** **neutral** and that technologies remain **interoperable**.

The **alternative** to **global** **standards** may be competing standards that could **divide** the **digital** **economy** and, in the long run, underpin a beginning bifurcation between an old Western-led and a new China-led order. Not to forget, China [in parallel](https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/china-and-new-geopolitics-technical-standardization) to its activism in the global bodies facilitates the deployment of its own standards bilaterally through the “Belt and Road” and other initiatives. It is hardly surprising that the consolidated autocracies around the world follow China’s technological leadership. However, it is worrying that the developing nations in **Asia, the Middle East**, and **Africa** tend to tag along, as they [**depend** on **Chinese** **investments** and loans](https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-working-papers/chinas-overseas-lending-12820/) and because China’s [Digital Silk Road](https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3101549/instead-targeting-tiktok-and-wechat-us-should-work-alternative?mc_cid=6bb557ad39&mc_eid=c2cd27e354) satisfies their growing appetite for inexpensive connectivity.

The **EU** **must** **adapt** to what seems to be a new reality: the “[Brussels effect](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-brussels-effect-9780190088583?cc=es&lang=en&)”—the externalization of its regulations and norms through market mechanisms—works well within liberal democracies that cherish privacy protection and human rights as well as with the big tech companies that operate within them. However, the “Brussels effect” may not provide a crucial pull or competitive edge in the rest of the world’s digital economies. **China’s** **cooperation** with Greece, Hungary, and especially [Serbia](https://www.csis.org/analysis/becoming-chinese-client-state-case-serbia) speaks volumes about **how** **easily** even relatively **well-developed** countries in **Europe** fall for the **temptation** of the **cheaper** and faster rather than the safer tech options. Even if other countries have adopted legislation in line with the General Data Protection Regulation—the prime example of European rule setting—the reality of the digital economy is such that the **EU** **cannot** **assume** that the **world** **around** will **purchase** **equipment** with **adequate** **safeguards** to guarantee these rights. In short, the **EU** will need a **more** **activist** **approach** to promote its own standards and norms **going** **forward**.

#### Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” *BAS*, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war>)

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

### Block – A/O – LL

#### Multiple scenarios for extinction

Markley 16 (Stephen, Journalist for Paste Magazine, “Is France the Final Domino for the European Union?”, Paste Magazine, December 15, 2016, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2016/12/is-france-the-final-domino-for-the-european-union.html)

For many Americans reading this, there is no doubt a sense of remove from the relevance of the European project. Think of it this way: for centuries Europe was the Middle East of the world. It was a war-hungry, dysfunctional, violent, chaotic piece of the globe that could barely go a decade without a barbaric, usually pointless blood-letting conflict. Since World War II and the economic and political integration that brought former nation-state rivals into mutually beneficial coexistence, the continent has been a region of remarkable prosperity and stability. Keep in mind, this has never happened before in human history: a set of political leaders and their constituents voluntarily chose to cede elements of sovereignty in order to form a better, stronger union. The United States and Great Britain, often mentioned as democratic ideals, were two empires won by violent conquest in which wealthy elites only begrudgingly allowed democracy to sift down to the most impoverished and brutalized citizens.

The parochial movements of the last five to ten years—from the EU’s troubles to the Scottish independence vote to the surge of American nationalism that brought us such phenomenon as the go-it-alone war in Iraq and now Donald Trump—have different roots and causes but they do share a common thread. We live in an increasingly complex and interdependent world where the greatest threats to peace, individual well-being, and human flourishing are largely transnational. Climate change, infectious disease, nuclear proliferation, financial crisis, cyber insecurity—these are all borderless phenomenon that do not care if their victims are French, British, American, or Syrian. Their worst consequences do not care about our flags, languages, religions, or skin colors. And yet at a time when transnational peril necessitates a greater need for cooperation, tolerance, and unity, Western liberal democracies are taking a hard turn into fragmentation, arrogance, self-pity, and denial. The break-up of the European Union brought on by a wave of selfish, quasi-authoritarian nationalism would be a staggering blow to the economic and political security of what remains of the increasingly precarious free world.

### Block – UQ – EU-US Coop Falling Now

#### The relationship is collapsing – only a revival on tech can solve.

Csernatoni 21 [[Raluca Csernatoni](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6#auth-Raluca-Csernatoni), PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2021. “The Technology Challenge in the Transatlantic Relationship” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17816858211059251> DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

In this article the transatlantic relationship is defined as the overall set of relations between the US and the EU, relations that are maintained via engagements in institutions such as NATO (Smith 2018, 539). This relationship has been intimately linked to the ebbs and flows of two interconnected structural changes. First, since the end of the Cold War era, systemic changes in the international arena have seen successive US administrations and European leaders alternate between fully embracing shared views and interests, with limited disagreement on certain issues, and episodes of acute discord and crisis. To name a few points of disagreement, the US-led invasion of Iraq; nuclear strategy; and international development, monetary and trade policies have caused many furrowed brows in both European capitals and Washington. These issues all arose long before the US strategic pivot towards Asia, disagreements over China, the lingering effects of former President Donald J. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, data privacy and the recent responses to the novel coronavirus pandemic.

Second, structural changes in the EU integration project and the increasing supranationalisation of the EU’s defence policy have also had powerful repercussions. The growing role of the European Commission in defence technological and industrial matters and the launch of the European Defence Fund, an unprecedented funding scheme financed directly from the EU budget to support homegrown European collaborative defence research and development (Håkansson 2021), have raised concerns across the Atlantic. In recent years, a new momentum in EU defence integration has taken shape around the concept of European strategic autonomy, coupled with pragmatic policy steps and initiatives prioritising European sovereignty in defence industrial areas, as well as technological and digital matters (Csernatoni 2021b). This growing supranationalisation has been partly triggered by the combination of former President Trump’s vitriolic stance towards the EU and NATO, the EU losing its strongest transatlantic link with the UK’s departure, and the evolving international technological rivalry between the US and China. Such challenges have called for a critical reappraisal of European autonomy and dependency in key technological areas, from defence, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and the digital domain, to space. Conversely, EU talk and action to spend more on military and technological power have provoked fears that European defence and technological cooperation will lead to industrial rivalry with the US or a duplication of NATO’s efforts.

Against this backdrop, instead of broadly examining how the structural cracks in the transatlantic bond have emerged and are growing, this article zooms in on the challenges to the relationship posed by technological innovation, both as a driver of cooperation and as a cause for further rivalry. In doing so, the article explores three core and interrelated dimensions:

* the transatlantic technology gap and the EU’s quest for technological sovereignty—namely the desire to strengthen Europe’s technological competitive edge, support a strong industrial base and reduce dependencies in critical technology areas and value chains;
* differing approaches to technological innovation and the role of emerging and disruptive technologies; and
* the values-based governance and regulation of digital and technology issues.

In the shifting geopolitical context, the EU and the US share values and have a common interest in navigating the current and emerging technology challenges together by leveraging their common strengths and operationalising a transatlantic technology agenda. As fast-paced technological and digital transformations continue to disrupt societies, economies and geopolitics, technology must be at the heart of a revived phase in EU–US cooperation and trust. Granted, this will be easier said than done

### Block – UQ – EU Tech k Power

#### Russia, China, and the US are all outcompeting the EU. Revitalized strategy is key.

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Today’s major powers engage in comprehensive global technology politics. The weaponisation, mastering, and control of digital technologies is the new ‘Great Game’. These power dynamics are helping shape technological spheres of influence. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – but also in central Eastern Europe and the Balkans – have fallen or may soon fall under Chinese or Russian technological influence or dominance. China is luring countries into technological dependencies to undermine their political sovereignty through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. Beijing also shields its own citizens from foreign influence with its ‘great firewall’ and develops industrial strategies to secure its technological autonomy from the West. It uses digital disinformation to influence public opinion in other countries, mounts cyberattacks and cyberespionage to strengthen its industrial base, strategically deploys attractively-priced 5G technologies abroad to gain control of telecom networks, and tries to impose its technical standards through international organisations.

Together with Russia, China is attempting to ingrain authoritarian values into the global cyberspace. Russia is also leveraging and restricting mass media and social networks to protect its interests, shielding its population from democratic temptations, and waging an information war against the West and its allies with the aim of undermining citizens’ faith in democracy.

Meanwhile, the United States tries to offset Chinese and Russian influence, seeks to maintain its cutting-edge advantage on military artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and backs and protects the interests of its major technology companies globally. It also denies other nations access to key technologies, monitors critical investments in the technology sector to avoid security risks, seeks to secure and control critical supply chains (especially of semiconductors), and imposes export controls and even embargoes on sensitive technologies.

As for the European Union, the Brussels institutions are trying to shape global standards of privacy and data protection, digital platforms, and AI according to European values  using the attractiveness and power of its internal market. The EU also promotes digital partnerships with like-minded countries and allies – and announced, in December 2021, the “Global Gateway” initiative as the EU version of China’s DSR.

All this implies that the EU has begun to play the global technology game. But it is nowhere near its rivals in terms of sophistication, strategy, resources, and vision. If the EU is to learn to speak the language of power, it needs to understand its efforts as part of an integrated digital strategy that can both cooperate and compete with those of China, Russia, and even the US.

### Block – INB – Spillover

#### The CP signals willingness to cooperate – causes EU cohesion.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 12-6-2021, "The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

The historical development of closer European security and defense industrial and technological cooperation is a complex affair.8 It has involved highly networked and transnational EU-state-industrial relations across various EU institutions and agencies, interest groups, and security and defense industrial actors. It also illustrates member states’ increasing willingness to give the EU a more significant part to play in security and defense matters. Given the salience of current debates concerning the EU’s defense and technological sovereignty, the costs and benefits of European security and defense research and innovation programs need to be set out in full.9 Moreover, the contributions of various interest groups and EU institutions also need to be further examined. Linked to this discussion is a broader understanding among member states that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) needs a new level of strategic ambition, with an awareness of the benefits of establishing a European defense industrial and technological research and innovation policy.

### Block – INB – Tech Key

#### EU tech leadership is necessary for broader clout.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 8-12-2021, "The EU’s Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Sovereignty", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Behind the EU’s recent multiple sovereignty agendas is the need to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to innovation. The very label of a geopolitical European Commission implies a new level of engagement for the EU in the global balance of power. Technological and digital sovereignty are at the heart of such ambitions.

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has further exacerbated the urgency to shore up technological, digital, and regulatory responses to preserve the EU’s economic clout, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical influence, as well as to reduce dependencies in critical technology areas. What has the EU done so far, and what must it still do to meet that goal of technological sovereignty?

Four cross-cutting dimensions can help unpack the concept of technological sovereignty and better structure the discussion about EU initiatives, programs, and instruments:

Research and capability-development efforts in security and defense

Investments in cutting-edge research and innovation and in digitalization

Critical infrastructure resilience and security of supply

Tech-related regulatory activism

DEFENSE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

According to Arnout Molenaar, the head of division in the European External Action Service, dealing with security and defense policy is also related to “a learning curve for the Union to develop a ‘hard power’ mentality.” Technology plays a fundamental role in terms of making possible the EU’s hard military power ambitions—not only to act in a tense geopolitical setting but also to defend the EU’s interests in areas related to technology, security, and defense matters.

### Block – INB – A2: EU Tech Inevitable

#### Not inevitable – we’re on the brink – it’s only a question of what happens now.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 12-6-2021, "The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Also, the emergence of a common European approach to security and defense technological and industrial matters has not gone as smoothly as expected. At the same time, the European Commission’s expanding competencies in these fields remains a sensitive issue to other EU institutions and member states. This sensitivity reflects long-standing national protectionism related to the high politics of security and defense, and ongoing competition with other EU institutions and agencies, such as the EDA, over the EU’s security and defense policy agenda.10

The above interrelated developments have all contributed to the EU momentum to proceed on defense industrial and market integration. They provide a link between the why, the who, and the how:

Why: The European defense industry is at the crossroads of military technological development, owing to the lack of national-level investment and unprecedented technological advancements in the civilian sector.

Who: The defense industry has had a growing role in setting EU policy agendas and in shaping security and defense R&D initiatives.

How: The European Commission, and to a limited extent the European Parliament, have a rising supranational role in EU security and defense policy.11

### Block – INB – EU Unilat Solves

#### EU leadership on emerging tech solves and is necessary to build EU sovereignty and autonomy free from U.S. coercion

Csernatoni ’21 – Raluca, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where she works on European security and defense with a specific focus on disruptive technologies, (“The EU’s Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Soverignty”,8/12/21, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134) – sel

STRATEGIC AUTONOMY ISN’T JUST DEFENSE, IT’S ALSO TECHNOLOGY

Over the past two decades, the **impact of new and emerging tech**nologies **and increased digitalization** have **become the prime drivers of globalization and international competition**. **States** around the world **are making digital autonomy**, **tech**nological **supremacy, and innovation the cornerstones of their diplomatic, security, and economic efforts**. **The** European Union (EU) **is no exception.** The **coronavirus** pandemic **and** its **broader implications** have **further highlighted** the **importance of digital transformation in all aspects of society**, **as well as the need to reduce strategic dependencies in key, high-end technology areas, value and supply chains, and critical infrastructures**. **Against the backdrop of a deteriorating geopolitical and security environment**, **it comes as no surprise that European digital and technological sovereignty are at the center of current** EU **policy discussions.** There are indeed signs of a new and yet conceptually ambiguous narrative taking shape around building the EU’s technological innovation power. What exactly are the practical and policy implications of a new “technological sovereignty” narrative? And more importantly, what EU tech sovereignty efforts have been made in line with broader European strategic autonomy objectives? The **concept of European strategic autonomy is** certainly **not new**. It **initially emerged in discussions related to the EU’s space and security and defense policy strategies, as well as in terms of upping the** EU’s **game in military capability building.** Political discussions about European strategic autonomy indeed have a long and controversial history. The **term has deep historical roots in** French **strategic culture and thinking**, **and** since the 1990s, it **has** typically **referred to the notion that the EU should be able to carry out modest-size, out-of-area, and militarily well-equipped crisis management operations, especially in its own neighborhood, and** independently **of the** United States **and** the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While the publication of the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016 is credited for putting the concept of strategic autonomy on the EU’s foreign and security policy agendas, the reality is that various **EU institutions and member** state**s have long been discussing the need to upgrade the EU’s defense technological and industrial portfolio and crisis management capabilities**. **Key to such debates was the preservation of a competitive** European Defence Technological **and** Industrial Base. In the words of Josep Borrell, **the EU’s** high representative for foreign affairs and security policy and vice president of the European Commission, the **concept of strategic autonomy is** indeed **not new**, as it has **been extensively used in the military realm and for a long time was limited to issues related to European security and defense**. According to Borrell, **strategic autonomy is** also **a “process of** political survival**” for the EU, and its logic should be** expanded **to other sectors.** This **narrow security and defense focus** has **been recently expanded by the geopolitically focused European Commission** under President Ursula von der Leyen and **under the stated ambition to** revamp **the European power agenda in various strategic sectors**. **The underlying logic behind strategic autonomy has started to increasingly encompass discussions about technological protectionism and capacity building in new domains related to** digitalization**,** data**,** space**,** energy**, and new and** emerging tech**nologies.** The **new tech**nological **sovereignty** narrative **is meant to build EU-wide consensus around the need to preserve Eu**ropean leadership and autonomy **in** various **key tech**nological **areas**. It is the **EU’s attempt to put forward a** pragmatic **and** autonomous **approach to avoid** dependencies **and geopolitical** coercion **in critical techn**ological **sectors.** The stakes could not be higher. Indeed, the incumbent commission has started to actively circulate various notions of sovereignty derived from discussions on strategic autonomy and defense sovereignty by populating the discursive landscape with related concepts such as technological, digital, and data sovereignty. This **expansion is revealing increasing fears that more protective autonomy in other policy areas than security and defense is needed to safeguard the EU’s economic and strategic interests and European values**. **Hence, the impact of terms such as sovereignty, power, and strategic autonomy floating around the technology, digitalization, and data spheres should not be easily disregarded.** These terms give strategic meaning to EU action and institutionalize different sectoral approaches to sovereignty building. They are also **indicative of** recent **EU-led policy, regulatory, and funding efforts in the industrial, technological, and digital domains**. But which are the most significant initiatives designed to consolidate the EU’s quest for various sovereignties, and do they amount to a coherent and integrated approach?

#### The US is competing with the EU on tech regulatory mechanisms now --- the counterplan is key to ensure the EU model comes out on top

Ringhof & Torreblanca ’22 – Julian, Visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations through Mercator Stiftung’s *Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs*programme., Jose Ignacio, Senior policy fellow and head of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a position he has held since the launch of ECFR across Europe in 2007., (The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player”, 5/17/22, pp. 3-5, <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-geopolitics-of-technology-How-the-EU-can-become-a-global-player.pdf>) – sel

A digital vision

If **the EU** is to invest in setting up its own digital and technology foreign policy, it **needs to be clear about what its goals are**. The **ultimate aim of this policy should be to give the EU both the strategy and the tools to** transform **it into a** global technological actor **able to sustain its interests and values at home and abroad, and in competition and cooperation with other powers**. All the **elements laid out in this brief are** therefore **focused on turning the EU into a capable and effective geopolitical actor in the field of digital technology**. The need for such a strategy is clear. The EU has set itself the goal of becoming a technologically advanced and decarbonised economy. The **success of** this **major economic transition** crucially **depends on the EU’s capacity to** master**,** command**, and have** full and unrestricted access **to critical digital technologies**. These technologies are increasingly contested, disputed, and even weaponised by third actors. Access to them may thus be denied or made conditional on political goals, jeopardising this transition. In a worst-case scenario, rather than allowing the EU to become a more autonomous and powerful actor, the transition to a digital and decarbonised economy may create new vulnerabilities and simply change the nature of the EU’s geopolitical and economic dependence. The future of the EU also depends on its capacity to sustain democracy and democratic institutions, both at home and abroad. However, for 15 consecutive years, democracy has been in decline around the world, both in the number and in the quality of democracies. Coincident with this decline, both born-again and long-standing authoritarian regimes are growing stronger and more challenging. Misuse of digital technologies has contributed to these trends. This not only serves to undermine democracies by fuelling political polarisation and providing the tools for foreign influence operations, but it also helps authoritarian governments cement their grip on their citizens. Countering these trends is not only a moral necessity for the EU but also essential to securing its global interests. The **vision behind EU digital policy should** thus **be to secure and promote both its** economic **power base and its** political **model**, **at home and globally**. To achieve this vision, the EU needs to act strategically. **Acting strategically means that in designing its means and ends, the union needs to understand what other countries and powers are doing and how it plans** to compete **and cooperate with them**. China and Russia have started a process of decoupling from the West, to which they seek to attract other countries. The rules-based order is being replaced by a power-based order. Geoeconomics (or sheer mercantilism) is back. **States are using economic and technological** interdependencies to impose their views **and secure their geopolitical interests**. It is a new world order – and in that world, technology becomes a key element of power, sovereignty, and survival. **To secure its interests**, values, and global standing**, the** **EU should embed its open-market and humancentric approach to technology in its** alliances**,** partnerships**, and the** multilateral organisations **to which it belongs**. In a world where technology is disputed and weaponised, **the more technologically sovereign like-minded countries are, the more the EU’s own sovereignty and its global geo-technology** standing are assured**; the more allies are protected against foreign influence operations, cyberattacks, and coercion derived from technological vulnerabilities, the more alignment and cooperation with the EU at the global level will be facilitated.** The EU should therefore aim not at technological independence but **at mutually reinforced and shared** technological sovereignty **with its allies**. **To achieve this aim, the EU first needs to become an attractive partner for other countries**. This **attraction should extend to those who have signed up to Chinese digital infrastructures and investments or are targeted by China’s, Russia’s, and other countries’ propaganda and influence operations**. The Global Gateway initiative can help this process if it focuses on strategic opportunities to strengthen alliances and undermine Chinese and Russian spheres of influence. The EU also needs to strengthen its existing alliances. This need affects first and most fundamentally the US, but also applies to other partners. With the US, which in many fields is a technology competitor, the EU must settle its differences. **The EU and the US have** distinct approaches **to technology governance**. **In Europe, values and regulation play a greater role than they do in the US.** This **distinction has** so far **prevented regulatory harmonisation and led to tensions**. Still, **while** these **differences may prevent policy harmonisation**, **they should still allow policy convergence**, or at least coexistence – particularly given the common global challenges the EU and the US face. Clearly, the EU and the US cannot counter Russia’s and China’s aggressive technological strategies while refusing to compromise among themselves. Much as they did after the second world war, the US and Europe need to reach a wide agreement to sustain a global and free democratic technology order. The postwar order required rules-based institutions and military alliances to secure free trade across key straits and blue waters. The new order will require the transatlantic alliance to work together to facilitate a flow of data that preserves privacy, and to embed democratic values in technology regulations and governance at the global level. In sum, to stand up for its interests and values, **the EU must become a global technology player**. The EU and its member states can deliver on this vision by acting along three policy dimensions (values, security, and markets) with a common strategy and new and enhanced policy tools. As the next section shows, the EU is already on the road to global influence in technology. But it has a long way to go, and the most difficult part still lies ahead.

### Block – INB – Impact/Turns Case

#### EU dependence makes Russia/China war unwinnable---wargame simulations prove.

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A stronger European defense to strengthen NATO’s posture While the EU has made significant progress in countering hybrid warfare since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the same cannot be said with regard to developing more effective traditional deterrence capabilities. Such capabilities are increasingly necessary, not just because of Russia’s aggressive posture — expanding its area of operations beyond the post-Soviet space to Syria and Africa — but also because of the growing geopolitical and security alignment between Beijing and Moscow.

Since 2014, cooperation between China and Russia has expanded beyond the domain of arm sales. The two countries have supported each other’s development of strategic weapons (such as for missile defense) and artificial intelligence, as well as each other’s political positions in the United Nations Security Council.41 Beijing and Moscow have deepened their interactions in Africa, where Russian Wagner Group mercenaries patrol Chinese facilities,42 and conducted military exercises including a shared air patrol in the Asia-Pacific region.43 They also have been seeking common ground on Afghanistan since the departure of U.S. troops.44 Such alignment is increasingly resembling a partnership that is reflected at the military level too. After the past year’s military drills in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, and the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia recently conducted a joint military exercise called Zapad/Interaction-2021 in China’s northwestern region of Ningxia, where for the first time they used a joint command and control system and shared equipment — mimicking the way NATO forces work with each other.45 Meanwhile, the United States has begun to shift its security focus toward the IndoPacific region and South China Sea where Beijing is threatening Taiwan. Consequently, should a direct confrontation with China occur in the medium to long term, Russia could take advantage of the situation and potentially target Europe while U.S. forces and attentions are directed elsewhere. For this reason, it is crucial for European allies to have the military capabilities to push back against Russia with little support from the United States, at least in the initial phases. With more defense capabilities, European allies would also have the resources to respond to crises that arise in the Mediterranean region. After four years of strained trans-Atlantic relations — where the defense spending issue has intoxicated the broader debate on trans-Atlantic security — a stronger European defense would help Washington recognize the increased geopolitical cohesion and security concerns of the bloc. Unfortunately, as described earlier, such capability has yet to be achieved. A RAND Corporation wargaming simulation exercise assessed that in the case of a conventional attack by the Russian Federation, Moscow’s forces would be able to reach the outskirts of either the Estonian or Latvian capital in around 60 hours, and the NATO allies would not be able to defend these territories because of a (totally fillable) shortage of military capabilities.46 Similarly, a scenario analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that without the help of the United States, conventional forces from European NATO countries would not be able to push back against the hypothetical conquest of Lithuania and part of Poland by the Russian Federation.47 To ensure that they can successfully respond to a land attack from Russia, or a coordinated Russia-China operation, Europeans need to increase the quality and readiness of their defense apparatus. A policy brief by the NATO Defense College calls for multinational battlegroups in Poland and in the Baltics to increase their readiness in terms of support capabilities, such as artillery and air defense, and for European allies to fulfill their NATO 2018 Readiness commitment of providing several land combat brigades and maritime task groups.48 The authors also point out that to increase deterrence, European allies need sufficient and effective air and missile defense capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, as well as long-range conventional precision-strike weapons to limit Russia’s options for regional conventional attacks.

All these analyses indicate that expanded capabilities on the European side are crucial for a stronger NATO posture. Political tensions around the branding of European strategic autonomy have unfortunately poisoned this debate and complicated a very simple issue: European forces must be able to take effective action with or without the United States in the theaters that are crucial for European security.

#### A weak EU turns NATO capabilities---tanks burden sharing and hurts US public support---EU autonomy solves.

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European and US interviewees came up with several arguments pointing to the benefits of a strong European pillar not only for NATO and the EU, but also outweighing the challenges that may emerge in the process. Whether these efforts come under the umbrella of European strategic autonomy and EU-level defence integration or via bi- and multi-lateral programmes, or some combination of both, did not make a substantive difference to the well-shared perception that a more capable Europe is good for NATO and good for the transatlantic partnership. A less engaged, less capable, less coherent and less reliable European pillar of NATO is unlikely to be capable of meaningful burden sharing. And from a US national perspective, justifying investment in European defence matters to the U.S. public would be very difficult if European nations choose not to invest in strengthening their contribution to NATO. While a weak Europe (our Scenario 2) would require least policy effort and resources, it would also be the one with least benefits for NATO and the U.S., particularly as it looks for allies in an emerging systemic competition with China. Naturally, the question arises as to whether the pursuit of European strategic autonomy is the ‘right way of going about it’, and whether the lack of clarity in relation to the concept creates more problems than it solves when it comes to the transatlantic relations. All in all, despite the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication, the concept of European strategic autonomy, if underpinned by continuing defence consolidation, does seem to offer a unifying principle for a much needed defence integration to enable the EU to take up greater responsibilities for its defence and security matters.

## NATO Coop Solves

### 1NC/2NC EU-NATO Coop Solvency

#### A balance between bolstering EU autonomy and multilateral cooperation is possible---they’re compliments. \*\*solvency advocate for EU-US coop CP and EU-NATO coop CP

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However, the next four years of the Biden presidency should not be wasted on meta-debates. They present a window of opportunity for both sides of the Atlantic. It is up to the Europeans to prove that the European quest for greater strategic sovereignty can at the same time be positive for the transatlantic partnership and that a strong and self-reliant Europe is in America’s interest. And it is up to the Americans to show that they are interested in real partnership on greater eye-level, instead of curating vassals. The starting conditions are good: President Biden wants to repair the shattered relationship with the Europeans and make the transatlantic partnership the cornerstone of a unified Western approach toward great power competition. The recent US request to join a PESCO project on military mobility as a third country represents an initial test case – and a big opportunity - for a constructive future EU-US cooperation. For the Europeans, this also means that they must contribute greater added value to the transatlantic partnership through measures that simultaneously strengthen their own strategic sovereignty. First of all, this would be the development and procurement of more effective European capabilities, including high-end spectrum capabilities and strategic enablers. Very few PESCO initiatives currently address these capability gaps. Even if the issue of transatlantic industrial cooperation will remain difficult – Biden will be tough when it comes to buying and selling American – a basic willingness to support credible efforts to strengthen European defence capabilities is there. But the EU will need to demonstrate that its efforts go beyond subsidizing European defence industries and lead to a tangible boost in Europe’s operational equipment that would be available also within a NATO framework. Second, the EU needs to take some military load off the United States. They should assume greater regional responsibility in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood and also increase their operational readiness for operations abroad. Third, Europeans should spell out what the European pillar of NATO is supposed to be and how it relates to CSDP. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has made much progress in recent years, but there is clearly still unused potential. Capability development and defence planning could be even better coordinated and further aligned. The ongoing Strategic Compass process should be closely linked to the NATO review process, especially in the areas of countering cyber and hybrid threats as well as fighting terrorism and disinformation campaigns, cooperation between the two institutions should be strengthened. The EU needs to reemphasise its effort to strengthen European military mobility and provide adequate funding.

### Block – Solvency – Generic

#### EU-NATO summits allow the EU to take the lead on emerging tech.

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EDTs = Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

As the allies meet with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell at this month’s NATO summit, the two organizations need a more ambition agenda for cooperation. In particular, the EU and NATO need to consider a joint task force on fostering defense innovation and EDTs, with renewable two-year mandates. This instrument would provide political impetus for closer cooperation on EDTs, it would give coherence, regularity, and structure to the efforts of the two sides, and ensure commonality of purpose and synergy of output. In addition, allies could consider meeting regularly in EU-NATO digital summit formats. The EU could take the lead in this regard given its considerable financial capacity for investing in EDTs and its regulatory powers. EU-NATO digital summits would allow the transatlantic partners to regularly review progress, provide strategic guidance on legal, ethical and adoption challenges related to innovation and EDTs, and enhance their tech diplomacy by inviting like-minded global partners to attend.

#### EU-NATO cooperation is an established norm.

EEAS 20, The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the European Union’s diplomatic service. Since 2011, the EEAS carries out the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy to promote peace, prosperity, security, and the interests of Europeans across the globe., (European Union for External Action Service, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheets\_en) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

A NEW ERA OF INTERACTION

On 8 July 2016, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, together with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed a Joint Declaration in Warsaw with a view to giving new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership. It outlined seven concrete areas where cooperation between the two organisations should be enhanced: 1. countering hybrid threats; 2. operational cooperation including at sea and on migration; 3. cyber security and defence; 4. defence capabilities; 5. defence industry and research; 6. exercises; 7. supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts.

On the basis of the mandate by the Joint Declaration, common sets of proposals were endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils in December 2016 and 2017. Altogether 74 concrete actions are under implementation in the seven areas (see list). Five progress reports have been submitted highlighting main achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in different areas. On 10 July, 2018, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, together with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed a second Joint Declaration in Brussels calling for swift and demonstrable progress in implementation.

Cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the established norm and daily practice and continues to take place on the basis of key guiding principles: openness, transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State.

#### The CP solves interoperability, cooperation, and Euro defense autonomy---zero funding or overlap deficits. \*\*an IL to Euro autonomy INB

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Synergies in procurement and capability development As with the cyber domain, NATO and the EU could respond to outside pressure by increasing and improving procurement and technological cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered shortages and vulnerabilities in the supply chain, and the competition for rare earth material and high-technology products (such as microchips) has increased. Meanwhile, breakthrough technological achievements are opening new frontiers for competition in the security domain. First, European allies could better coordinate their defense spending within the framework of the European Union; the absence of an integrated defense structure inevitably leads to duplications and wasted resources. Moreover, the armed forces of different European countries may encounter difficulties in operating with one another, given that there are 138 defense systems in Europe (compared to only 30 in the United States).70 As stated in a European Commission report, the lack of cooperation in the European defense industry produces a loss of 25 billion to 100 billion euros per year, while 30% of the costs could be saved if a joint procurement was in place.71 In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards. On this point, the EU could leverage resources from the European Defense Fund and the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program to develop new technologies and fill security gaps. Both the fund and program are relatively young and would benefit from a deeper exchange with NATO — whose experience in military procurement is unrivalled — to help define standards as well as characteristics of the technology. NATO and the EU address capability development in markedly different ways. NATO focuses more on procuring a given item from a given state to meet a specific need of the alliance, whereas the EU focuses more on filling capability gaps and encouraging member states to cooperate to develop new assets. In this regard, the EU appears to have a comparative advantage given the role of the European Defense Agency to go beyond specific operational requirements and its ability to consider long-term trends and ways member states can cooperate on the development of new capabilities. In particular, the EU defense procurement benefits from strong support from EU-led research and development programs, as well as from considerable financial resources from the European Defense Fund. As European defense capabilities advance, there will be overlap between the EU Capability Development Priorities and the NATO Defense Planning Process; this gives the EU and NATO an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and build up a more efficient and competitive trans-atlantic defense.73 A recent study from the French Institute of International Relations identifies areas where defense requirements could be harmonized and where the EU and NATO could work on joint research projects: from cyberdefense, air superiority, logistics, and medical support capabilities to science and technology, arms control, and intelligence.74 A more synchronized approach in these areas — that would also entail a joint assessment of member state performances — will undoubtedly reinforce both NATO- and EU-led operations as well as deterrence.

#### Solves better and prevents extinction.

Belin ’19 — Célia; visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, domestic determinants of foreign policy, and the politics of travel under COVID. She holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master's degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). April 2, 2019; “NATO matters, but the EU matters more”; *Brookings*; <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/02/nato-matters-but-the-eu-matters-more/>; //CYang

Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later — and 16 new members later — the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans.

Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group — as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations.

The neighbors of the European Union are no fools. Those who seek prosperity and stability hope to join the EU club. Those who reject the model set by the West and liberal democracies feel threatened by the European Union — it is the prospect of Ukraine moving into the EU’s orbit through an Association Agreement that triggered Russia’s hostility and ultimate aggression, not NATO. The power of attraction of the European Union, at least as much as the security guarantees of NATO, has helped stabilize Eastern Europe.

Despite these realities, Americans often indulge in a scornful disregard for the EU. Recently, benign contempt has taken an ugly turn. Since taking office, President Trump and his administration have attacked the European Union and individual member states repeatedly, with near impunity.

At first sight, American complaints appear to be centered on the issue of Europe’s trading power, which rivals that of the United States. For Donald Trump, the EU was created to “take advantage of” the United States and it is “worse than China.” Early in his mandate, the American president pushed for tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatened to go after automobiles, until a meeting with EU Commission President Juncker put a brake on the downward spiral.

However, a deeper look reveals a fundamental ideological contention: The brand of nationalism and populism that defines this administration stands in direct contradiction with the very existence of a liberal, supra-national body such as the European Union.

As laid out by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Kiron Skinner in December 2018, the administration holds the view that “international institutions have steadily encroached on the rights of sovereign nations” and that “nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests” — an indictment of the EU’s very existence. The ideological clash is reminiscent of older times. Addressing a crowd in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump likened the European Union to the Soviet Union, criticizing a similar “steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people,” an equivalency popular in conservative circles. Similarly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested in a December 2018 speech in Brussels that EU bureaucrats were not really working for the interests of European citizens.

By making no secret of his personal support for euroskeptic forces, Donald Trump has become an active political opponent of the European Union in its existing form. He celebrated the Brexit vote, expressed support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen ahead of the French presidential elections, disparaged Angela Merkel repeatedly, and appeared to rejoice at the Yellow Vests protest movement. He criticized Theresa May for negotiating a “soft” Brexit, and even recommended to Emmanuel Macron that France leave the EU. The American president has nominated ambassadors famously critical of the EU, and his administration demoted the EU ambassador’s status without notification, before reversing under criticism.

As Donald Trump torments both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, all rush to NATO’s bedside, and few worry about the EU. Truthfully, Atlanticists love to love NATO. It stands for values, valor, unity, solidarity. NATO won the Cold War. Celebrating NATO is celebrating the military. It is much harder to love the EU, the bureaucracy, the politics, the regulations. The EU lacks democratic appeal, and its slow-moving decisionmaking process create many frustrations. Unlike in NATO, the United States sits on the sidelines, it does not control who enters, or who stays in. The EU is also an economic peer competitor, a tough trading partner, and a sovereign international actor, at times non-compliant with American demands.

Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO — or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake. In a world where the strongmen are striking back, Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond.

### Block – Solvency – Biotech – Generic

#### Transatlantic cooperation on biotech solves

Giddings ’22 – Val, Senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, (“Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective”, 3/11/22, <https://itif.org/publications/2022/03/11/prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-biotech-policy-us-perspective/>) – sel

A WORLD OF BIOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES Mutual self-interest provides a strong basis for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology based on shared recognition of its vast potential to provide solutions to some of civilization’s most pressing problems. Thanks to explosive advances in our understanding of the many ways in which promiscuous nature has been manipulating DNA and RNA for the past billion years, it is widely anticipated that the 21st century will belong to biology.1 We are now at the point where our ability to innovate is constrained less by technical capability than by the limits of our imaginations. Multiple laboratories and companies on both sides of the Atlantic (and throughout the world) are pursuing promising applications, and experience confirms progress would be accelerated by cooperative approaches. But there are some considerable challenges, especially in agricultural and industrial contexts. The most important rate-limiting factor in our ability to harness biological innovations to the challenges of feeding the world, sustaining human and environmental health, and addressing climate change, is the burden imposed by ill-considered regulations. Unless this bottleneck can be unblocked, the enormous potential for transatlantic scientific cooperation will not yield the necessary fruits. DIVERGENT REGULATORY PATHS: PRECAUTION VS. OPENNESS TO INNOVATION Existing policies, legislation, and regulations do little or nothing to advance human or environmental safety.2 Born out of understandable caution at the dawn of recombinant DNA technologies, today their most obvious impact is to obstruct and discourage research, development, and deployment of innovative solutions to various challenges.3 This is so despite an abundant record of production and consumption of new biotech products with enviable records of improved safety, superior sustainability, and widespread beneficial economic impacts.4 The benefits are so substantial that a pattern has emerged of farmers breaking the law to acquire and plant improved seeds in countries where governments have lagged in allowing access.5 It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability, but only impede our ability to use the most innovative, precise, and safest tools to address our gravest challenges.6 In terms of regulatory policy and openness to biological innovations, the width of the Atlantic might be measured better in light years than miles or kilometers. As imperfect as regulations for the products of biotechnology are in North America, they are simply indefensible in Europe.7 The United States decided in 1986, after years of study and consultation, that no new laws were required to ensure the safety of crops and foods improved through biotechnology. This was based on the finding that they present no novel hazards, and foreseeable risks of their development and use fall into categories with which humans have considerable experience from millennia of conventional plant and animal breeding.8 The United States therefore decided to regulate these novel products under existing authorities administered by the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency.9 While implementation of this policy, the “Coordinated Framework,” has been far from perfect, it has been sufficiently predictable and science-based to enable an explosion of innovation, new product development, and commercial activity. Consequently, the United States has led the world to the present day wherein crops improved through biotechnology are now the global standard for quality seeds, delivering improved yields, safety, sustainability, and economic productivity around the world, with the lion’s share of benefits accruing on behalf of small farmers in developing countries.10 Europe took a different approach. It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability. The European Union decided to regulate seeds improved through biotechnology as a novel class governed under new regulations specifically focused on an arbitrary category known as “GMOs” (for “genetically modified organisms”). The conceit was that because they represented gene combinations produced by mechanisms supposedly “not found in nature” (but actually ubiquitous) they must present novel hazards, even though none has ever been identified. These putatively novel hazards, despite the lack of any concrete manifestations, allegedly required dedicated, specific, “precautionary” regulations. The resulting regulatory regime proved so burdensome it led to the general collapse of agricultural biotechnology in Europe, which had played a leading role in its discovery and invention. Permissions for field trials proved almost impossible to obtain, products could not be developed and brought to market, academic labs abandoned the field, and the industry relocated most of its assets and activities to the Americas. And Europe became the world’s largest importer of commodity foods improved through biotechnology, only recently surpassed by China. OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone. As to national security risks, just as with other risks, novelty attributable to biotechnology is elusive. One can do very nasty things with conventional bioweapons, and they are easily magnified with recombinant DNA techniques. At the same time, defensive capacities are also buttressed by biotechnology, as demonstrated by the rapid development of mRNA vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. There has been some good work done in this area, but this topic is worth exploring at greater depth. The OECD has a track record of thoughtful analyses with such topics. One possibility would be to build on that foundation by establishing a joint OECD/NATO working group to serve as a forum.

### Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

#### EU-NATO cooperation over cyber security solves best --- maximizes resources, fills defense gaps, and avoids article 5 activation

Deschaux-Dutard ’21 – Delphine, Associate Professor in Political Science at the University Grenoble Alpes, France. She is also a researcher at CESICE and Vice-Dean for International Relations at the Faculty of law at the same institution., (“Is NATO ready for cyber war?”, pp.1-3, 8/30/21, <https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/nato-briefs-series/nato-ready-cyber-war-2021>) – sel

In a more and more connected world cyberspace has become the fifth battlespace. The latest Pegasus case, refereeing to a spying hardware which affected many European heads of states and government in the Summer of 2021, shows how much cyber threats are now part of the international security arena. NATO has tackled the cyber topic for over a decade. NATO’s awareness towards cyber threats started raising in the late 1990s, following cyberattacks by Serbian hackers against NATO Supreme Command’s (SHAPE) website during the air bombing campaign on Serbian positions in the frame of the Kosovo war. The cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and in the context of the conflict in Georgia in 2008 urged the Alliance to take this new threats seriously. NATO is today the most advanced international organisation regarding cyber defence. With a cyber command structure set up in 2008, its 2010 Strategic Concept has enabled it to lay the foundations of its vision for cyber defence. Indeed NATO frames cyber threats as a direct challenge for transatlantic and national security as stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Alliance approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in 2008 (revised in 2011 and 2014) and established a Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) in 2008 and even a Cybersecurity Operations Centre within NATO Command Structure in 2018. The Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 in Lisbon fully acknowledges cyber defence capabilities as a necessity for the Alliance. NATO also created tools to prevent cyber-attacks and cyber offensive capabilities with a central objective: to defend the Alliance’s own communications and information systems and to arouse its member states’ awareness on the need to protect critical infrastructures implied in contemporary military operations. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, the organisation crossed a new important threshold by recognizing cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence and therefore included cyber threats as relevant article V material. This concretely means that NATO could trigger the article V of the Washington Treaty in case of a massive cyber attack with lethal implications against one of its members. Yet such a case would raise the difficult question of the attribution of the cyberattack. Such an attribution to a specific state or state-sponsored hacker would necessitate a consensus among the member states within the North Atlantic Council, which would probably make it difficult as it tackles diplomatic strings and strategic priorities which keep diverging among the EU member states. Indeed attribution continues to be a competence of member states until now, and not of NATO as such. Since 2014 NATO regularly reaffirms the importance of cyber defence as one of the core tasks of the Alliance, as it has been done during the Alliance’s summit in Brussels in June 2021: NATO endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy supporting the three main priorities of the Alliance (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security). The member states also agreed to commit to making use of the full range of capabilities to actively deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Aside from these policy aspects, NATO also develops a wide range of tools and capabilities in the area of cyber defence, with the aim of being able to provide assistance to its member states in case of cyber-attack. It should also be acknowledged that NATO owns its information and computer networks used in NATO military missions, whereas in the case the EU for instance, the EU depends on the members states ICT infrastructures for CSDP missions. NATO set up a specific agency dedicated to cyber defence in 2012 at its SHAPE headquarters: the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), which hosts since 2016 a Cyber Security Operations Center (CyOC) dealing with around 500 cyber incidents each month and responsible for the cyber defence of NATO’s information and computer infrastructures in the world and on military theatres (like in Afghanistan until August 2021 for instance). This Cyber Operation Center should be fully operational in 2023. In addition to these tools the Alliance created a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, which is a research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, research and development. The main task of the Centre is to provide expertise on cyber defence, and organise cyber exercises involving both NATO Allies and partners. These tools are completed with NATO’s smart defence initiatives entailing cyber defence aspects and aiming at bringing member states to cooperate to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or alone. The Alliance develops yearly exercises under the label Cyber Coalition. The development of NATO cyber capabilities over the last 15 years clearly shows that NATO started developing its own cyber defence culture. The organization therefore issued a Cyber Defense Pledge at the Warsaw summit in 2019 to facilitate cyber cooperation among its member states. As a follow up, France decided to host the first international conference in Paris in 2018 gathering the 29 NATO member states and the Secretary General of the Alliance to urge its allies to keep developing strategic thinking on cyber issues. Last but not least, NATO also develops an important cooperation with the EU on cyber defence. Both organizations have enhanced their cooperation in cyber defence since their joint declaration at the Alliance summit in Warsaw in 2016. They regularly organize common training and exercises and develop information sharing in order to raise mutual. Cooperation is even more needed in a context of limited financial resources: some experts suggest using the Berlin Plus agreements in cyber defence. The EU and NATO have also concluded a technical agreement between their response teams for cyber incidents (NCIRC and CERT-EU) in February 2016 to intensify their cooperation on cyber defence. This agreement has been enforced to discuss cyber threats in the context of 2019 European elections for instance. NATO also started a partnership with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP). More precisely the Alliance develops links with computer firms such as Microsoft, Atos, Thales, Cisco or Apple. The panorama of NATO’s cyberdefence assets shows therefore that the Alliance takes cyber threats seriously and dedicates resources and reflection to the topic. Even though NATO could not decide itself to trigger article V against a cyber aggressor, its member states have the common framework enabling them to act, should they manifest the political will to do so.

#### Continued EU development of emerging tech development strategies is critical to solidify the EU’s model as the global standard for tech regulation

Ringhof & Torreblanca ’22 – Julian, Visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations through Mercator Stiftung’s *Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs*programme., Jose Ignacio, Senior policy fellow and head of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a position he has held since the launch of ECFR across Europe in 2007., (The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player”, 5/17/22, pp. 5-8, <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-geopolitics-of-technology-How-the-EU-can-become-a-global-player.pdf>) – sel

The EU: a geo-technology player in the making

In the last decade, **the EU has** gradually **woken up to the geopolitical implications of digital tech**nologies. This awakening can be linked to a series of events beginning in 2013 with the disclosures by former NSA employee Edward Snowden followed by Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, the Brexit referendum, the 2019 European Parliament election, and various EU member states’ national elections. The Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 helped put the spotlight on big US technology companies and the need to better regulate them. Similarly, the onset of international discussions over the Chinese 5G provider Huawei that same year raised greater awareness of EU technology vulnerabilities. In parallel to this, **the global impact of the EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation** (GDPR), even if unexpected, **turned the EU into a** global technology actor **and showed it the way to leverage the attractiveness and power of its internal market.** **Equipped with** these influential regulatory tools, **the EU is now seeking to become the global leader in the regulation of digital tech**nologies. EU digital legislation is no longer just inward-looking. **The union** now **proactively seeks to leverage its regulatory capacity and nurture digital partnerships and alliances to globally project its values**. Building on previous successes, **the EU is now in the process of implementing innovative regulatory regimes for** AI, data governance, **and** digital platforms **that**, like the GDPR, **have the potential to go global.** This **new geopolitical logic underpins several new EU geo-technology initiatives**. In the EU-US TTC, launched in 2021, the union and the US are currently negotiating enhanced cooperation in technology and standards development, digital regulation, connectivity investments, and the security aspects of advanced technologies. The swift and harmonised EU and US export controls on advanced technologies imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February this year are the first success story of this new transatlantic technology cooperation. Beyond the EU-US TTC, **the EU has announced a new TTC with India**, **launched its first digital partnership with Japan**, **while negotiating additional partnerships with Singapore and So**uth **Ko**rea. With the Global Gateway initiative, **the EU seeks to link digital development investments in lower income countries with values-based digital regulation and geopolitical thinking.** The **EU** has also **taken steps to reduce its tech**nological **vulnerabilities and asymmetric dependencies through investment in technological capabilities**. These efforts have been heavily influenced by China’s technological assertiveness, the US-EU technology clashes during the Trump administration, and most recently the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Along these lines, **the EU has developed new** instruments **and** cooperation **mechanisms**, **such as the Toolbox for 5G security and the Joint Cyber Unit, to secure EU cyberspace** To further strengthen its technological capabilities and reduce its asymmetric dependencies, **the union is decisively investing in the development of critical tech**nologies **including** semiconductors, through the European Chips Act; supercomputing, through the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking; **and** 6G development, for example, through the Hexa-X project. Moreover, **the EU has rolled out a host of strategies addressing issues at the nexus of digital tech**nology **and geopolitics**, **including the 2030** Digital Compass**, the** Strategic Compass**, the** Cybersecurity Strategy, **and the** Standardisation Strategy. The breadth of the issues addressed in these various efforts underscore the ubiquity of geo-technological dynamics across diverse policy fields. While the EU was building its digital standing, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time. As so often, war became an accelerator of existing trends. Long before Russia’s invasion on 24 February, Ukraine had become ground zero for Russian digital and hybrid warfare, with hundreds of thousands of cyber-attacks and mass disinformation campaigns intended to destabilise the country, undermine Ukraine’s democratically elected government, confuse Western public opinion, and ensure the global south will rally around Russia. In its response to the war, the West has deployed massive sanctions on advanced technologies with the intention of paralysing Russia’s industrial base and weakening its military capabilities. And while the Kremlin has prohibited and blocked several foreign digital platforms in Russia to impede the flow of outside information into the country, many other Western technology companies independently decided to cease operating in Russia. Both developments foreshadow a new digital iron curtain. The **war in Ukraine has** already **demonstrated that digital tech**nologies now **shape the response to international conflict.** The legislative and policy measures taken so far by the EU are commendable. However, there is still much to do. The EU continues to be a technology research powerhouse, but its success in the commercialisation and the securing of significant market shares in digital technologies has been limited. Today, Europe is lagging in the development of advanced technologies including semiconductors, AI, and cloud and high-performance computing. As the EU rolls out initiative after initiative, a cohesive strategy is missing to tie these measures together to improve coordination, set priorities, and identify gaps. Due to a lack of information, resources, and engagement the union is currently not realising its full potential – and not reaping the full geopolitical benefits of its digital policy efforts. Because such an overarching framework is lacking, important information is not flowing between the relevant Brussels and member state institutions and towards the EU delegations around the world that play a crucial role in forwarding European digital foreign policy interests. Both the European Commission and the member states have identified these challenges. The commission’s 2030 Digital Compass, approved in March 2020, said that the EU needs a “comprehensive and coordinated approach to digital coalition-building and diplomatic outreach”. This is a position shared by the member states, which at the 12 July 2021 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) called for the EU high representative and vice president (HRVP) and the commission “to formulate a comprehensive, ambitious European external digital policy in coherence with existing internal policies”. The diagnosis is clear. If the EU wants to become a global technology actor, it must develop and deploy digital diplomacy tools. The next three sections spell out in detail how to deliver on this mandate and propose a policy approach along three dimensions: values, security, and markets. More precisely, they lay out a path: 1. to promote a human rights-focused and rules-based global technological order; 2. to secure the EU, its partners, and other like-minded countries in the analogical and digital worlds; 3. to promote fair, open, sustainable, and inclusive digital markets.

#### The EU can enhance security cooperation with NATO on cyber---EU funding solves better than the AFF.

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Last but not least, NATO also develops an important cooperation with the EU on cyber defence. Both organizations have enhanced their cooperation in cyber defence since their joint declaration at the Alliance summit in Warsaw in 2016. They regularly organize common training and exercises and develop information sharing in order to raise mutual. Cooperation is even more needed in a context of limited financial resources: some experts suggest using the Berlin Plus agreements in cyber defence. The EU and NATO have also concluded a technical agreement between their response teams for cyber incidents (NCIRC and CERT-EU) in February 2016 to intensify their cooperation on cyber defence. This agreement has been enforced to discuss cyber threats in the context of 2019 European elections for instance.

#### **EU-NATO cooperation is key to cyber security.**

Shea 19 (Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, “EU-NATO COOPERATION A SECURE VISION FOR EUROPE,” Spring 2019, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/dp\_2018\_web.pdf)//JRD

To **strengthen** inter-organisational **cyber** **security** and **cyber** **defence** **cooperation**, the **EU** and **NATO** should solve the political blockage, develop **joint** **action** plans to be implemented by member states and do away with technical issues such as the lack of **formal** **agreements** between **institutions**. The work done at staff-to-staff level must now be replicated at the national level by launching and investing in joint activities and projects that will increase member states’ capabilities. While top representatives spoke of ‘prioritising strengthened cooperation’ at the 2016 and 2018 NATO summits, more should be done to generate investments from the capitals. The following **policy** **proposals** aim to **designate** a number of **joint** **activities** with an aim to create more **substantial** **cooperation** among the member states of both organisations. A **strong** **political** support and **prioritisation** is **necessary** also from the **key** **capitals**. First and foremost, an EU-NATO working group on cyber security and defence issues must be established. These topics must also be regular agenda items in other joint working and high political level meetings, such as the EUNATO capability development group and the NAC-PSC meetings. This new working group should discuss policy themes where closer cooperation can create **synergy** (synchronising **crisis** **response** mechanisms, speeding **political** **decision-making**, developing **joint** **response** options to **cyberattacks**, etc). Joint working groups at the subject matter expert level should explore possibilities to **develop** **joint** **research** and **innovation** **programmes** and coordinate **national** and **union-level** **activities** in the area of **emerging technologies** (including 5G and artificial intelligence). Joint education and training courses should be created with the first step of opening all existing courses to each other’s officials and member states. The EU must be granted observer status at the Steering Committee of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (**CCD COE**), as suggested by the Allied Command Transformation. Formal cooperation – including technical arrangements for **information sharing** – must also be established with ENISA and other relevant EU bodies (such as the Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre and EU-CERT) in order to facilitate participating in each other’s exercises. Closer cooperation between **research and competence** centres is needed to **jointly develop** doctrine and concepts, and launch **common research** projects in areas such as **cyber activities** in the grey space, **supply chain security**, **military dependencies** on civilian **critical infrastructure** (such as energy, transport and finance), including how do develop common methodology to assess inter-dependencies. The NATO Cyber Defence Pledge could also be applied to **non-NATO EU countries** and possibly in third countries. The resiliency requirements and cyber security standards of the EU and NATO should be complementary and ensure the minimum common level of protection in all countries. Information sharing between the organisations has been improved but more should be done to create joint threat assessments and intelligence sharing for attribution of cyberattacks. The EU and NATO should continue synchronising their hybrid threats playbooks with a view to creating joint responses. They must also synchronise cyber defence capabilities development **roadmaps and experiences** on improving civilmilitary information sharing. One way forward is through joint EU-NATO joint exercises, be they technical, crisis management or table-top style. The table-top exercises at the subject matter expert and ambassadors, foreign and defence ministers level should explore the application of EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox and joint response options. More joint action is also needed to promote the **application of international law**, confidence building measures, and state responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Both organisations should create common cyber capability **building programmes**, including **joint trust funds**, for the third countries. In the area of cyber defence, the EU and NATO should explore options on how to use the sovereign effects of the NATO Cyberspace Operations Centre with a view to support future EU missions and operations. PESCO’s recent ‘Cyber Rapid Response Team’ initiative – comprised of nine participating EU member states – could be deployed to assist non-EU NATO countries and third countries to prevent, detect and respond to cyber incidents.

### Block – Solvency – AI

#### The CP solves all of case and revitalizes tech cooperation.

Franke 21 [Franke, Ulrike Esther. ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123. Accessed 20 Jun. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123.%20Accessed%2020%20Jun.%202022). //ArchanSen]

International competition on technology, such as 5G, has recently attracted significant attention. At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, for example, tech was an important topic – yet the discussion was not really about tech, but about power, as the rivalry over who builds 5G telecommunications infrastructure turned into a US-Chinese competition. This was despite the fact that the leading 5G providers are European and Chinese.

There is a growing realisation that the adoption of AI-enabled systems may have geopolitical consequences and eventually affect the global balance of power. In particular, AI may give one actor considerable power over others, be it in the form of an economic boost or an AI-enabled military advantage, or through control over crucial technology components and standards.

In the US, there is growing concern over the possibility that China might become too strong an AI actor. The competition over global leadership between the US and China is intensifying, with technology in general, and AI in particular, as battlefields. The US fears that AI may give China a competitive edge. Therefore, countering China’s AI ambitions – as embodied in its attempts to dominate international technology standards bodies, for example – has become an important motive for the US to seek international cooperation. In this context, Joe Biden has proposed an “alliance of liberal democracies” to present an economic and political alternative to China.

### Block – Solvency – A2: Interoperability

#### The EU is capable of coordinating military interoperability with NATO.

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In a world marked by COVID-19, deeper social divisions, more vulnerable supply chains, and increased competition in the international arena, the roles of NATO and the EU and their ability to tackle global challenges are constantly being questioned. Moreover, with the proliferation of ad hoc coalitions to tackle specific challenges, the two organizations are constantly fighting for relevance and space to operate. In this context, as this paper has shown, both NATO and the EU have more to gain through joining forces rather than competing with one another. In light of the arguments developed so far, some broad policy recommendations appear relevant: 1. NATO and EU member states should leverage their policy fora to discuss joint initiatives and better employ their assets — NATO’s military capabilities and logistical systems and the EU’s capacity building and financial assistance. This would enable a more coordinated approach to crises based on a division of labor agreed to on a case-by-case basis. Learning from past experiences, the two organizations should work to avoid another “Afghanistan scenario” in areas like the Sahel region. 2. NATO and the EU should increase information sharing and establish protocols in crucial sectors from anti-terrorism cooperation to cybersecurity. The periodic joint exercises performed so far are important steps toward building confidence and fostering regular updates and the sharing of best practices. Yet insufficient information sharing and the lack of protocols in case of a crisis hinder the utility of the exercises conducted. While this recommendation ultimately depends on political will, some smaller channels could be created to streamline limited but vital information, especially in the event of a cyberattack. 3. Regarding disinformation, NATO should take advantage of the EU’s apparatus and support it with its own solid structure for intelligence gathering — instead of having NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division duplicate the work of the EU StratCom task force. Alternatively, because countering disinformation is not the main job of the division, NATO could create a separate disinformation unit to work closely with the EU’s task force. Coordinating efforts to tackle different outlets of disinformation could help reduce the overall burden. In both scenarios, the two organizations should not just seek to counter disinformation but also prevent it as much as possible. 4. NATO and the EU should increase their dialogue on regulations and impediments to military mobility and interoperability. NATO’s deeper expertise on strategic airlifting and military operations could help the EU improve regulations to facilitate military mobility. More broadly, NATO should leverage EU regulatory power in conjunction with its objectives when it comes to capacity building as well as in countering China’s multifaceted influence. 5. To reinforce NATO’s posture in Europe and elsewhere, the EU should boost its military capability (as member states’ militaries contribute to NATO’s single set of forces). Enhanced military capabilities would also enable the EU to intervene independently from the United States in theaters that are no longer security priorities for Washington. European countries will need to assess their defense spending for greater efficiency and assess the advantages of a more integrated procurement system. While doing so, Europeans should consider mechanisms to enable the U.S. defense industry to participate; this could minimize the economic losses, foster technological development and cooperation on a trans-Atlantic level, and reduce dependence on geopolitically risky supplies. 6. NATO and the EU should foster cooperation in procurement and capability development to increase interoperability, including through the establishment of similar standards. This would enhance military mobility and interoperability across Europe and other theaters like the Indo-Pacific, where the engagement of the U.S. and Europe is growing.

#### EU-NATO security cooperation solves interoperability---PESCO and the EDA prove past successes.

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Improved military mobility and interoperability While an increased European military posture is important per se, quick deployment and interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space is equally important. For this reason, NATO-EU cooperation appears even more relevant when it comes to military mobility, interoperability and procurement. Military mobility — defined as the ability to deploy and move thousands of troops across the European territory — is crucial to project an effective deterrence and is a key area where NATO-EU cooperation has been the most successful. Many factors slow mobility and therefore negatively impact the readiness of European defense, such as infrastructure incompatibility, as well as complex regulations on the transportation of weapons or military equipment. In 2019, NATO countries identified concrete steps to increase their military mobility, with the goal of being able to deploy 30 ground battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combatant ships in the span of 30 days.49 The steps focus on four main areas: (1) developing and strengthening infrastructure, (2) improving strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, (3) strengthening the command and control line as well as planning for better coordination on a large scale, and (4) easing legal and diplomatic procedures across the military and civilian sectors to facilitate clearance processes. However, an Atlantic Council report has noted some significant gaps within each of the above listed sectors, which include a lack of resources and institutional weakness in tackling military mobility. As military mobility has important repercussions for strategic projection and procurement,50 it should be an area where NATO and the EU could have a more constructive dialogue. Strategic location is not currently a prime criterion for the evaluation of new defense projects in the EU, as the union is not a military power and is not used to strategic thinking in the military field. For this reason, the EU could benefit from NATO geostrategic experience to identify areas where more resources are needed and how they could be put to better use when considering geographical factors. For safer military mobility, such infrastructure should also be made more resilient to cyberattacks. Given its regulatory power, the European Union could play a valuable role in easing military mobility by establishing simpler processes to attain custom and border permissions for the transportation of, for example, dangerous goods or military equipment. The EU is also well placed to strengthen roads and infrastructure that are crucial for military mobility. In fact, the EU has launched the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects, a series of studies and activities designed to eliminate bottlenecks to mobility across the continent by, for example, completing missing sections of transit corridors and developing new dual-use (civilian and military) infrastructure projects.51 EU countries have also started featuring military mobility in their defense projects under PESCO and have set parameters for non-EU members to join; for example, Canada, Norway, and the United States are expected to participate in a PESCO project led by the Netherlands to test the state of military mobility in Europe.52 Improving military mobility across the trans-Atlantic space would positively impact the interoperability of allied armed forces — specifically their ability to be deployed and to operate with one another across the territory of the alliance. NATO and the EU can already count on deep interoperability because they share the forces of 21 countries that are member states of both organizations. Yet, as there are important asymmetries in military capabilities across the EU and more broadly across the alliance space, interoperability is in constant need of improvement. So far, one success story of NATO-EU interoperability has been the technological cooperation between the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) on air-to-air refueling operations (transferring fuel from one military aircraft to another in mid-air). This cooperation helped address one of the biggest EU defense shortfalls.53 In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the AUKUS deal that marks the United States’ pivot toward the Indo-Pacific region, the debate over European defense has sharpened and more funds are being allocated to the European Defense Fund to strengthen the union’s military posture. In fact, the third EU “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility” has noted significant progress since October 2020, including on custom formalities and work with the EDA on two Cross-Border Movement Permission Technical Arrangements.54 Most importantly, from next year onward, EU member states can use funding from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility to invest in transport, including dual-use infrastructure.55 The EU also has a budget of 330 million euros (roughly $375 million) for co-funding projects (subjects to call for proposals) on dual-use infrastructure.56 While this level of ambition is certainly welcome because of its positive impact on EU defense capabilities, the EDA and NSPA should closely coordinate their efforts in order to increase interoperability and ultimately NATO and EU resilience and readiness toward international security threats.

## China INB

### Block – Solves Semiconductors

#### The CP solves the entirety of case and creates broad EU-NATO coop – tech is key.

FOE 21 [Friends of Europe, Peace, Security & Defence Summit 2021 — Autumn 2021. “Strategic foresight: a zero-sum game? The EU Strategic Compass and NATO 2030” <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PSD-summit.pdf> DOA: 6/24/2022 //ArchanSen]

Building up defence capacity must focus on innovation, as new technological developments, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, quantum warfare and increasingly complex cyber threats, present a growing challenge, the summit was told.

“Our competitors are shaping the environment, they are competing every day, the threats are permanent, they are boundless, and they are simultaneously used … we have to manage that,” cautioned General Philippe Lavigne, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

“We need more and more innovation to adapt faster, to be agile and we need innovation coming from our societies, open innovation, in order to continue to get the advantage,” he said in a pre-recorded interview from Allied Command Transformation in Virginia.

The technology is moving fast and although NATO has what Lavigne called “the best military thinking package in a generation”, it still has to accelerate change to keep ahead of its rivals amid an increasingly complex tech landscape.

“The new plane will not be a new plane in the future. It will be a system of systems, it will be sensors linked to platforms, linked to space, linked to multi-domain. That’s collaborative welfare,” the general explained.

However, there was a word of caution against over-reliance on technology from Ian Bond, Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform in London.

“Russia’s seizure of Crimea was low-tech; the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan was no-tech,” he wrote on the summit’s chat line. “How does NATO avoid reliance on vulnerable technology like GPS, satellite comms and space-based sensors and how does it ensure that it can defeat adversaries that don’t rely on superior technology but on better tactics?”

Speakers underscored the importance of working with the private sector to ensure the latest technology is available to defend against offensive threats from authoritarian regimes and rogue players.

“We have complex issues to solve and the world is volatile, and it is in a state of disarray,” cautioned Jane Frankland, award-winning leader, best-selling author, speaker and women’s activist.

“National, international and online threats are becoming progressively integrated as our enemies develop new means to exploit vulnerabilities across borders, and between the cyber and physical worlds,” she added, naming China, North Korea and Iran among the countries developing more effective offensive cyber capabilities. “We have more threats, more costly breaches, and the speed and intensity of these attacks continue to challenge every part of our ecosystem.”

Technology presents a “great opportunity” for further EU-NATO cooperation, said Andrea G. Rodríguez, Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB). She welcomed the Alliance’s push to set up the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) by 2023 to provide a network of technology test centres and accelerator sites to harness civilian innovation for security. It could cooperate fruitfully with the EU’s proposed innovation hub within the European Defence Agency, Rodríguez said.

Innovation efforts should focus on quantum computing, AI, hypersonic and some bio technologies, she added, “the technologies keeping me up at night”.

“We are entering a time in which everything is hyper-connected,” Rodríguez said. “With quantum computing and quantum communications and other quantum applications that may emerge, it will be like going to war with horses, instead of like going to war with tanks, because the capacity lead will be so big,” she cautioned. “The first one who gets it will have a strategic advantage. That’s something that, as NATO or as Europe, … we shouldn’t let happen.”

#### Collaboration is key to solve semiconductor supply shocks.

Tyson and Zysman 22, \* Laura Tyson, a former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of the Board of Advisers at Angeleno Group. \*\* John Zysman, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is Co-Founder of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy., (Laura and John, “From Sanctions to Semiconductor Resilience and Security”, Project Syndicate, March 22, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-the-west-can-secure-its-semiconductor-supply-chain-by-laura-tyson-and-john-zysman-2022-03) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Russia's war in Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of sprawling supply chains and underscored the importance of key technological inputs like semiconductors. With much of the world united in holding Russia to account, the moment is perfect for deepening multilateral collaboration in strategically vital industries.

BERKELEY – To be effective, economic sanctions depend on multilateral coordination. Freezing the Russian central bank’s holdings and kicking Russian banks out of the SWIFT financial messaging system for international payments in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are groundbreaking moves. But such measures will be successful only if there are no (or at least very few) ways to circumvent them. Their implementation and enforcement must be truly multilateral, extending beyond NATO and the transatlantic community. The unprecedented multilateral response to Russia’s war is an opportunity for the United States and its allies to strengthen their collaboration on a wide range of shared security and economic issues. Consider the semiconductor industry, which is crucial for today’s economy and for national security. The sanctions limiting Russian access to semiconductors depend on support from TSMC in Taiwan and Samsung in South Korea, the leading global producers of both commodity chips and the more advanced chips used in many weapons systems.

Policy collaboration in the semiconductor sector can and should extend beyond the sanctions. There are many promising opportunities for collaboration among the economies that form the core of today’s complex semiconductor supply chain: the US, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel. All are investing significant public funds and deploying industrial, research, training, trade, and cross-border investment policies to increase their semiconductor producers’ capabilities. Multilateral policy coordination in the semiconductor industry should aim to ensure a competitive, resilient, secure, and sustainable (CRSS) supply of semiconductors to meet the significant increase in global demand over the next decade. Given the global dispersion of research, production, talent, and knowledge, this goal cannot be accomplished through technological autarky or isolationist self-sufficiency.

The concentration of chip production in Asia – where China accounts for a growing share – poses a long-term threat to CRSS. The solution is to invest significantly more in US and European semiconductor production capabilities, particularly for the most advanced chips. This need not exclude Asian companies and Asian allies. For Asian producers, locating some production facilities in the US and Europe would provide protection against regional supply-chain shocks.

#### EU inter-coordination and strategic autonomy are key to Euro semiconductor stability---only domestic capacities and geopolitical leverage provide resilience against competition and shocks.

Poitiers 21, Research Fellow for Bruegel, Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona, a M.Sc. in economics from the Universität Bonn, and a B.Sc. from Universität Mannheim. (Niclas, “Digital European Economic Sovereignty? The Case of Semiconductors” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

2.1 The Global Semiconductor Industry in a Geopolitical Storm The US-China conflict is often portrayed as a ’technological cold war’5 , where leadership in new technologies is key to obtaining or retaining economic supremacy. The EU, while being at the forefront of digital regulation, all the while harnessing the ‘Brussels effect’6 , relies on both the US and China for many digital goods and services. This leaves the EU caught in between the US-China rivalry. The highly specialised and globalised Informatics and Communication Technologies (ICT) industry and its core technology – semiconductors – is an interesting case study. Semiconductors are one of the most strategically important sectors of the modern economy. They have a wide range of use – from memory chips over sensors to processors – and are essential parts of the value chains in many industries. Semiconductors are embedded in all types of modern goods, from manufacturing machinery, computers and smartphones, 5G transmitters, medical equipment, cars to everyday household appliances. ICT goods are the most important Chinese export good. In 2019, they account for over 27% of Chinese total exports and 96% of high-tech exports from China to the US.7 Telecommunications equipment account for over 30% of EU imports from China. 8 However, for the most crucial input to these ICT goods – semiconductors – China is dependent on foreign inputs. As a result, semiconductors have become China’s single largest import, surpassing even oil (see Figure 1). China’s foreign dependency in its biggest industry has made semiconductors a critical target for US trade policy and sanctions. Semiconductors and related equipment account for a quarter of the US exports subject to the Phase I trade agreement9 , and the technology is used for targeted sanctions against Chinese companies10. Unsurprisingly, the development of ‘home-grown’ semiconductors is an important goal of Chinese industrial policy11. For such high-end products, know-how and production capacities are highly specialised but they are also integrated at the global level12. A few countries are home to cutting-edge semiconductor production capacities: the US, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Europe and increasingly, China. But to date, no country has achieved self-sufficiency in the sector13. In fact, according to one study14, the semiconductor value chain is made up of three steps along which high coordination between firms is required: 1) design; 2) fabrication; and 3) assembly (see Figure 2). Some firms, Integrated Design Manufacturers (IDM), do the first two steps and represent about half of the overall semiconductor market. The below analysis focuses on firms that only provide one production step15. The design phase specifies the physical architecture of the semiconductor by laying its functions and the electronic components that will be needed for production. The US is by far the leader in design with firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia and AMD, but it is followed by Taiwan with Mediatek, Novatek and Realtek. However, Chinese market shares are increasing fast16 and Chinese firms such as Unigroup and Huawei subsidiary HiSilicon are important in this regard. Semiconductor designs rely on specific software for which the market is highly concentrated around three US-based firms – Cadence, Synopsy, Mentor –, and it is on this part of the value chain that US sanctions were most effective in blocking Huawei HiSilicon productions.

CHART OMITTED

The second production step – fabrication - is highly technical and the most capital-intensive and $ billions worth of upfront investments would be needed to catch-up to market leaders.17 Fabrication is concentrated around a few global players, with market leaders being Taiwan’s TSMC and Korea’s Samsung. The third and last step – assembly - is comparatively labour intensive and reaps lower profit margins. Over the years, this market has consolidated across countries and firms and Taiwan is by far the leader in the sector with several top firms, notably ASE Group, while the US has only one assembly firm, Amkor Technologies. In this sector, China managed to increase significantly its market share with firms such as JCET. Along these production steps, machinery, inputs of raw materials such as silicon and chemicals are required, corresponding to markets that are also very concentrated. The US, EU and Japan are the biggest suppliers in those peripherical markets and leading EU firms include Dutch ASMLA (machinery), German Aixtron (chemicals) and French Riber (machinery)18. Overall, the high degree of specialisation and concentration as well as the capital-intense nature and high degree of cross-country interdependence of the semiconductor sector expose its supply chain to political risks. Due to its strategic nature, it has been a target for sanctions by the US administration. The lack of availability of substitutes makes export bans particularly effective for impacting production lines. US export bans on American-made technologies have put a dent in Huawei’s production capacities19 and in SMIC’s (China’s most promising foundry) ambitions to produce high-end semiconductors20. Leverage over bottlenecks have been used by others too, and Japan imposed export bans on crucial components to South Korea in 201921. These sanctions have ripple effects through the entire industry and on its customers. Shortages caused by increased demand for ICT goods during the pandemic have been aggravated by stockpiling by Chinese firms in reaction to US sanctions, leading to shortages in 202022. As a result, the car manufacturing industry is reportedly facing challenges in upholding its production lines, as technology companies are favoured in semiconductor deliveries23. While the US uses its central position in these supply chains to exert leverage over China, China is trying to catch-up and become technologically independent. China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ plan includes the stated goal of a 70% semiconductor market share for Chinese companies in 2025. However, when looking at the intermediate goal for 2020, it becomes clear how large the challenge is: while China aimed at a 40% market share by 2020, it had only reached 19% share in 2019 in the assembly, and it seems highly unlikely that it will gain the leadership in all segments targeted by the State Council for 2030. The Chinese state plans to invest $118 billion in government funds over 5 years into domestic production24. While this investment is considerable, it seems insufficient to achieve technological leadership in this highly specialised and competitive sector. The global investment into R&D by the industry alone was $68 billion in 202025, and capital investment is considerably as well: TSMC announced capital spending of $25 to $28 billion for 202126. 2.2 Consequences for the EU and its Digital Sovereignty The semiconductor industry is characterised by a high degree of interdependence between China, Taiwan, South Korea, the US and the EU. While the US is currently leading in cutting-edge chip design and also fabrication, value chains are highly integrated across the jurisdictions. Recent US actions have indeed put these integrated value chains into distress. China has responded by investing into its own capacities but reportedly is still some years away from being able to become self-sufficient. Although the EU is making headway in defining what it means by ‘open strategic autonomy’27, in strategic sectors like the semiconductor industry more tools and a clear vision are still needed. This is especially the case considering that other global leaders (US, Taiwan, Japan, China) have endorsed roadmaps and invested massively to support this strategic sector28. On the one hand, the EU is committed to keeping its markets open to foreign competition and ensuring cheap supplies of valuable input into its productions processes and consumer goods markets. Some may even argue that the ‘tech war’ between the US and China offers an opportunity to free-ride on cheap products, as both countries subsidise their tech sector. On the other hand, the EU is likely to be vulnerable to significant pressure from both the US and China in the coming years when it comes to the digital sector. In our view, a central pillar in the EU’s strategy needs to be substantial investments in research and production capacities in the sector. These investments need to be protected from technology transfers through a strong investment screening mechanism. The recent case of the US pressuring the Dutch government to cancel the sale of semiconductor machinery to China29, whether for economic or security purposes, begs questions of what the EU strategy is. At the same time, the highly specialised nature of this key sector exemplifies the benefits of global value chains. A strategy to reach full independence from foreign inputs in the sector seems not only extremely costly, but also unfeasible for Europe, China and even the US, at least in the coming years. In our view, European industrial policy should create more domestic production capacities without aiming at import substitution. Rather than import substitution, diversification of supplies, both with new domestic supplies as well as additional foreign supplies, would reduce vulnerabilities. Moreover, a greater weight of EU-based production capacities in global supply chains can give the EU leverage. A threat by a trading partner to interrupt supplies could then be counteracted with threats to equally disrupt supplies. Crucially, this leverage should be used to improve the resilience of this industry through plurilateral cooperation and by strengthening multilateral trade institutions. In practice, the real question is whether the EU could have the instruments and the political capacity to retaliate with such threats. Strategic sovereignty implies an ability to jointly take stock of economic and security interests. The EU manages separately sectoral policies and this fragmentation of tasks between member states and the EU is a weakness in today’s world of increased geopolitical tensions. Medium term, the EU needs to consider changing its decision-making processes in foreign policy related matters. The European Commission President’s idea to reconsider the unanimity requirement in foreign policy is worthwhile, though with major implications beyond the scope of this chapter.

### Block – Demand k Semconductors

#### European domestic semiconductor production is close --- but increased defense technology demand is necessary to spur production

Machi ‘21

(Vivienne, Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine“How will Europe’s planned semiconductor strategy affect its nations’ military ambitions?,” pg online @ <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/10/10/how-will-europes-planned-semiconductor-strategy-affect-its-nations-military-ambitions/> //um-ef)

The European Union wants to build its own microchip manufacturing capability to counterbalance the dominant Asian market and ensure enduring technological sovereignty. Industry officials have separately called for a pan-European electronics strategy, but until a recent EU proposal becomes concrete legislation, the long-term effects on military programs may prove difficult to gauge. EU leaders recently announced the European Chips Act meant to support increased research, design and testing capacity as well as ensure national investments are coordinated with those of the broader union. “The aim is to jointly create a state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem, including production, that ensures our security of supply and will develop new markets for ground-breaking European tech,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her Sept. 15 state of the union address in Strasbourg, France. The ultimate goal is to increase Europe’s global share of semiconductor production to 20 percent by 2030, per the commission. Digital technology is the “make-or-break issue” facing the European market today, and “there is no digital without chips,” she said. While the global demand for semiconductors has exploded, the European share of designing and manufacturing those microchips has diminished, and nations have largely become reliant on Asian-made products, she noted. The COVID-19 pandemic sparked a global microchip shortage that prompted other governments, including the United States, to introduce a domestic semiconductor strategy, as the chips enable systems in virtually every sector from the military to health care and from computers to clean energy. Nations are developing interconnected, highly software-enabled platforms to operate in increasingly joint environments, and “digitalization” has become a buzzword across the global defense sphere. In Europe, those platforms include the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System program that would ultimately feature a next-generation fighter, unmanned drones, and a slew of sophisticated sensors and weaponry, all interconnected with each other. Meanwhile, NATO has highlighted “emerging and disruptive technologies” as a key focus area for the alliance. Many of the technologies it cited will rely on digitalization. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy are also co-researching and developing cutting-edge technologies to enable sixth-generation air combat platforms under their own initiative, dubbed Tempest by the British. Industry and government officials involved in that effort were asked about domestic electronics sourcing during a panel discussion at the biennial DSEI conference in London last month, which took place the same day as von der Leyen’s speech. A conference attendee asked whether the British-led effort would rely on European-sourced and -manufactured parts, rather than Chinese or American electronics. Richard Berthon, director of future combat air for the British Defence Ministry, said his team will access the global market for parts “where it’s cost-effective, [and] where our sovereignty and security are not impaired.” Berthon emphasized that the program office is taking security “incredibly seriously,” and that the entire Tempest enterprise “is all about ensuring that for the U.K., we’ve got the technology we need, the skills we need, that we can secure those, and we can sustain them over time.” Another panelist, Saab Deputy chief executive Anders Carp, called for a “pan-European or pan-Western strategy” to help governments and their industry partners prioritize key technology research and development efforts. Saab represents Swedish industry participation in the British-led aircraft push. The electronics sourcing conversation is broader than just one such technology initiative — or the fighter aircraft portfolio — and could encompass some other mix of trusted allies and partners, Carp noted. However it’s organized, “there should be some sort of strategy in place to look at how do we make sure that we don’t end up being reliant on someone ... that we don’t want to be reliant on, or may not want to be reliant on in the future,” he said in an interview with Defense News. When it comes to the broader Tempest effort, industry partners are discussing these issues “at a headline level,” as the program’s design phase remains in the study stages, Carp noted. Multiple European industry representatives declined to comment on the European Chips Act, citing the recent nature of the initiative. The EU has yet to announce when the European Chips Act might be formally unveiled or voted on. Thierry Breton, the European commissioner for internal markets, laid out proposed elements of the effort in a Sept. 15 LinkedIn post, including building European-based fabrication plants and establishing a European semiconductor fund. With 27 EU members, there will be divergent opinions involved in developing the legislation and “a lot of different interests on the ground level,” said Dan Darling, a senior analyst for Forecast International, a U.S. market intelligence firm. The focus on domestic semiconductor sovereignty makes sense, but the EU needs to move from “a declaration of vision and intent” to actual momentum, he said. Europe is home to a plethora of defense electronics companies, and a domestic supply of resources is sure to trickle up eventually, he added. That being said, European defense contractors have established business relationships with overseas chip suppliers — such as Samsung in South Korea and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — not the existing suppliers on their own continent, said Franz-Stefan Gady, a cyber, space and future conflict fellow at the London-based think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies. “At the moment, European advanced semiconductor manufacturers produce low-volume niche products with limited military applicability,” he told Defense News. Some such niche products could make headway in Europe, like those related to aerospace sensors, or security chips for crypto processing and other cybersecurity technologies. But it’s unlikely European chipmakers would supply individual European nations’ defense industries over the next two decades, as the expense would be too great even with strong political will behind the effort, Gady added. “There is no real market and very little genuine demand from the European defense industry for indigenous European products en masse, despite paying lip service to the concept of strategic autonomy,” he said. Von der Leyen, who previously served as Germany’s defense minister, acknowledged in her speech that boosting sovereign semiconductor manufacturing capabilities will be a “daunting task,” but one required at this point in time to support both European competitiveness and technological sovereignty. “Let’s put all of our focus on it,” she said.

### Block – Impact – Supply Shocks

#### Taiwan’s a supply choke-point---it’s vulnerable now, and shocks ripple globally.

Crawford et al 21, Bloomberg News, (Alan Crawford, Jarrell Dillard, Helene Fouquet, and Isabel Reynolds, “The World Is Dangerously Dependent on Taiwan for Semiconductors”, Bloomberg News, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-25/the-world-is-dangerously-dependent-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

As China pushes the world to avoid official dealings with Taiwan, leaders across the globe are realizing just how dependent they’ve become on the island democracy. Taiwan, which China regards as a province, is being courted for its capacity to make leading-edge computer chips. That’s mostly down to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s largest foundry and go-to producer of chips for Apple Inc. smartphones, artificial intelligence and high-performance computing. Taiwan’s role in the world economy largely existed below the radar, until it came to recent prominence as the auto industry suffered shortfalls in chips used for everything from parking sensors to reducing emissions. With carmakers including Germany’s Volkswagen AG, Ford Motor Co. of the U.S. and Japan’s Toyota Motor Corp. forced to halt production and idle plants, Taiwan’s importance has suddenly become too big to ignore.

U.S., European and Japanese automakers are lobbying their governments for help, with Taiwan and TSMC being asked to step in. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron discussed the potential for shortages last year and agreed on the need to accelerate Europe’s push to develop its own chip industry, according to a French official with knowledge of the matter. The auto industry’s pleas illustrate how TSMC’s chip-making skills have handed Taiwan political and economic leverage in a world where technology is being enlisted in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China -- a standoff unlikely to ease under the administration of Joe Biden.

Taiwan’s grip on the semiconductor business -- despite being under constant threat of invasion by Beijing -- also represents a choke point in the global supply chain that’s giving new urgency to plans from Tokyo to Washington and Beijing to increase self-reliance. By dominating the U.S.-developed model of outsourcing chip manufacture, Taiwan “is potentially the most critical single point of failure in the entire semiconductor value chain,” said Jan-Peter Kleinhans, director of the technology and geopolitics project at Berlin-based think tank Stiftung Neue Verantwortung.

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The Trump administration exploited that pinch point to deny Beijing access to technology. By banning access to all U.S. chip technology including design, it was able to cut off the supply of semiconductors from TSMC and other foundries to Huawei Technologies, hobbling the advance of China’s biggest tech company. It also negotiated with TSMC to establish a $12 billion chip fabrication plant in Arizona. South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Co. is set to follow, with a $10 billion facility in Austin, Texas. The “CHIPS for America Act” introduced to Congress last year aims to encourage more plants to be established in the U.S. Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican, plans to reintroduce the bipartisan bill this year with a view to securing $25 billion in federal funds and tax incentives. McCaul said in a statement he’s working with colleagues in the House and Senate “to prioritize getting the remaining provisions of CHIPS signed into law as quickly as possible.” News that Intel Corp., the onetime industry leader, was considering outsourcing production of some chips to TSMC under its former CEO underscored the need for a U.S. player that can fabricate at the leading edge, said a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee staff who is not authorized to speak publicly. The European Union aims to bolster the bloc’s “technological sovereignty” through an alliance armed initially with as much as 30 billion euros ($36 billion) of public-private investment to raise Europe’s share of the global chip market to 20% (without a target date) from less than 10% now. It’s also encouraging Taiwan to increase investments in the 27-nation bloc, with some success. GlobalWafers Co. -- based in TSMC’s hometown of Hsinchu -- just boosted its offer for Germany’s Siltronic AG to value the company at 4.4 billion euros, an acquisition that would create the world’s largest silicon wafer maker by revenue.

That’s not to say Taiwan is the only player in the semiconductor supply chain. The U.S. still holds dominant positions, notably in chip design and electronic software tools; ASML Holding NV of the Netherlands has a monopoly on the machines needed to fabricate the best chips; Japan is a key supplier of equipment, chemicals and wafers. But as the emphasis shifts to ever smaller, more powerful chips that require less energy, TSMC is increasingly in a field of its own. And it’s helped Taiwan form a comprehensive ecosystem around it: ASE Technology Holding is the world’s top chip assembler, while MediaTek has become the largest smartphone chipset vendor.

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Tokyo, too, is attempting to attract TSMC to set up in Japan. With 110 billion yen ($1 billion) earmarked last year for R&D investment and another 90 billion yen for 2021, some of that may go to a TSMC facility, which reports have said the company is considering setting up in Japan. “TSMC is becoming more and more dominant,” said Kazumi Nishikawa, an official working on technology issues at Japan’s Economy Ministry. “This is something everybody in the chip industry must find a way to deal with.” China, in its five-year plan presented in October, is channeling help to the chip industry and other key technologies to the tune of $1.4 trillion through 2025. Yet even that kind of money doesn’t negate the need for Taiwan. Indeed, China has long tapped the island for chip-making talent; two key executives at China’s top chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., used to work at TSMC: co-Chief Executive Officer Liang Mong Song and Vice Chairman Chiang Shang-yi.

But with Washington stymieing China’s progress, there is also speculation that Beijing could resort to stealing chip IP, with Taiwan at the heart of those endeavors. Taiwanese cyber security firm TeamT5 has observed a steady increase in attacks on the island’s chip industry corresponding to the tightening of U.S. export controls on China. While it’s not always possible to know if these are Chinese state actors, “they are all attacking the Taiwanese semiconductor industry,” Shui Lee, a T5 cyber threat analyst, said. Fellow analyst Linda Kuo said the Taiwanese government was alarmed by a ransomware attack on TSMC in 2018 and had announced plans for some $500 million to help the industry become more aware of cyber security issues.

The greater worry is that TSMC’s chip factories could become collateral damage if China were to make good on threats to invade Taiwan if it moves toward independence. TSMC's capital spending of as much as $28 billion for this year suggests it's going to stay out in front. “Taiwan is the center of gravity of Chinese security policy,” said Mathieu Duchatel, director of the Asia program at the Institut Montaigne in Paris. Yet while Taiwan’s status in the global chip supply chain is a “huge strategic value,” it’s also a powerful reason for Beijing to stay away, said Duchatel, who’s just published a policy paper on China’s push for semiconductors. Assuming Taiwanese forces were to be overwhelmed during an invasion, “there is no reason why they would leave these facilities intact,” he said. And preserving the world’s most advanced fabs “is in the interests of everyone.”

#### Semiconductor supply shocks tank the economy AND US military capability.

Inboden and Klein 22, \*William Inboden is executive director of the Clements Center for National Security and associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. His previous service includes the State Department and National Security Council in the George W. Bush Administration.\*\* Adam Klein is deputy director of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and a faculty member at the University of Texas School of Law, Austin. He previously served as chairman of the U.S. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which oversees U.S. intelligence and homeland security programs., (William and Adam, “A lesson from the Ukraine war: Secure our semiconductor supply chains”, The Hill, May 22, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/3494860-a-lesson-from-the-ukraine-war-secure-our-semiconductor-supply-chains/) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

[Edited] for ableist language

That is the good news. But the war also holds a cautionary tale for the West: the peril of relying on supply chains that can be choked or cut by an adversary. Since the war’s outbreak, the United States and our allies have inflicted severe financial and industrial sanctions on Russia. Yet the effect of these sanctions has been blunted somewhat by Europe’s dependence on Russian energy exports, especially natural gas. While Russia has been cut off from other revenue sources, European money for oil and gas still flows into the Kremlin. Paradoxically, even as EU members send billions in military aid to Ukraine, they continue to pay Russia more than $20 billion per month for fossil fuels. The hard truth is that supply chains dependent on massive, capital-intensive facilities can’t be rerouted quickly when the guns begin to roar. Countries can rush to cobble together alternative supplies — witness Germany’s scramble to build liquefied natural gas terminals and ink a supply deal with Qatar. But the immense fixed costs mean that leading European economies such as Germany and Italy are largely at the mercy of existing dispositions. European leaders now regret that the continent made itself so reliant on Russian oil and gas.

For the United States, our most critical supply chain vulnerability is not in energy; it is in semiconductors. We are still among the world’s leaders in chip design, but America manufactures only about 12 percent of global chip output — a share that has declined steadily for three decades. Meanwhile, the United States is the world’s second-largest importer of chips, and we import almost three times as many semiconductors as we export. Almost all of those come from Asia. Considering that virtually all our electronics, including the device on which you are probably reading this article, rely on chips, it is no stretch to say that our daily lives — indeed, our national livelihood — depend on semiconductors. Fortunately, democratic Taiwan, not communist China, at the moment retains an overwhelming lead in this most critical commodity for the information economy. Yet Taiwan is the most likely target of aggression by Beijing. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has warned of the risk that China will attempt an invasion within five years. In an invasion or blockade, Taiwan’s more than 50 percent share of global advanced chip output would disappear immediately from the world market. If anything, that calamity actually understates the problem: Critical sea lanes around Taiwan also would be disrupted, because insurers would not cover ships passing near a war zone. This would prevent chips made in manufacturing hubs such as South Korea, Vietnam and Japan from reaching markets.

The resulting shortfalls would [rupture] ~~cripple~~ the supply chains that power global manufacturing, devastating the American economy. U.S. manufacturers, still trying to catch up from COVID-related disruptions, would struggle to produce airplanes, automobiles, home appliances, personal electronics, communications devices and countless other products and systems. Once these shortfalls arise, they are hard to make up — chip-making plants, or “fabs,” cost billions of dollars and take years to build. A chip-supply crisis would put American national defense at grave risk. Advanced precision munitions would be decisive in a war with China. Magazine depth — each country’s stockpile of precision munitions and ability to build more — would help decide which side would prevail, or at least outlast the other. American reliance on chip supplies from Asia would make it hard for American manufacturers to keep pace. In the 21st century, if we are to remain the Arsenal of Democracy, we must be able to make chips — and lots of them.

#### China holds 89% of materials for semiconductors---overreliance risks global shocks.

Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

“Some people felt like it would be mostly to talk about disputes with the Europeans over how to regulate the tech sector,” Padilla said. But after Russia invaded Ukraine, “people on both sides of the Atlantic got reminded that the U.S.-European relationship is the essential partnership — economically, politically and now militarily — in the world.” Those officials clearly felt a shared sense of urgency to onshore semiconductor manufacturing. At the TTC, they agreed to collaborate more closely on supply chain transparency and subsidy programs. The strong language contained in those clauses affirmed their commitment to an already aggressive onshoring strategy. The meeting also revealed the centrality of semiconductor manufacturing to U.S.-centric military objectives. For chip manufacturers, that means free-flowing subsidies for now, but at the cost of a potential overcapacity problem in the longer term.

National security “freak out” “You have to understand that these fabrication facilities, they are not being propped up because of pure economics concerns. They’re being propped up because of national security — people freaking out, really, that’s what it is,” Adi Rao, a PhD candidate in The Department of Government at Cornell, explained to Protocol. “The level of urgency that we’re seeing from government leaders in the U.S., Europe and Japan is driven mostly by the national security concern,” echoed Padilla. The pandemic-related supply chain crunch helped government officials realize their economies were entirely too dependent on Taiwan for semiconductors, he said. “Every government meeting I have, almost the first thing an official says is, ‘We cannot rely on just Taiwan for chips.’”

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China holds an estimated 89% of global rare earth separation capacity, the TCC statement pointed out. Those rare earth metals are critical to semiconductor manufacturing, and the entire industry worldwide is still entirely reliant on China in that sense. “If something were to happen between China and Taiwan, that would be catastrophic for the semiconductor industry,” Patrick Penfield, a professor of supply chain practice at Syracuse University, told Protocol. “If we were to do what we're doing to Russia, to China — you would talk about massive supply chain issues throughout the world.”

### Block – Solves European Economy

#### EU semiconductor production boosts European economies and technological sovereignty.

Kearney 21, Kearney is a leading global management consulting firm with more than 4,200 people working in more than 40 countries. Kearney works with more than three-quarters of the Fortune Global 500, as well as with the most influential governmental and non-profit organizations., (“Europe’s urgent need to invest in a leading-edge semiconductor ecosystem”, https://www.kearney.com/communications-media-technology/article/-/insights/europes-urgent-need-to-invest-in-a-leading-edge-semiconductor-ecosystem) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Fab = semiconductor fabrication

Europe would significantly benefit from local leading-edge chip manufacturing and is well positioned to succeed Success at the forefront of semiconductor technology relies on a combination of advanced engineering (research and design) and manufacturing (equipment and fabrication) capabilities. Integrating these domains has been a historical strength of Europe, for instance in the automotive industry. Europe holds strategic assets in the semiconductor value chain. Backed by leaders in fab equipment, top R&D capabilities and engineering talent, a stable political environment, excellent infrastructure, and the necessary financial muscle, Europe has what it takes to reestablish the region’s competitiveness in leading-edge semiconductor technology. Strengthening leading-edge semiconductor technology can bring Europe significant economic benefits. A leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing fab creates more than two times the initial investment in economic impact (see figure 2).

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It would also give rise to new business opportunities and provide a breeding ground for local start-ups. Furthermore, chip manufacturing in Europe would bolster the region’s technological sovereignty and improve supply chain resilience. European fab operations currently suffer from total cost of ownership disadvantages against other regions. Over 10 years, operating a new leading-edge fab in Europe is 30 percent more expensive compared with South Korea and more than 40 percent when compared with Taiwan. The main differences are the regional incentives, co-investments, and subsidies. Unless it changes the status quo, Europe will lose even more of its global position.

#### US-China rivalry is centering on Europe---European tech sovereignty is key to check the resulting disinfo, democratic collapse, and crisis instability.

Shapiro 20, Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of focus include US foreign policy and transatlantic relations., (Jeremy, “Introduction: Europe’s digital sovereignty” in “Europe’s digital sovereignty: From rulemaker to superpower in the age of US-China rivalry”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/europe_digital_sovereignty_rulemaker_superpower_age_us_china_rivalry/#introduction-europes-digital-sovereignty>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Technological developments naturally focus our attention on change. But, in this whirl of dynamism, many less stirring, but no less critical, pockets of continuity often go unnoticed. Technology can engender rapid changes, but, as many of the contributors emphasise, several aspects of the struggle for digital sovereignty have already been with us for several years and we can expect that they will continue to shape that struggle for many years to come. The first concerns the continuation of the bipolar competition between the United States and China that is undermining international cooperation, particularly on technology issues. Nearly all the essays underline that this conflict will likely persist, and indeed that US-Chinese relations, particularly on technology issues, will continue to deteriorate. As both Fran Burwell and Janka Oertel show, the pandemic has exacerbated existing divisions between the US and China. Most of the authors see their burgeoning conflict as framing the European struggle for digital sovereignty. Europe remains digitally dependent on both the US and China in a variety of domains, from chat platforms to telecommunications equipment. Competition between the US and China means that both sides increasingly see the European market as a critical battleground in the larger struggle to establish their global technological and industrial dominance. Europe, in Oertel’s words, is already “caught in the crossfire”. As recent political debates within Europe on issues as diverse as 5G technology and internet regulation demonstrate, US-Chinese rivalry is starting to impinge on practically every technological issue.

The second area of continuity concerns the capacity of digital tools, particularly social media, to spread disinformation and undermine democratic institutions. As José Ignacio Torreblanca points outs, the coronavirus crisis has only highlighted the degree to which both foreign and domestic actors can use a combination of digital technology and social psychology to pursue a variety of political agendas, including disrupting democratic processes and exacerbating domestic political polarisation. The growing awareness of this problem has not yet lessened its prevalence and we should expect conflict within societies over how to regulate digital content. The fact that, in Europe, the dominant social media companies are American means that the struggle to regulate them will have geopolitical consequences.

A final field of continuity concerns the persisting digital divide within Europe. As Alicia Richart emphasises, this divide does not correlate with the size or power of the state. Some of the largest and wealthiest states in Europe, such as Germany and France, lag in creating digital infrastructure, while Lithuania and Greece are among the leaders. The more critical divide is also within states: between urban areas that tend to have effective access to digital infrastructure and rural areas. Digital divides have all sorts of pernicious effects on individual lives and national solidarity. But the coronavirus also highlights just how critical digital technology and infrastructure has become in enabling countries to retain their capacity to act, particularly in crises. Spain’s strong digital infrastructure, as Richart points out, was essential to its capacity to manage the lockdown and its overall covid-19 response. Digital divides thus also threaten both European sovereignty and European resilience when the next crisis, regardless of its nature, hits.

### Block – A2: Chips Act Solves

#### Short-term relief like the Chips Act fail---overcapacity, inconsistency, and competitor reactions. Only long-term coordination solves.

Poiters and Weil 22, \*Research Fellow for Bruegel. Niclas' research interests include international trade, international macroeconomics and the digital economy. He is working on topics on e-commerce in trade as well as European trade policy in global trade wars. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona, a M.Sc. in economics from the Universität Bonn, and a B.Sc. from Universität Mannheim. During his Ph.D. he was a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. \*\* Pauline works at Bruegel as a Research Analyst. She holds a bachelor in Political Science and a master’s degree in International Trade and Finance from Sciences Po Lille. She also studied an MSc in Political Economy of Europe at the London School of Economics., (Niclas and Pauline, “Is the EU Chips Act the right approach?”, Bruegel, June 2, <https://www.bruegel.org/2022/06/is-the-eu-chips-act-the-right-approach/#:~:text=The%20European%20Chips%20Act%2C%20proposed,global%20value%20chains%20for%20semiconductors>.) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Though global demand for chips will undoubtedly increase in the coming years, the current shortages have prompted governments and firms to invest in fabrication, making overcapacity in the future not unlikely. For instance, prices for some types of memory chip, which best fit the definition of a commodity, are expected to decline by 16% in 2022 as supply growth outstrips demand. The chips industry is subject to boom-and-bursts cycles. The Commission has not clarified which market failure the Chips Act is supposed to address with massive government support, or how obtaining an (at best) modest market share in cutting-edge logic chips would actually increase EU geostrategic leverage. On supply management, implementing emergency measures would not fit the reality of supply and demand dynamics in the high-end chips sector. The chips that would be produced by an EU ‘first-of-a-kind’ facility are not commodities that can be reallocated. High-end logic chips are produced by foundries according to customer specifications, which vary between industries and buyers, and the manufacturing of such chips can take up to 26 weeks. A request to divert production would be inconsistent with an industry that cannot swiftly adapt production lines – as confirmed by the 2021 shortages.

Governments currently make up 1% of global demand for chips. If the Commission were to act as a buyer, it would have to choose to which companies to allocate the scarce supplies, while making the situation worse for everyone else. This problem can be much better solved by firms reviewing the trade-off between lean inventories and supply sustainability. The private sector should adapt to the risks on global value chains witnessed during the pandemic – it is starting to do so. Such measures raise risks of adverse economic implications and political messaging. Protectionist measures in a sector in which the EU is currently dependent on imports could create a precedent which would be to the detriment of the EU if copied by other players. Chip shortages were not the result of export bans but of a multitude of economic factors. Where export control measures have been introduced in the chips sector, it has been because of geopolitical rivalries and has not targeted the EU. While the rationale for EU export controls – economic activity or national security – remains unclear, their signalling is clearly protectionist. The EU has more to lose than others from ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies in the industry.

The need for a more muscular trade policy would be better achieved through general trade defence tools than chip-specific export controls. The EU should push back against uncoordinated protectionist reactions triggered by heightened supply chain risks and uncertainty, since the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This moment should be turned into an opportunity for sustainable trade: the balancing act is between creating global coordination structures among likeminded partners for strategically important products, while retaining policy independence from players such as the US.

## EU Autonomy INB

### 1NC/2NC --- Defense Autonomy

#### EU strategic autonomy solves multilateralism, which solves econ, climate, and tech---US foreign policy swings undermine it.

Alcaro 21, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “European Strategic Sovereignty and Multilateralism: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Dea”, European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The notion that the EU and its member states should pursue greater autonomy in international affairs has gained increasing salience in intra-EU debates. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy elevated the attainment of a higher degree of autonomy in security and defence to a strategic imperative.37 In 2018, the Juncker Commission38 embraced a view of strategic autonomy that extended to other policy areas, such as the economy and trade, climate and energy, as well as digital and technology regulations. Strategic autonomy has remained since a dominating theme in official EU discourse, as attested to (amongst others) by the selfdepiction as ‘geopolitical’ of the Von der Leyen Commission39 and the HR/VP Josep Borrell’s call on the EU to embrace power.40 While increasingly salient, strategic autonomy has also been controversial. Detractors dismiss it as a misleading notion that creates the illusion of an EU capable of achieving independence from the US, which remains the ultimate security guarantor of several (most) EU member states.41 While understandable, such concerns are misplaced. Autonomy is not about independence. It is about reducing the vulnerability of the EU and its member states to the political use of asymmetric interdependencies by other countries, starting with systemic rivals but including also allies. Examples include Russia’s leveraging its energy supplies, China using access to its market to force technology transfers, and the US weaponising financial interdependencies through extraterritorial sanctions.42 It is not by chance that autonomy has become increasingly tied to the notion of ‘European sovereignty’.43 This connection does not stem from a (non-existent) demand to confer statehood on the EU, but points to the strengthening of the Union as the best way to enable EU member states to act according to their own norms and laws. In these terms, greater autonomy of the EU is tantamount to a stronger defence of the sovereign rights of its member states. Partly, the demand for stronger autonomy results from the evolution of the EU into an ever more integrated polity, endowed with more competencies and correspondingly greater ambitions. Arguably more important, however, has been the emerging multipolarity of international politics. The latter is usually ascribed to the growing economic prowess of such countries as China, which seek to promote their own models of governance of global issues. Yet, an equally decisive factor has been the difficulty of US policymakers to forge an enduring consensus on how the US should conduct itself in international affairs. The ever-wilder oscillations of America’s foreign policy have emboldened its rivals and disoriented its allies. Critically, US foreign policy swings have eventually resulted in a diminished commitment to the system of multilateral institutions, treaties and regimes that the US itself did the most to create in the decades after World War II.44 This trend peaked during the Trump years, when the US deliberately pursued a policy of contestation (of the World Trade Organisation and the International Criminal Court, to mention just a few) and disengagement (a partial list of international arrangements the US left under Trump include the Paris Accord on climate, the World Health Organisation, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces and Open Skies treaties, as well as the Iran nuclear deal). As the US distanced itself from multilateral institutions, China made efforts to increase its sway within them, targeting in particular technical agencies such as the International Standards Organisation and the International Telecommunication Union to bring global technology standards closer to Chinese ones.45 Seen from the EU, this is a vicious cycle in which multilateral institutions are simultaneously undermined from without (by the US) and within (by China). The outcome may be a dysfunctional multilateral order or one that more closely reflects China’s model of authoritarian capitalism. 46 Either outcome would negatively affect the EU and its member states’ security and prosperity, as it would reduce European influence in existing multilateral institutions. The strengthening and expansion of the latter are therefore essential in making the EU and its member states capable of navigating the agitated waters of a more competitive international system. The ability of EU member states to live by their own laws and rules is thus inextricably linked to multilateralism.

### ---EU multilat

#### EU multilateralism is possible even in US disagreement---ICC, Kyoto, and Iran nuclear agreement prove.

Alcaro 21, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “European Strategic Sovereignty and Multilateralism: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Dea”, European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Specifically, multilateralism performs three functions that serve European sovereignty. The first is that it anchors interstate interactions in accepted, and at times binding, norms, rules and practices. The EU and its member states have an interest in ensuring that such norms, rules and practices continue to reflect values they share, including individual rights, democracy, secularism, non-discriminatory trade and free markets. Second, multilateralism is about cooperatively addressing transnational challenges, like climate change, pandemics or the myriad risks emanating from regional crises, which affect European citizens, economy and security. Third, multilateralism reduces the room for power politics to shape international affairs, an outcome that favours a collective polity with very limited military projection capacity such as the EU. 47 Admittedly, strengthening multilateral norms, institutions and practices in a world increasingly characterised by multipolar competition – and with the US oscillating between support and disengagement – is a tall order. It is not impossible though, nor an absolute novelty for the EU and its member states. In the early 2000s, for instance, the Union managed to bring forward the multilateral agendas on international justice (ICC) and climate (Kyoto Protocol) in the face of opposition from Washington. Another, arguably more illustrative, example of the European potential to promote multilateralism is the pursuit of the nuclear agreement with Iran and the defence of it after the US pull-out. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and a group of six powers, namely the US, China, Russia and the E3 of France, Germany and the UK, as well as the HR/VP in representation of the EU (together labelled the E3/EU+3).48 The case of the ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’ can help us ascertain what contribution it has made to multilateralism, and what role the EU played in bringing about its agreement. In particular, the case of the JCPOA is illustrative of the way in which the EU requires multilateral frameworks and partnerships in order to wield influence in international relations. Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Deal can be used more broadly for the way the EU can play a more effective role in global affairs.

### Internals --- U.S. Lead kills EU

#### US-led NATO makes EU influence impossible---only the cp makes them a credible actor

Hugo Klijn 11. Senior research fellow at the Security and Conflict Programme of the Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague. “Chapter 15. Europe’s Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship”. Nato’s Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten. https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/334997151.pdf

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties. Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement. Good Old NATO Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. None of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF. Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the acquis atlantique, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s Article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship with the USA which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process. Third Parties Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the USA, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, Moscow is likely to regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s enlargement agenda, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘EuroAtlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

### Impacts --- Euro Power k LL

#### Solves global hotspot escalation.

Weinstein 14 – Kenneth R. Weinstein, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hudson Institute, “Why the US Needs Europe”, Aspen Institute, http://www.aspeninstitutece.org/en/article/1-2014-why-the-us-needs-europe/

This crisis notwithstanding, the U.S. needs closer engagement with Europe on crucial defense and foreign policy matters. The U.S. under President Obama may be turning inward; but the fact remains: Europe is vital and irreplaceable to us.

History and culture bind the U.S. and Europe together; Europe discovered us, shaped our thinking, and forms of government. But there is more than just cultural affinity that unites us. There is a deep moral scope to the alliance. It was, after all, in the West that concepts such as limited government, individual rights, freedom of worship, free markets, and equal rights for women arose. The moral basis of our alliance embodied in these concepts was critical to our heroic joint efforts leading the fierce external opposition to totalitarianism that helped bring down the Iron Curtain.

The common defense threats we face in the 21st century—almost all on the periphery of the U.S. or the EU—are different in scope and kind: conventional challenges such as Russia bent on dominating its near abroad or China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial matters and growing military prowess; others are unconventional, including the spread of radical Islam and terrorism in the Middle East and beyond, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and North Korea. In an age of extremist ideologies, non-state actors with increasingly widespread technological capacities could pose the greatest threats of all to international order.

Other challenges that arise from the “arc of instability” to the south of Europe—including migration and unruly political transitions in the Arab world—require a mix of hard and soft power. The diplomatic flexibility that approaches by a multiplicity of states in Europe can afford— combined with the potential threat of hard power when necessary—offers the most diverse set of tools to handle such crises.

Our moral message and policy prescriptions are much stronger when unified; we are able to achieve far more together than alone. But to achieve unity, as the last decade has shown, we really have to work at it. This means more than occasional consultations, after the fact, as has often been the case during the Obama administration.

Strong U.S.-European relations require regular consultations, give and take, even blunt conversations— not just lectures from Washington or from Brussels or European capitals—to give Europeans a stake of ownership in policies. This ownership will allow them and us to make the case for shared sacrifice to their and our polities—a case that needs to be made in politics since the choices officials face in security policy are often less than optimal. The failure of American leadership since 2009 to make such arguments at home has weakened our ability to expect our allies to make the same kinds of cases to their publics, thereby harming the alliance.

American cannot “go it alone.” Europe offers America an invaluable tool: a key multilateral dimension to policy. With it, comes greater credibility in the international arena and a greater capacity to undertake complex missions. America has to lead, but Europe has to be our partner, willing to be vocal when we are unwilling to meet out responsibilities. Without it comes the excessive swings of American foreign and defense policy that have led us, in recent years, to shirk our global responsibilities.

Europeans contributed in crucial ways to the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and were absolutely central to the intervention in Libya. France’s willingness to intervene in Mali and the Central African Republic with assistance from the U.S. and the E.U. at a time when the U.S. is less willing on new anti-terror interventions is a very positive sign. But French interventionism, as welcome as it is, cannot make up for shrinking defense budgets and reluctant leadership from both Germany and the U.K. The U.S. needs to encourage its allies to assume their responsibilities.

Although Europe’s armed forces are less strong and less well equipped than desirable, European armed forces are, in fact, well-trained, technologically sophisticated and also geographically closer to the regions that are likely to be critical in the 21st century—North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The manpower and cost efficiencies from potential joint operations cannot be overstated.

Europeans can bring unmatched sensibilities in their own backyard, but need to assume their responsibilities. Their knowledge of history and culture is essential. This knowledge and willingness to use “soft power” has to be joined to a sense of the importance of burden sharing, especially as American forces are overstretched in a time of declining American defense budgets.

Increasing isolationism in both American political parties should serve as a wakeup call to Europe that we might not always be there to help police Europe’s periphery as in Kosovo or Libya.

The greater distance we are assuming from Europe should make us all the more sympathetic to European defense initiatives. Given the deeper challenges we face, it is time to leave aside “theological” debates over whether NATO or the EU should be the prime focus for the future of European defense. Instead, we need to focus on how best to meet common strategic challenges with the array of resources, diplomatic and military, that we can muster.

When Europeans and Americans work together for shared purpose, the partnership enhances us both and makes our complex and simultaneous missions much easier to accomplish.

### Impacts --- EU Power k Soft Power

#### EU power solves multilat through unique soft power benefits but returning to strength is key

EEAS 9/9/20 (European Union delegation in Iraq, Delegation represents the European Union in Iraq and, as a diplomatic mission, works closely with the 13 Member State Embassies that are represented in Baghdad as well as their Missions in Erbil, Kurdistan Region. It ensures the tasks of the EU Presidency both in Baghdad and Erbil. The Delegation is the permanent and principal interlocutor of the EU vis-à-vis local authorities, the international community and all other stakeholders for all matters related to EU external action. Acting in close cooperation with all EU Member State diplomatic missions, the Delegation strives to ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU external action in Iraq. It ensures the follow-up of bilateral relations in the political, economic, trade, energy and development areas.“Building Global Europe”, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/84888/building-global-europe\_en)

Multilateralism in crisis The world has become more multipolar but multilateralism has weakened, as evidenced by the growing paralysis of the United Nations Security Council, the deep crisis of the World Trade Organization, or more recently that of the World Health Organization. And this precisely at a time when global problems, especially the climate crisis or health issues, are becoming more and more critical. Amid this increasing competition, not only do the classic tools of power play a role, but soft power itself is increasingly used as a weapon: think of films and other cultural products, the capacity to build social networks or the ability to attract talent. Trade, technology, data, information are now instruments of political competition. “Europeans feel they live in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. They need to be reassured that we can provide a meaningful and robust European answer. “ Europeans feel they live in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. They need to be reassured that we can provide a meaningful and robust European answer. If the EU does not become also a real world power, in terms of both hard and soft power, it will be at the mercy of other international actors. And this will affect all fields of our lives: communication, economy, environment, security. Even our democracies and individual rights and liberties would be in danger. Europe needs to act more united. To avoid this fate, Europe must strengthen its traditional levers, look for new ones and take new and visible initiatives to enhance its global posture. Europe needs at first to act in a more united way. And frankly, the EU is the only platform enabling European democracies to promote and defend their interests effectively. In the past, we have sometimes allowed others to paralyse us by dividing us, for example with regard to our relations with China or Russia. We must stop seeing Europe as a collection of national interests and instead define and defend together the common European interest. This is in particular the aim of the work undertaken with the European defence ministers around the “Strategic Compass” concept, to jointly define the threats and challenges that Europe will have to face. “Strategic autonomy” is about defending our interests and values by acting multilaterally whenever we can, but being ready to act autonomously whenever we must.” We need to strengthen our capacities to act autonomously. The concept of “Strategic autonomy” is not about protectionism but about having the capacity to defend our interests and values by acting multilaterally whenever we can, but being ready to act autonomously whenever we must. We have more levers that we think To achieve this, we have more levers of influence than we ourselves often believe. Our internal market is still one of the most important in the world and no external player can afford to neglect it. The European Union has one of the strongest “soft power” toolboxes, with powerful trade and competition policies, significant aid volumes and the new possibilities offered by our investment screening mechanisms. We must use it to its full potential, taking a holistic approach and overcoming silos. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fragility of existing global value chains and Europe’s vulnerability in that regard. Re-localisation and economic sovereignty have become dominant themes everywhere in Europe As I expressed earlier with Commissioner Thierry Breton, we need to link closely our industrial and research policy with our foreign policy. “Re-localisation and economic sovereignty have become dominant themes. We need to link closely our industrial and research policy with our foreign policy”. We are the most important norm setter worldwide –as Anu Bradford convincingly sketches in her recent book “The Brussels Effect” - but we cannot maintain this position if we are not also a technological leader: we need to close the gap between our regulatory capacity and our technological ambitions. We need to protect key technological sectors from falling under excessive control by a third party and to ensure the security of vital sectors such as digital, energy, raw materials and health. We must protect our critical infrastructure (from energy to space), and our digital autonomy and security (international digital rules/standards, cybersecurity). We should also leverage the renewed political priorities of the EU Next generation instrument on digital or environmental issues in the context of the programming of our assistance and other external policies. The principle of reciprocity is key Relations with foreign partners must be evaluated according to the principle of reciprocity. This must become the rule, not the exception, while of course bearing in mind the need to take into account different levels of development and overall strategic interests. The rules that we impose on European companies, particularly with regard to subsidies, must also apply to non-European companies that want to enter our market. “Where necessary, we should be ready to adopt a more robust and strategic approach as we have done for instance with China.” Where necessary, we should be ready to adopt a more robust and strategic approach as we have done for instance with China. We have worked to build our relationship with China on more reciprocity and a level playing field in trade, investment and beyond. By highlighting our political differences, we have achieved that Beijing has to take Europe more seriously. In parallel, we need to continue giving full priority to our very troubled neighbourhood both to the East and the South, and to Africa. Our partners’ stability and prosperity are crucial for the EU’s own security and strategic interests. We have also to strengthen our common action in the field of security and defence and foster the EU’s capacity to act as a global security provider. “The EU has a strong stake in maintaining and developing a rules-based international order within the framework of an effective multilateralism.” The EU has a strong stake in maintaining and developing a rules-based international order within the framework of an effective multilateralism – even if others are clearly trying to weaken it. The joint Communication on Multilateralism that we are planning for next year will set out what the EU can do to counter this trend. Over the years, the EU has been quite successful on the climate issue but we must also contribute more actively to reform what needs to be changed, for example in the WHO and WTO. “As EU we can and should do more to develop a level playing field when it comes to social and human rights.” As EU we can and should do more to develop a level playing field when it comes to social and human rights, through enhanced so-called “due diligence” requirements for economic operators in their procurement chain. We must strengthen our trade policy to ensure that the commitments made by our partners with regard to social and environmental standards are fully respected. We must also reflect on the implications of a carbon border tax without which the Green Deal would lead either to carbon leakage or to competitive disadvantage. And of course we must continue to lead the global fight against tax havens.

### Impacts --- EU Autonomy k India Rels

#### EU strategic autonomy requires a willingness to engage —Key to EU-India relations

Lannoo 19 (Karel Lannoo is the Chief Executive Officer and Stefania Benaglia is Associate Researcher at CEPS. CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs., “Could the EU and India jointly shape the world?”, https://www.ceps.eu/could-the-eu-and-india-jointly-shape-the-world/)

For the EU-India strategic partnership to reach its full potential, the EU needs to act as one in its foreign policy relations. The EU needs to convince its members of the added value of being the main – if not the sole – interlocutor for India, and demonstrate the limitations of bilateral relations. To persuade India of the benefits of dealing with the EU as a collective actor, the EU should leverage its soft power. The EU is finally beginning to grasp the importance of strong and coordinated public diplomacy and efforts to restructure and intensify it are ongoing. However, now is the time to define clear objectives and strategies to obtain them. Member states need to allow the EU the necessary strategic autonomy for it to take the lead in coordinating their actions in India. Moreover, for the EU to defend multilateralism, it needs to live up to it, which means some painful changes for its members in giving up their primacy at the table of multilateral organisations such as the IMF or the UN. Meanwhile, beyond the imminent appointment of a military attaché to the EU mission in India, the EU needs to shed its reluctance as a global security actor and work together with India on security cooperation. The Indian administration barely considers the EU as an actor, focusing its attention more on individual member states (notably UK, Germany and France, and, more recently and to a lesser degree, the Eastern countries). India turns these bilateral relations to its advantage in striking deals on better terms, playing on the occasionally prickly competition between member states. The strongest competitors of EU Members for tapping into Indian potential are Russia, the US, and China. Without robust and coordinated EU engagement, bilateral relations between EU member states and India may survive, but they will not thrive. There is, for example, no de-facto European chamber of commerce in India, only some national chambers. For the relationship to be deepened, both sides will need to take significant steps. The EU has to prove its added value, but the Indian government also has to act. India’s external trade position is still in its infancy. Its trade and regulatory environment remains relatively restrictive, with discriminatory and diverging standards. Its central government has limited powers, possibly even less than the EU. Many competences remain with its 29 states, which restricts its capacity for outreach. India has also a very limited external presence, with less than 1,000 diplomats abroad – similar in number to those of the Netherlands with a population of just 1% that of India.

#### Solves every global problem—the EU focusing solely on domestic affairs instead of international security will sacrifice European soft power—prevents Indian ocean war

EBR 19 (European Business Review, “The case for an enhanced EU-India cooperation”, https://www.europeanbusinessreview.eu/page.asp?pid=3350)

The European Union is at a strategic crossroads. After the confirmation in the European Parliament, the next European Commission will have to change gears and refuse to be consumed by small stakes. It is not enough to embrace “strategic autonomy” or to talk about a “geopolitical” Commission, the time has come for the EU to deliver by showcasing relevance, decisiveness and even creativity. Given that the negotiation of the next European budget will be more of a headache, the strategic minds of the Union have started to put more emphasis on how the EU can turn the increasingly prominent great power competition to its advantage. As it looks for a “big win” in the coming year, the EU could make of its strategic partnership and relation with India a key piece of its global game. Yes, there will be in 2020 another big stake, with the China-EU summit, to be organized under the German EU Presidency, but this does not preclude Brussels and Delhi to walk the talk from sharing a similar worldview to building up a more concrete partnership.

With the exception of France (who, by the way, views India as a strategic partner), the EU has been slow to react to the trade war between United States and China and to the weakening of the rules-based international order. Caught off guard, the EU is seeking to regain the lost ground and to be influential beyond its immediate neighborhood. Although some have argued that the Union should first deal with the economic and political reverberations of Brexit, that an internal consolidation is mandatory before enlargement to the Western Balkans or that a “global strategy” is too much of a task, others have rightly pointed out that the international realignments, especially the unilateralism of a Trumpian United States and the rise of a perhaps overconfident China, risk to transform the very context in which the Union operates.

There is no clear solution to the EU’s Trump problem. For example, France’s plans for more defense and security cooperation – a step to compensate for the unpredictability of Washington – have been received with caution in Berlin and with sheer mistrust in Central and Eastern Europe. Calling NATO brain dead does not help either. In all honesty, the hope in Brussels is that the US will come back to its old strategy after the disruptive president is defeated in the elections next year in November. But Trump may actually win again, and Europe hasn’t got a plan B for 4 more years except for an ambitious "strategic autonomy" which is hard to predict in terms of actual progress. Europe also pays more attention to the moves of China, first within its own borders and then in different parts of the world. After the U.S. has used its leverage with some Central and Eastern countries, Germany seems to reconsider its initial open stance on 5G. More generally, Chinese investments will be analyzed not only through an economic lens, but also by factoring in technological transfer, access to innovation and patents, and the buzzword "reciprocity". Investment screening is now available at EU level and will be used when needed. However, all these steps are rather reactionary, risking being perceived as the desperate moves of waning (soft) power.

This is where the relation with India could play an important part. The EU is one of the strongest believers in the current rules-based international order, in globalization and free trade. Nonetheless, internal divisions, demography and the international logic prevent the Union to act alone and it has to look for valuable partnerships. Building an alliance of major players, emerging powers and small states is not an easy task, but actions have been taken: the recently entered into force FTA with Japan, the enhanced cooperation with Canada or the attempt to give real substance to the partnership with India. Showcasing that there is an alternative to great power competition and that a different world dynamic is possible, takes off if, for example, EU can coordinate with a major country like India on matters of deep significance. This is entirely consistent with the Indian ethos based on throwing off the notion that the world is a battle between two things/powers – something that could be thought by observing the US – China cold war. By making such a bet, Europe could indeed demonstrate that it can escape strategic defensive: the EU has the potential to contribute to a soft rebalancing in Asia, but of a type that is different from a US "China containment" strategy. If this is the strategic dimension, then the challenge will be to move towards real progress at the sectoral level. Fortunately, there is a long list of topics of common interest that can really receive greenlight once the existential, key aspects of the cooperation have been sorted out. Connectivity, nuclear nonproliferation, investment in new (environmental) technologies and maritime security (for instance, the Indian Ocean could become a bridge, with impact on joint naval patrolling or something even bolder such as space operations) are on everyone’s mind. Europe has already the financial tools to invest in India’s infrastructure and to show to the other countries of the region that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not the only game in town; for example, there is potential for coastal cities twinning between Europe and India, with investments and mutual benefits. Climate change mitigation is another area of convergent interest – let’s only think about the opportunities for the recycle economy. What is essential here, as others have suggested, is that trade is only a small part of the bigger picture. The long-term goal is to bring together like-minded powers such as the EU, India, Japan, Australia and ASEAN and to set the way forward for reimagining a world order under big pressure today. The time to go strategic has arrived.

#### Indian ocean wars escalate

Gamage 17 (Rajni Gamage is a senior analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., 11/5/17, “Why the Indian Ocean Must Not Become Like the South China Sea”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-indian-ocean-must-not-become-the-south-china-sea-23028?page=0%2C2)

Rising Strategic Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean The pursuit of contesting regional orders by major powers has engendered a strategic environment of uncertainty and mistrust in the Indo-Pacific. As geopolitical developments at land and sea feed off one another, the maritime domain has been marked as the latest theater of war. These dynamics have been most evident in the East and South China Seas, where the complexity of issues at hand is telling. A case in point is China’s construction of military facilities on artificial islands proximate to disputed maritime areas, against a backdrop of contesting interpretations of international law. As regional and extra-regional states face a rising China on all fronts, a climate of strategic anxiety prevails in anticipation of its potential impact on the existing rules-based international order. Such anxieties inevitably spill over into the Indian Ocean Region and manifest in ways unique to that part of the world. A rising India with aspirations to global-power status finds its regional dominance challenged by China’s two-ocean strategy and Belt and Road Initiative. In the maritime realm, India’s response comprises internal naval and port modernization, and increased naval engagements and exercises with neighboring littorals and external powers that have major stakes in the region. This has not, however, had any noticeable effects in tempering regional anxieties. Heavy maritime traffic in increasingly congested regional waters operate alongside this tense backdrop. The risk that various surface vessels could collide—whether naval or commercial—and the risk of submarine accidents is on the rise. A number of regional and extra-regional states have forward-deployed their navies in the Indian Ocean, independently or as part of various task forces. There have already been several maritime accidents involving warships and air crashes in the Persian Gulf and the northern Arabian Sea between regional and extra-regional navies—some of which escalated politically. The Iranian Navy, for instance, has confronted its smaller neighbors and the U.S. Navy by conducting high-speed naval maneuvers and missile firings, and it has used drones to shadow U.S. naval assets. Late last year, an Indian submarine attempted to enter into waters close to Gwadar Port and was reportedly repelled by the Pakistan Navy. Miscommunications and misperceptions are likely to result from such incidents and could escalate very fast to negative political and military expressions. It is against this setting that a code of conduct (COC) for the Indian Ocean was first proposed.

#### Uniquely go nuclear

Mastro 8/26/18 (Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)., "Can India Help the United States Against China?" https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china)

Second, the need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off ramps. These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic means to resolve the issue. Even if China does not want to fight a war with India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message to India to back down could have the opposite effect. The two-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese military’s attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and Bhutan, demonstrate some of these problematic escalatory dynamics.

### Impacts --- EU Indep k Heg/Trans Wars

#### EU independence solves hegemonic competition and unstable transitions

Besch et al. 20, \*senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform. She works on European defence issues, with a focus on EU Common Defence and Security Policy, European defence industry co-operation, NATO and German foreign and defence policy \*\*joined the Centre for European Reform as director of foreign policy in April 2013, prior to that, he was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years \*\*\*Clara Marina O’ Donnell Fellow at the Centre for European Reform (Sophia Besch; Ian Bond; Leonard Schuette, 9-21-2020, “Europe, the US and China: A love-hate triangle?,” Centre for European Reform, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#section-summary)

Conclusion

The US and China both have a tendency to treat the EU as an object of international relations rather than a subject – competing to enlist it on their side, or to prevent it aligning with the other side, but not treating it as having agency. The EU often plays to this image of passivity, seeming always to follow others in reacting to crises – its initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic being an example of that. But in reality, the EU has power, if it can agree internally on how to use it. As Charles Michel, President of the European Council, said after the EU-China leaders’ videoconference on September 14th, Europe needs to be a player, not a playing field. Europe should not get sucked into a contest between China and the US for global hegemony. Instead, the EU should use whatever influence it can to ensure that both sides exercise their power with restraint and in a framework of rules, not simply on the basis (as Thucydides wrote) that “the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must”. Europe should also accept that China is not converging with the West politically or in terms of its values: the ‘responsible stakeholder’ era is over almost before it began. Chinese and Western interests will sometimes align, but Xi has shown less willingness than his predecessors to slot China into the existing international system. At the same time, it is impossible to know where Xi’s policies will lead China in the long term. Some scholars argue that the Chinese Communist Party’s rule has been made dysfunctional and brittle by Xi’s centralisation of power.[51](https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#FN-51) Other analysts believe that China’s rise is world-transforming and its growing influence irresistible.[52](https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#FN-52) Europe should remember the (possibly apocryphal) story of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s 1972 verdict on the results of the French revolution: “Too early to tell”. It will be a long time before Xi’s policies can be judged successful or otherwise. Meanwhile, the EU should remain open to economic and other forms of co-operation with China where they are to Europe’s benefit; resist Chinese activity that harms European states and institutions or their allies; and invest resources and diplomatic effort in enabling international organisations to adapt to the rise of China without breaking. The Trump era has made the EU’s job harder: Trump has deprived Europe of its most important partner in defending the rules-based international order and universal values. But the EU cannot afford to leave the future of the world to be settled in a series of trials of strength between Beijing and Washington. When relations between the US and China looked rosier, there was talk of a ‘G2’ to deal with the problems of the world. That was never a realistic construct. For the foreseeable future, the three big economic and political powers in the world will be China, the EU and the US, and the triangular relations between them will contain elements of attraction and elements of hostility. Western firms will still want to tap the Chinese market, while governments worry about threats to national security; Chinese families will still want their children to study in the West, while the Communist Party worries about the ideological contamination they might bring back; and Europe and the US will still be each other’s most important security and economic partners, while bickering about defence budgets and food safety. In the absence of a friction-free utopia, the EU’s best option is to work with Beijing and Washington to pursue pragmatic policies that maintain stable relations between the three.

#### That goes nuclear

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Caitlin Talmadge, 10-15-2018, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

### Impacts --- EU k Africa/Latin America War

#### East Asian, African and Latin American conflict coming now---only EU can solve

Seán O Regan 16, Master’s Degree in Commerce and Government from the University College Cork, Postgraduate Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution from Trinity College, Dublin, Higher Diploma in Accounting, Business, Accounting, Tax, and Law from Dublin City University, “Conflict Resolution Revisited: Peaceful Resolution, Mediation and Responsibility to Protect”, All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Volume 5, Issue 1, January, p. 70-73

Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of this commitment. The term conflict prevention in this era meant containing the potential for nuclear war between the major blocs. The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into conflict all over the globe, notably in East Asia (Korea and Vietnam), Africa (the Congo and Angola) and Latin America (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community’s response was generally to insert peacekeeping forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Many such conflicts ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of that Union and its client states erupted. The international community’s failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian conflicts in the Caucasus and South Eastern Europe on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it became clear that, as Smith12 put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of conflict prevention became prominent for the international community.

3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice

Van Waalraven13 explored the conflict policies of a sample of Western countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and found that general conflict policy, as against specific conflict intervention, was embedded in other, mainly development assistance, policies. He found it difficult to identify generic approaches to conflict prevention, although all countries examined used similar language in their descriptions of conflict and its causes, even if there was only vague consensus on what those causes are.

The Council of the European Union, at its June 2001 meeting in Gothenburg,14 endorsed a programme of conflict prevention,15 stating this would “improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action [to prevent conflict]” and that “[c] onflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects.” This document and the European Security Strategy16 provided the foundation for the elaboration of a whole series of policies, including the promotion of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution. It was followed in 2009 by the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities,”17 which uses the term mediation to encompass improved communication, negotiation, dialogue and facilitation through the offices of a third party, namely the EU. In this document mediation can be directive and coercive. It also notes the EU’s financial power and moral authority as positive factors in a mediation process.

#### Africa instability escalates

Walter Mead 13. James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College. “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care.” The American Interest. 12-15-2013. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/>

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real.

But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence.

Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night.

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today.

The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts.

That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly.

The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends.

Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.

#### Latin American conflict goes nuclear---draws in Russia and China

Dr. R. Evan **Ellis 16**. Research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. 12-09-16. "Strategic Insights: Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean", Strategic Studies Institute, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Thinking-Strategically-About-Latin-America-Caribbean/2016/12/09

As noted previously, there is arguably no region (including Asia) upon which the United States is more dependent for its prosperity and security, and with which it is more closely tied through bonds of family, than Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of trade and investment, from manufacturers to the food Americans put on the table, there is no region for which disruption of commerce with the United States could do more damage to our economy and the everyday lives of Americans. Reciprocally, the region’s proximity to the United States makes it a logical and attractive business partner; there is not another region of the world for which prosperity, healthy infrastructure, and institutions could contribute more to a win-win commercial relationship with the United States. With respect to security, the United States is blessed by the absence of neighbors that pose a direct military threat to the nation, are experiencing conditions of chaos, or permit U.S. adversaries to operate from their territory. Yet, if these fortunate conditions were to change, the resulting threat to U.S. national security could force a significant reorientation of U.S. security initiatives away from its foreign engagements to address the emergent threat closer to home. To use a military analogy, Latin America and the Caribbean is, for the United States, an “unoccupied high ground.” The fact that the United States does not fully leverage the opportunities offered by Latin America, nor suffers a significant immediate security threat from the region, does not make it any less strategic. The Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in the Region. The activities of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, often characterized as the principle security issue in the region, is more of a strategic challenge to the United States than is commonly understood. On the one hand, the activities of groups such as the Maras in the Northern Triangle and warring cartels in Mexico generate violence and destroy economic opportunity in ways that generate refugee flows toward the United States. Indeed, the 2014 crisis of child migrants from Central America obliged the Obama administration to request an additional $3.7 billion to respond to the situation, eclipsing the $979 million previously spent on the region under the Central America Regional Security Initiative since 2008.2 In addition, the money used to enable transnational criminal activities corrupts institutions, undermining governance, and expanding criminal networks that can be used by terrorist organizations to raise and launder money, smuggle persons and materiel through the region, as well as creating spaces in which they can hide, train, plan operations, and recruit fighters for their global activities. Such threats are magnified further where anti-U.S. governments, such as the “Bolivarian Socialist” government of Venezuela, tolerate and possibly even facilitate the activities of such groups, permitting, for example, the entry of Iranian paramilitary Qods forces into the region through the country.3 The Need for U.S. Scenario Planning to Include the Potential Use of the Region by U.S. Adversaries to Conduct Actions Against the United States. Military professionals in the United States have the responsibility for planning how to fight the nation’s wars if called upon to do so by their elected leaders. In today’s globally interconnected world, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. “near-peer competitor,” such as China or Russia, would allow the United States to engage with them in such a conflict (however undesirable) entirely as an “away game.” U.S. defense planners must expect that in such a conflict, the adversary would employ its full global range of assets, capabilities, and options, including: relationships and access agreements with foreign militaries (however benign) in all parts of the world, knowledge of, and the potential for, staging activities leveraging their commercial operations near the United States, as well as information technology infrastructure built by the adversary’s companies there. Potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China may be expected to leverage such assets and relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, in addition to other regions, in order to undermine U.S. coalition formation in the run-up to a conflict, to conduct operations in the region during the conflict to disrupt the U.S. economy and financial system, and potentially to conduct military operations from Latin America and the Caribbean to attack U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, and to put the U.S. homeland at risk, thus forcing the diversion of U.S. forces from other theaters. While Russia and China have not currently established formal military bases in the region that could be used against the United States, their familiarity with Latin American armed forces through regular military-to-military engagement, their knowledge of regional infrastructure such as ports, airports, and commercial logistics systems, means that they could achieve a functional military capability in the region rapidly in the months leading up to the conflict, if U.S. adversaries in Latin America permitted them to do so.

# Aff Answers

## Solvency

### 2AC – Solvency – Generic

#### It fails – duplicity, internal divisions, and empirics.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why\_an\_eu\_army\_is\_a\_bad\_idea\_we\_dont\_need\_a\_political\_bloc\_of\_the\_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure?

Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”

At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.

#### Creating EU strategic autonomy trades off with security cooperation AND causes hot internal debates that divide the EU.

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3.1.2 Reconciling Strategic Sovereignty and the Transatlantic Relationship The idea that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises goes back to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration. Since then, the question of what constitutes an acceptable balance between a more independent European security and defence policy and transatlantic security cooperation in NATO has been hotly disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear of upsetting the US and jeopardising the American security commitment to Europe was a good reason for many European member states to keep EU defence efforts to a minimum. However, the election of Donald Trump as US president has decisively changed the parameters of the debate. The US’ strong footprint in European security could no longer be taken for granted. For many Europeans, this was a wake-up moment that brought the need for greater autonomy from the US back into focus. At the same time, the very notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ became toxic. While Europeans insisted that strategic autonomy was not synonymous with a Europe ‘going it alone’, Washington, but also some EU member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceived it as an attempt for de-coupling and hence as a threat. On this account, German defence minister Annegret KrampKarrenbauer spoke on behalf of many Europeans when she sent her message to the incoming Biden administration in November 2020: ‘The idea of strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it is taken to mean that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the US’. 36 The related dispute between her and French President Emmanuel Macron has once again shown that Europeans themselves have not yet agreed on how far Europe should be able to act independently of the United States.

#### Only the US can do security cooperation with NATO on AI---EU is far behind on funding, adoption, and private investment.

Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Research in the areas of International Affairs and International Security, with a particular focus on: Geoeconomics, Economic Statecraft, Defence Economics, Defence Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, NATO, Great Power Competition., (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe” in *European View*, Volume 21(1), Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17816858221089372) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).

#### Technical impracticalities between EU states and ideological divergences mean EU-NATO cooperation fail.

Akturan et al 18, EUChicago, (Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon, “”, The University of Chicago’s Chapter for European Horizons, <https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

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However, the difference in how commitment to respective sets of values is executed in NATO and EU results with a wide portfolio of cooperational problems, ranging from bureaucratic to strategic, despite their intention to work together. Could there be comprehensive and mutually respectful cooperation between the two organizations on security issues? Would this cooperation be wearproof given the bilateral conflicts brought up by non-joint members, such as in the Cyprus dilemma? This article surveys how bilateral and regional conflicts challenge the international resolve for transatlantic security cooperation, in which NATO and EU share common milito-political interest.

The European Common Security and Defense Policy: Boon or Bane

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), known before 2009’s Lisbon Treaty as the European Security and Defence Policy, represented the apex of security cooperation among European Union member states and the EU’s undertaking of a heavier defence role along with NATO. The CSDP seeks to exercise European military independence from NATO within five areas: the self-assured security of the EU, a closer relationship between eastern and western Europe, structural improvement in European conflict management, cooperation between neighboring regions, and pioneering global governance of conflicts. To implement these priorities into pre-existing European structural mechanisms, the EU’s civilian-military status has undergone an updating process. For instance, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created through the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, which made the EU constitutional laws legally binding and further centralized the Union. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address the independent methods in which the EU member states were answering international crises.

When EEAS was launched in December 2010 as an EU department with the express function of consolidating EU responses to international security issues as an autonomous unit, it actualized CSDP’s vision for a new European crisis management strategy which technically compelled member states to cooperate in situations of security threats, in or out of the EU. Initiatives similar to EAAS make clear what the EU lacks has not been the incentive to incorporate an international security dimension to its agenda, but the technical practicality to implement decisions to that end in a unified manner. Although common goals had been set for NATO-EU cooperation through the Berlin Plus Agreements in 2003 before CSDP, creation of a unified transatlantic defence and security policy between the two entities has encountered ample executive difficulties. For instance, Cyprus – an EU but not NATO member- was excluded from joint EU-NATO meetings by Turkey – a NATO but not EU member- due to the decades long political antagonism over the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974. Even this seemingly inconsequential bilateral problem was enough to [halt]~~paralyze~~ the NATO-EU cooperation, making some organizational details of Berlin Plus Agreement impossible.

Berlin Agreement’s decision to create a merged NATO-EU headquarters in Brussels to manage conflicts in which both the EU and NATO have common interests has not helped reduce the fracture between American and European politics. For instance, when France and Germany coordinated a joint gathering with Belgium and Luxembourg to protest the British-American invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, NATO and then American government denounced it as “Chocolate Summit,” betraying the spirit of cooperation aimed by CSDP. Joint NATO-EU missions for stabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, in Dafur, Sudan, as an assistance to African Union or in Somali to combat piracy are, however, some successful products of Berlin Plus Agreements. These joint undertakings are cases in which not all the EU or NATO members were interested in intervention, but they were made possible by sharing of military expertise and assets from either of the parties, mostly by NATO. However, post-colonial Africa and Western Balkans are regions over which NATO and EU do not have strong strategic disagreements. Despite Berlin Plus, EU has been critical of NATO’s call for joint missions in Afghanistan for instance and only supported the civilian projects of current Resolute Support Mission of NATO.

Bilateral hurdles in front of NATO-EU cooperation such as Cyprus Dispute are hence not the actual root causes hindering the constructive attitude of Berlin Plus. As Europe’s disapproval of Iraqi invasion or reluctance of cooperation in Afghanistan demonstrates, the CSDP cannot overcome the strategic divergence of NATO and EU in issues of incompatible political interests. Ideological divergence of the two partners should be reconciled before the region specific problems are addressed by calls for joint military actions. The new and more NATO-conscious level of ambition for CSDP thus required European member states to invest more in security and defence, both politically and economic. Perhaps an important undertaking was revisiting Berlin Plus Agreement’s comfort in EU utilizing NATO asset and capabilities when necessary, instead initiating more EU-focused solutions like EAAS.

With the attenuation of this cooperative ethos in both sides, there is a present risk that NATO and the EU will begin to compete for limited military resources, straying from the envisioned Berlin Plus Agreement. Lack of a coherent strategy among Western partners could prevent efficient response to crises, which does not bode well in a time of humanitarian atrocities — whether it be in Syria, Yemen, or South Sudan.

#### New initiatives set a clear signal that the EU is working towards tech sovereignty in the squo.

Csernatoni 21, Raluca Csernatoni is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where she works on European security and defense with a specific focus on disruptive technologies. Csernatoni is also a guest professor at the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels (VUB). Prior to joining Carnegie, she was a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Charles University’s Institute of Political Studies in Prague, where she focused on the impact of new military capabilities and emerging dual-use technologies such as drones on the EU’s security and defense architecture., (Raluca, “The EU’s Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Sovereignty”, Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

EU TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY IS IN THE MAKING

Behind the EU’s recent multiple sovereignty agendas is the need to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to innovation. The very label of a geopolitical European Commission implies a new level of engagement for the EU in the global balance of power. Technological and digital sovereignty are at the heart of such ambitions. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has further exacerbated the urgency to shore up technological, digital, and regulatory responses to preserve the EU’s economic clout, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical influence, as well as to reduce dependencies in critical technology areas. What has the EU done so far, and what must it still do to meet that goal of technological sovereignty? Four cross-cutting dimensions can help unpack the concept of technological sovereignty and better structure the discussion about EU initiatives, programs, and instruments: Research and capability-development efforts in security and defense Investments in cutting-edge research and innovation and in digitalization Critical infrastructure resilience and security of supply Tech-related regulatory activism

DEFENSE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

According to Arnout Molenaar, the head of division in the European External Action Service, dealing with security and defense policy is also related to “a learning curve for the Union to develop a ‘hard power’ mentality.” Technology plays a fundamental role in terms of making possible the EU’s hard military power ambitions—not only to act in a tense geopolitical setting but also to defend the EU’s interests in areas related to technology, security, and defense matters. In this regard, collaborative EU defense research and development (R&D) initiatives have been prioritized at the EU level for some time now to support the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

EU institutions and agencies have made considerable efforts to preserve Europe’s edge in key areas, including emerging and disruptive security technologies and infrastructures such as cybersecurity, drones, secure networks, space technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum technology. Indeed, recent EU initiatives such as the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF) as part of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 2021–2027—as well as its precursor programs, the Preparatory Action on Defence Research and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme—are intended to financially empower the EU’s autonomy in defense technology and industry and its research and innovation capacity in future-oriented and disruptive defense technologies.

Such initiatives have been framed as timely catalysts and potential game changers for increasing collective European action and for fostering cutting-edge defense research and innovation in Europe. The commission funded the Preparatory Action on Defence Research as a test case of defense-related research and technology projects, pulling directly from the EU budget line rather than from member states’ joint initiatives. This scheme was a concrete step designed to demonstrate the added value of EU-supported defense technology research and innovation. If successfully implemented, the EDF is expected to bolster more lucrative and joint research and capability-driven investment schemes in defense technologies across Europe and to increase the EU’s global leadership position in strategic tech sectors. The commission has already pledged a relatively small percentage of up to 8 percent of the EDF funding to disruptive technology actions. However, with the initially proposed amount of 13 billion euros ($15.4 billion) now reduced to about 8 billion euros ($9.5 billion), the EDF’s real potential to create value added and to incentivize technological and industrial cooperation and competitiveness in Europe is unclear. Indeed, this reduction could be accounted for by the fact that some member states either took a budget-restrictive approach to the entire 2021–2027 MFF or judged that on balance, they would benefit less from the EDF than their contribution to it and thus opted for reducing the overall funding. What is certain is that the EDF marks an important paradigm shift in consolidating the EU’s increased supranational activism in the field of defense technology and industry as a basis for building the EU’s military hard power and defense portfolio. The fund also consolidates the European Commission’s increasing role and strong interventionism in the EU security and defense policy fields that have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of member states’ decisionmaking.

There is also a clear message that developing the defense industry and technology base in Europe is key to strategic autonomy. Hence, logic dictates that defense-related technological sovereignty is central to the EU’s strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the reduced funding dedicated to the EDF and the small percentage of it that is flagged for disruptive military technologies are sufficient to foster high-risk, high-reward technological innovation in the European defense sector.

#### Squo solves EU autonomy---E12 and NORDEFCO.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In addition to these overarching EU initiatives, a number of separate bi- and multi-lateral groupings and frameworks have also emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, aiming to unite like-minded nations in pursuit of greater defence integration. This trend further confirms that EU member states and partners recognise that, individually, their defence capabilities are insufficient to independently deliver most, if not all, defence missions and that collaboration and harmonisation are necessary. Under the leadership of French President Macron, for example, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was launched in 2018 to be an agile, nonbinding, voluntary forum, among the most capable European governments willing to employ their military forces, complementary both to the EU (including PESCO) and NATO.88 The EI2 seeks to deepen cooperation in four areas: intelligence sharing and strategic foresight, planning and scenario development, support to operations and lessons learned.89 In practice, the initiative consists of meetings between the militaries of participating member states and periodically at the ministerial level.90 In Northern Europe, for example, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden take part in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a political and military framework that establishes cooperation in five areas: capabilities, armament, human resources and education, training and exercises as well as operations. The aim of NORDEFCO is to increase interoperability between those five members, develop a common understanding in these areas and optimise the use of their resources based on their common strategic culture.91 In addition, members of the Northern Group, including 12 countries bordering on the Baltic or North Sea, have been working to deepen regional defence and security cooperation including on information sharing, exercises and military mobility.92

#### Can’t solve sorry archan no time to tag

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In the last five years, direct association between EU defence integration efforts (such as CDP, CARD, PESCO, EDF) and the notion of European strategic autonomy has become widespread – at least when this term is understood to mean defence and a narrower understanding of ‘security’ rather than, say, economic self-reliance. Yet the pace of cooperation and emergence of new structures hides a wide range of official positions held by different EU member states, and differing views and visions even within each individual nation’s politics. Most notably, the views of European officials and experts differ on the question of leadership, the degree of autonomy, the desired level of the EU’s ambition and the optimal balance between national and joint capability development. These various divergences, jointly, and separately, undermine the cohesiveness and therefore the feasibility and credibility of the general ambition to achieve European strategic autonomy. This section briefly outlines the issues pertaining to each of these categories of debate and disagreement.

### 1AR – Solvency – Generic

#### EU initiatives fail---inter-state tensions, weak militaries, and over-dependence on the US.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.

### 2AC – Solvency – Overlap

#### Overlap, lack of communication, distrust, and military vulnerabilities severely limit cooperation.

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PROBLEMS IN NATO-EU COOPERATION As the overall strategic interests and security priorities of NATO and the EU have begun to overlap in response to emerging global challenges, the relationship — and hence cooperation — between the two organizations has become more complex. Limited communication channels Although personnel exchanges and joint exercises have helped to set up a framework and a mindset for more integrated operations, officials interviewed for this paper24 under the condition of anonymity pointed out that information sharing and the results achieved have been very limited. The lack of a secure communication system to share information between the two organizations severely hinders their ability to work together on a daily basis but most importantly to coordinate in a real crisis scenario and consequently to put in place a joint response. As of now, there is no direct inter-institutional secure lines of communication between the EU and NATO. All communications take place between each member state and either within NATO or within the EU. This also is particularly relevant when it comes to sharing best practices or handing over tasks from one organization to the other.25

Political tensions and different strategic priorities Adding to this communication difficulty, political tensions have multiplied within both NATO and the EU, triggering a climate of distrust that prevents intelligence sharing. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles26 and its invasion of northern Syria after U.S. troops withdrew raised security concerns in the alliance, while the Northern Cyprus question and Ankara’s activities in the eastern Mediterranean waters have created tensions with Greece.27 Relations between France and the U.K. have also significantly worsened since the AUKUS deal, which could ultimately impact the functioning of NATO. Complicating matters further, as described above, the two organizations’ activities have started to overlap, with NATO embracing capacity-building and cyber operations and the EU stepping up on crisis management. More recently, during preparation of its strategic concept, NATO has been questioning its role in the fight against climate change and in countering China’s multifaceted influence in the trans-Atlantic space. And following the AUKUS deal, the EU has been reflecting on developing a stronger military to be able to respond to crises directly impacting its security. NATO opposes any form of duplication, from command to resources, which is quite telling in terms of its soul-searching for the definition of its objectives and its range of action vis-à-vis global challenges.28 Recent events in Afghanistan offer a very good opportunity to reflect on the role of NATO and EU aspirations. After the Taliban took back Kabul, NATO called for an assessment of the accomplishments and failures of ISAF and Resolute Support.29 But instead the EU — not directly involved in Afghanistan as an organization but rather through individual member states — and the United Kingdom reflected on their excessive dependence on the United States in areas of paramount importance to European security. As evacuation operations started in Kabul, with devastating images traveling around the world, Borrell defined Afghanistan as a “wake-up call” for the strengthening of European defense.30 Allies complained about the United States’ lack of coordination and communication on the withdrawal, its unwillingness to extend the deadline for evacuations. For its part, the United Nation Security Council rejected a French-U.K. proposal to establish of a U.N.-controlled safe zone around the Kabul airport.31 While it is debatable whether or not the EU would have used its hypothetical army to secure Kabul’s airport, the Afghanistan experience exposed Europeans’ vivid vulnerabilities in the security domain and their dependence on the U.S. military’s logistical and technological capabilities.

#### Bureaucratic procedures, misalignments, and overlap tank coordination.

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EDTs = Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

The Biden administration also provides a window of opportunity to progress and be ambitious in broadening and regularizing NATO-EU cooperation in the field of innovation and EDTs. While political dialogue among their leadership has been steadily increasing over the past five years, the EU and NATO have consulted on their respective EDTs agendas only twice. Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures and misalignments sometimes frustrate even staff-to-staff cooperation in this area. The EU and increasingly NATO are proliferating agencies that conduct work on innovation in EDTs, including in security and defense. This makes it challenging to achieve internal coherence of activities within one organization, let alone coordinating agendas between the two.

### 2AC – Solvency – Undermines NATO

#### EU defense policy decks NATO.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

One of Britain’s key concerns about the prospect of an EU army was that it would duplicate or undermine the role of Nato.

Bart M.J. Szewczyk, from the US think tank the German Marshall Fund, agreed that it is “illogical” that a federal EU defence policy would be any better at “raising spending, pooling resources, or improving procurement” than current structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Nato allies and partners working as a team in long-established modes of cooperation – and not an inexperienced EU working at cross-purposes or even actively undermining the alliance – will remain the security provider of first resort for Europe,” he wrote in Foreign Policy.

### 2AC – Solvency – Say No

#### Say no.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

History shows there have been numerous failed attempts at forming an EU army, with opposition from outside the union and within. Critics suggest these disagreements would continue even if the idea was signed off. In a 2018 opinion piece for the Atlantic Council, international security and defence analyst Brooks Tigner wrote that the bloc would face a plethora of “technical, legal, and administrative differences” that would “boil down to the most mundane things such as soldiers’ rights”. Operational costs and caveats “always pose major headaches”, he added. The Telegraph’s James Crisp warned that there were “already grumbles” about French defence companies receiving “preferential and lucrative contracts”. “Diplomats joke that Mr Macron is in favour of a European army as long as it is a very French European army,” he said.

### 2AC – Solvency – Funding

#### The EU is broke – gotta get the US to pay – they’ll have 1/5th of the money.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why\_an\_eu\_army\_is\_a\_bad\_idea\_we\_dont\_need\_a\_political\_bloc\_of\_the\_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.

### 2AC – Solvency – AI – Generic

#### EU fails---decentralization, overdependence on US, and slow adoption.

Lawrence and Cordy 20, \*Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. \*\* Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.

### 2AC – Solvency – AI – Commercialization

#### The EU will seek commercial advantages on AI which undermines broader cooperation.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/#why-work-together-disagreements-and-shared-goals>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.

### 2AC – Solvency – Cyber – PPP

#### Private-public partnerships within the EU fail to implement effective cyber security ---inefficient spending, lack of centralization, and conflict of interests within private entities

Bossong & Wagner ’16 - Raphael, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Ben, (“A Typology of Cybersecurity and Public-Private Partnerships in the Context of the EU.” *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, vol. 67, no. 3, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 274–79, doi:10.1007/s10611-016-9653-3.) – sel

Surveying EU cybersecurity and public private partnerships

The two EU agencies ENISA and EUROPOL are the main public operational or executive actors in the area of EU cybersecurity. Both actors are heavily dependent on cooperation with private actors for their organisational success, and are supposed to cooperate increasingly with each other. At the same time, they clearly have different mandates and respective relationships with private actors. The following overview therefore uses the typological differentiation with regard to the central tasks of PPPs, namely information-sharing and active assistance, and sets in relation to the different audience or layers that the two agencies appeal to.15 By providing a structured overview of the types of relationships these organisations engage in, we hope to provide a clearer picture of what cybersecurity partnerships in this area actually look like in practice.

ENISA

ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, is the main organisation for structural cybersecurity, i.e. at the infrastructural and technical/ logical level. ENISA was founded in 2004 and has gradually established itself as a leading provider of technical advice in Europe (see Farrand and Carrapico in this issue) In particular, the agency produces a large volume of conceptual papers and organises exercises,16 workshops and expert meetings on cybersecurity. In 2013, ENISA was given an expanded and permanent legal basis, which defined its organisational mandate as follows ([92], 43): The Agency should contribute to a high level of network and information security, to better protection of privacy and personal data, and to the development and promotion of a culture of network and information security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, businesses and public sector organisations in the Union, thus contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market.^ In light of this, regular interactions across the public-private divide are clearly essential to the work of ENSIA. At a very general level, this can be illustrated by the inclusion of private representatives in the so-called permanent stakeholder group, which should assist the management of ENISA after the last revision of its mandate. 17 But already well before, ENISA conducted extensive research on different models and potential of PPPs in the ICT sector [93], which supports several arguments made in the first part of this article. Thus, the agency underlines that private actors are often unwilling to share information on a voluntary basis and that formal agreements or structures are necessary to ensure the operational usefulness of PPPs to both private and public actors. At the same time, the focus of ENISA on more infrastructural layers of cybersecurity suggests that public-private interactions are more likely to take the form of coregulation for general standard setting or security certification. 18 This reflects in a range of multi-stakeholder governance forums overseen by ENISA, such as the BENISA Internet infrastructure security and resilience reference groupB, 19 and the „Electronic Communications Reference Group (ECRG)B20 These groups interact with other forums for technical self-regulation, mainly the International Standards Organisation (ISO), the European Electronic Standards Institute (ETSI, with MoU) and CEN CELENEC for further industrial standards.21 ENISA also engages in a range of wider educational and awareness raising activities that should stimulate greater cybersecurity investments among both public and private actors. Aside from a so-called awareness raising community of ENISA – which seems to have been discontinued after 2010 -,22 the largest coordinated effort is the so-called cybersecurity awareness month, which includes various private organisations.23 However, these educations activities cannot be considered as sustained and substantial PPPs, since its target audience is diffuse and participants are not expected to enter into more regular relationships with ENISA. PPPs for information sharing (logical and user layer) For more substantial PPPs for cybersecurity, one can instead turn to private forums for sector-specific information sharing and which have contacts to ENISA. Examples are the so-called European Financial Institutes – Information Sharing and Analysis Centre 24 (EU-FISAC), or the so-called European Cyber Security Protection Alliance (CYSPA),25 which united both business and research institutions. A somewhat confusing array of additional private initiatives and platforms, such as the Internet Security Alliance for Europe and the Security Alliance for Europe, also interact with ENISA and comment on EU policy.26 However, the main PPP officially led by ENISA has been the so-called BEuropean Public + Private Partnership for Resilience^ (or E3PR). This initiative emerged in the context of a larger EU policy programme to increase the security of Critical Information Information infrastructures (CIIP) [94]. The E3PR format generated a number of thematic working and expert groups that should exchange information on relevant vulnerabilities and define policy options (compare Farrand and Carrapico in this issue).27 However, the E3PR failed to generate tangible results due to the diversity of stakeholders and avenues for action that could be considered before the EU proposed a more specific legislative agenda [95]. Information sharing channels for CIIP issues remained highly fragmented in Europe,28 particularly when aiming to address the cross-sectoral vulnerabilities of infrastructures. A later official evaluation report of the E3PR underlined that that multiple conflicts of interests with regard to the confidentiality of data or prospect of costly mandatory security measures further hampered the emergence of the desired partnership [96]. By 2013, the EU already debated the aforementioned NIS directive [52], which should extend mandatory information sharing on cybersecurity incidents from telecommunications providers 29 to other critical infrastructure providers. Even before the directive has been politically agreed on in December 2015, ENISA created the socalled NIS platform to succeed the E3PR. By mid-2015, the NIS platform listed more than 200 members - with approx. 110 of them representing business interests -,30 and had met at least five times. This indicates a substantial effort of public-private networking. Yet the terminological change from a partnership to a platform for private industry is telling. Rather than promoting regular operational or administrative cooperation, as we would expect in a classic PPP, the NIS Platform has worked on a clearer agenda for co-regulation and related policy options. For these purposes, ENISA created three working groups, namely on risk management, information exchange and incident coordination and, finally, secure ICT research and innovation. Clearly, these tasks may also apply to operational PPPs, but at the time of writing, the NIS platform has not reached beyond several conceptual papers that were intended to prepare the implementation of the upcoming NIS directive. 31 This stakeholder consultation should also be viewed in wider international processes, as reflected in a recent and first EU US meeting in that format. 32 In sum, the NIS platform should mainly be regarded as a supporting process of regulatory governance of critical infrastructures. Active assistance (logical and user layer) Yet one point to another area where ENISA may take on a more operational role for cybersecurity with private actors already, namely via its support for Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERTs33 have been developed since 2006 onwards. At the time, a few member states had started to create such units in emulation of the US, which pioneered this instrument already in 1990s [97]. By 2012, a separate EU CERT has been created,34 while regular network activities and standardization of procedures to coordinate the work of national CERTs were underway.35 The web presence of the EU CERT further includes regular news items on cyber threats and vulnerabilities of various applications. These CERTs arguably constitute of boundary case for PPPs as defined for the purposes of this paper. The leading US model is mainly public organisation, which maintains close contacts with private business.36 Various national CERTs in Europe clearly have strong ties with the private sector37 – or conversely, CERTs of leading IT providers, such as the German Telecom, maintain close contacts with the public sector, including the EU level. 38 The EU CERT Mechanism similarly lists various private companies and internet providers as Bpartners^ 39 for regular information sharing. However, public authorities also increasingly seek to provide their own cyber response capacities without having to partner with, or to rely on, private assistance. 40 For instance, the so-called European Governmental Cert Group 41 and officially listed partners of the EU-CERT are purely made up of public authorities,42 while a recent analytical paper uses the added qualifier of national CSIRTs (nCSIRTs), even if there remain significant interfaces with private actors [97]. So formalised governance networks can only be made out among public sector CERTs. This interpretation of CERTs as moving away from PPP should be tested in further comparative empirical research. In sum, ENISA expresses strong support for public private partnerships for cybersecurity, but mainly acts as a facilitator for technical co-regulation and certification with private actors (at the logical and infrastructure layer). ENISA organises stakeholder consultations in relevant EU regulation on cyber and critical infrastructure, as in the NIS Platform, and supports general awareness raising on cybersecurity among both public and private actors. Yet there is limited evidence for more operational PPPs, as official CERTs increasingly focus on the specific internal or defensive needs of public actors.

## EU Leadership INB

### 2AC – INB – Squo Solves

#### Squo solved – tech giant legislation.

Kang 22 [Cecilia Kang, 4-22-2022, "As Europe Approves New Tech Laws, the U.S. Falls Further Behind", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/technology/tech-regulation-europe-us.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

In just the last few years, Europe has seen a sweeping law for online privacy take effect, approved far-reaching regulations to curb the dominance of the tech giants and on Saturday reached a deal on new legislation to protect its citizens from harmful online content.

For those keeping score, that’s Europe: three. United States: zero.

The United States may be the birthplace of the iPhone and the most widely used search engine and social network, and it could also bring the world into the so-called metaverse. But global leadership on tech regulations is taking place more than 3,000 miles from Washington, by European leaders representing 27 nations with 24 languages, who have nonetheless been able to agree on basic online protections for their 450 million or so citizens.

### 1AR – INB – Squo Solves

#### Massive regs from EU.

Satariano 22 [Adam Satariano, 3-24-2022, "E.U. Takes Aim at Big Tech’s Power With Landmark Digital Act", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/technology/eu-regulation-apple-meta-google.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

The European Union agreed on Thursday to one of the world’s most far-reaching laws to address the power of the biggest tech companies, potentially reshaping app stores, online advertising, e-commerce, messaging services and other everyday digital tools.

The law, called the Digital Markets Act, is the most sweeping piece of digital policy since the bloc put the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data into effect in 2018. The legislation is aimed at stopping the largest tech platforms from using their interlocking services and considerable resources to box in users and squash emerging rivals, creating room for new entrants and fostering more competition.

What that means practically is that companies like Google will no longer be able to collect data from different services to offer targeted ads without users’ consent and that Apple may have to allow alternatives to its App Store on iPhones and iPads. Violators of the law, which will take effect as early as later this year, could face penalties of up to 20 percent of their global revenue — which could reach into the tens of billions of dollars — for repeat offenses.

The Digital Markets Act is part of a one-two punch by European regulators. As early as next month, the European Union is expected to reach an agreement on a law that would force social media companies such as Meta, the owner of Facebook and Instagram, to police their platforms more aggressively.

With these actions, Europe is cementing its leadership as the most assertive regulator of tech companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft. European standards are often adopted worldwide, and the latest legislation further raises the bar by potentially bringing the companies under a new era of oversight — just like health care, transportation and banking industries.

“Faced with big online platforms behaving like they were ‘too big to care,’ Europe has put its foot down,” said Thierry Breton, one of the top digital officials in the European Commission. “We are putting an end to the so-called Wild West dominating our information space. A new framework that can become a reference for democracies worldwide.”

### 2AC – INB – Inevitable

#### The CP is going to inevitably happen – the aff isn’t key.

Csernatoni 19 [[Raluca Csernatoni](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6#auth-Raluca-Csernatoni), PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2\_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

This comes at a moment when National Defence Technological and Industrial Bases (DTIBs) in Europe have increasingly come under pressure to produce competitive defence capabilities, due to budgetary restrictions and defence market forces. There is no denying the fact that the centre of gravity for security and defence technology R&D and innovation has shifted from the national and military levels to the corporate and civilian ones, because of a variety of factors, such as economic austerity reasons and the sharp decline of national defence R&D investment programmes in the post-Cold War period in Europe. In this regard, the maintenance of a strong EDTIB was set out to become a top mission for the EDA and the European Commission, by improving security and defence capabilities, the military expenditure of member states and by focusing on enhancing European security via the development of innovative and competitive high-end technologies.

Political will has been developing in the EU concerning high-tech security and defence capacity build-up, as demonstrated by the policy initiatives and strategies recently spearheaded by the EDA and the European Commission to empower the European defence technology and innovation sectors. The rapprochement between the EDA and the European Commission has increased significantly as shown by their combined efforts to converge national strategic needs and advocate for a more coherent pan-European common defence policy. The 2016 policy initiatives, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SDIP) and the European Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), are prefiguring a new practice of collaboration between the EDA and the Commission to create a stronger European defence market, to revitalise the European defence industrial base and to encourage member states to spend more on defence research and emerging technologies. The European Commission’s launch of the Preparatory Action (PA) on CSDP-related research and in partnership with the EDA as the hub of defence research is indicative of such moves. The PA is a support programme in the form of a one-off and of limited duration budget (Crespo 2015), which shifts financing opportunities for the European defence industries from EU member states to the EU per se.

The European Commission has proposed the PA back in 2014 for testing the added-value of CSDP-related research within a permanent EU framework, outside the limits of the Horizon 2020—The EU Framework Program for Research Innovation type of civilian or dual-use R&D programmes. At the time, if proven successful in the time-frame of 2017–2019, the PA was heralded as a potential game-changer in the field of European defence research, paving the way for permanent funding from the part of the European Commission to support CSDP-related research. In an unprecedented strategic move, it also opened the EU financing machine for defence technologies research and development beyond the limiting constraints of civilian or dual-use R&D and Research and Technology (R&T) under the structural funds such as the Horizon 2020. The European Defence Fund (EDF), presented in the European Commission’s EDAP from 30 November 2016 is case in point, becoming the first supranational financial tool to directly and exclusively fund cross-border European defence research projects, with a view to developing innovative and high-end security technologies.

In light of the above, a clear and resolute direction can be observed, with conclusive steps taken in strengthening, deepening, and widening the EU-level defence collaboration. There is no denying the fact that the European Commission has had an agenda-setting role, taking important steps to improve efficiency and cooperation in the defence sector: it increased its efforts to complete the Single Market for defence; it strengthened the competitiveness of the European industry; and it bolstered the European defence research by maximising synergies between civilian and military research (European Commission 2014). These steps are also achieved through the SDIP and the EDAP, the European Commission and the EDA working closely together with member states to outline these initiatives. By taking into account such developments, the chapter proposes a two-tiered research strategy, by first exploring the emergence of a European trans-sectoral security field via a new configuration of power relations and a convergence of interests at the intersection of different national, supranational and corporate levels in the case of future-oriented and high-tech research and development. Second, it examines the role of EU-led innovation and governance of such technologies in the specific cases of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics. The chapter builds on an interpretive methodology that mobilises qualitative content analysis of various types of textual data, such as official discourses, key reports, policy documents, speeches and declarations, press releases, academic research, grey literature from think tanks and expert evaluations. Consequently, the chapter investigates the EU’s agenda-setter potential as a key driver in galvanising the European high-tech and defence sectors to bridge the technological-innovation gap across intergovernmental-supranational, civil-military and public-private nexuses in Europe to bring about a ‘European comprehensive approach’ to future and emerging security technologies. In doing so, it also problematizes the possible implications of Brexit on the European governance and development of future and emerging technologies. Finally, it highlights the EU’s efforts in translating technological innovation in these fields into a potential governance edge and the transformation of the EU into a technological powerhouse.

## Semiconductor INB

### 2AC – Squo Solves

#### US and Europe are already taking measures to create semiconductor resiliency.

Arcuri 22, Gregory Arcuri is a research assistant for the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., (Gregory, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?” , CSIS, April 5, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.

### 1AR – Squo Solves

#### The European Chips Act solves---increases RnD, domestic production, and global partnerships to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.

Cota 22, Jillian Cota is a research intern with the Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC., (Jillian, “The European Chips Act: A Strategy to Expand Semiconductor Production Resiliency”, CSIS, March 7, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/european-chips-act-strategy-expand-semiconductor-production-resiliency) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In February 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Chips Act, which adds €15 billion to an existing €30 billion in public investments to create new STEM-focused programs, attract new talent to Europe, and build new infrastructure. These actions are part of a strategy to support a thriving European semiconductor industry ecosystem, averting future shortages of semiconductors, and promoting investment into the European semiconductor industry.

Through this legislation, the Commission hopes to: Increase EU resilience to supply chain disruptions like those created by building more domestic capacity. Make Europe a long-term industrial leader in semiconductors, increasing its global in manufacturing from 9% to 20% by 2030.

Areas of Focus: The European Chips Act focuses on five specific areas:

Research and Development: The announcement by the European Commission President calls for further allocations of funds for research and development (R&D) to keep up with global competitors. To augment the level of research, the Commission will further invest €3.3 billion in two current programs: €1.65 billion to the “Horizon Europe” program and €1.65 billion to the “Digital Europe” program. The "Horizon Europe'' program focuses on pre-competitive research, development, and innovation in the area of semiconductors while, “The Digital Europe” program looks to make digital domains and technology widely available for all businesses and the general public to maximize performance in key industries.

“From the lab to the fab”: The European Chips Act also calls for more effectively translating research into industrial innovation and market-feasible products. Experts emphasize that Europe must bridge the gap between excellence in laboratory research and onshore manufacturing to sustain leadership in semiconductors and other advanced technologies.

Industry Production: The European Chips Act recognizes that advanced production facilities come with huge up-front costs. Europe is looking to host “first of its kind” facilities through the creation of Integrated Production Facilities, which are factories that design and produce semiconductor components that serve the European market and through Open EU Foundries for chip design, which are facilities that design and produce components for other industrial actors such as medical devices and computer programming. The EU Commission sees Europe lagging in chip production, so if the EU can accomplish building these Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU foundries, the EU commission goal of increasing European chip production from 9% to 20% of global production by 2030 becomes significantly more reachable.

Local Support: European policymakers see the need to support the local skill base and the network of smaller, innovative companies and start-ups as a part of their strategy to grow their semiconductor and high technology ecosystems. To do this, the European Commission has established the “EU Chips Fund” which will contribute €2 billion to create a more competitive market for semiconductor start-ups to participate in and address skill shortages. Additionally, the Commission wants to help in the retention of employees that have the skills that these start-ups need to be successful and to find industrial partners for these start-ups to collaborate with.

Overhaul the European Supply Chain: The strategy also seeks to advance the European Union’s supply chain. Within the EU, the Commission wants to encourage Member States and industry stakeholders to coordinate efforts towards an improved European supply chain for semiconductors.. To enable a rapid response to the current shortages, the Commission has created a list of recommendations to the Member States. Along with streamlining policies of member states, Europe is also looking to build partnerships with the United States and other nations to create a more resilient global semiconductor network.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Semiconductor dependencies prevent Taiwan invasion---capitalist peace theory!

Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Fabricating our way into World War III? Political economists have long theorized that great powers are less likely to go to war if they rely on one another for trade. The so-called “capitalist peace theory” is a core tenet of classical liberalism — one of the many reasons scholars say we should embrace globalization, even if it comes with quite a few nasty side effects. Install a McDonald’s in your capital city, Thomas Friedman posited in 1996, and no other McCountry will invade. (Russia has since served as the counterpoint to this theory, though McDonald’s is now leaving Russia.) If the capitalist peace theory holds, then reshoring chips would have considerable geopolitical ramifications, according to Rao. In this sense, he added, China poses a greater threat: “The Chinese can’t actually threaten Taiwan currently, or at least not so easily, because they need the chips.” To secure that supply, China is expected to pour well over $100 billion dollars into developing its domestic semiconductor industry. “The way to frame this is whether or not China requires Taiwan — and in the future, they may not,” Rao said.

CHART OMITTED

China’s stated aim is to reunite with Taiwan, not demolish it. So in theory, Taiwanese manufacturing shouldn’t be at risk. But Rao said delicate chip fabrication facilities could be damaged in the event of an invasion, and that would be a supply risk China would likely not want to take.

## Defense Autonomy INB

### 2AC --- EU Autonomy Fails

#### European autonomy fails

Luke Coffey 20, MS, Politics and Government of the European Union, London School of Economics, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Daniel Kochis, MA, Comparative Political Science, Fordham University, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute, 8/10/20, "NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow", The Heritage Foundation, Speical Report, No. 235, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-the-21st-century-preparing-the-alliance-the-challenges-today-and-tomorrow

NATO and the European Union. The strength of the transatlantic alliance revolves around the axis of NATO, which has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other alliance—including the European Union—since its inception in 1949. Far from being outmoded, NATO today is more relevant and crucial for maintaining transatlantic security than it has been since the end of the Cold War. While some in Brussels and across the halls of power in Europe may have dreams of an independent EU Army or an independent EU defensive apparatus capable of replacing NATO and the U.S. military, true EU “strategic autonomy” in defense is a chimera.

The EU will never be able to provide the peace and stability that NATO— with feet firmly rooted in both North America and Europe for the past 70 years—has delivered, and will continue to deliver. While EU-led defense initiatives may be able to provide some defense improvements at the margins, the outsized costs include decisions that enervate NATO, exacerbate existing fractures within Europe, and severely stress the transatlantic link.

NATO’s reflection should approach further NATO–EU initiatives cautiously. While the EU undoubtedly maintains competencies that will be necessary and useful for responding to the challenges associated with a return to great power competition, the EU cannot fulfill the security role in Europe currently performed by the U.S. and NATO. For peace and security, it is essential that NATO maintain its keystone role in European defense policy. This means firmly pushing back against EU defense integration efforts that are not in the interests of the Alliance.

When it comes to EU strategic autonomy, NATO should insist that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “3Ds” continue to be respected—(1) no decoupling of U.S. security from European security, (2) no duplication of structures or initiatives that already exist within NATO, and (3) no discrimination against non-EU NATO members.

### 2AC --- AT: Europe leads

#### Europe can’t lead---the US is irreplaceable

Ana Palacio 11/20/20, former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group and a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University, “ America, Heal Thyself,” Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-heal-divided-america-liberal-world-order-by-ana-palacio-2020-11

The stakes are high. If the pole around which the international order was built continues to weaken, the dangerous drift of recent years – exemplified by the absence of a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic – will continue. Even the diplomatic muscle memory that has enabled the limited recent examples of cooperation will fade.

Why shouldn’t someone else lead? Simply put, because no one else can. There is no single actor, or even a collection of actors, that is ready to take America’s place.

Consider the European Union, which has long fancied itself a potential standard-bearer of liberal values. It certainly possesses many of the attributes of an exemplar: vibrant and diverse cultures, dynamic civil societies, well-institutionalized systems for upholding human rights and the rule of law, and a commitment to multilateralism.

And yet, in many areas vital to global leadership, the EU falters. A lack of political will has meant that Europe has consistently misallocated resources. As a result, it has failed to build up adequate shared capacity or even to create the conditions for doing so. For example, EU leaders insist that Europe needs to achieve “strategic autonomy,” without agreement on what that means.

More fundamentally, the EU lacks the self-assurance it would need to serve as a credible and compelling example for the world. To change that, it must first define and convey a compelling raison d’être, which can form the basis of its own revitalized model. It must then dedicate significant resources – time, effort, and money – to building the capacity and status needed to project its influence. In short, the EU must walk the walk.1

Unless and until it does, the US will be indispensable, because it is irreplaceable. That makes it all the more important for the Biden administration not only to re-engage with the world and the multilateral system as a convening power, but also to find a way to heal the US. Only a reasonably united America can stand tall, look forward, and serve as the beating heart of the liberal international order.

### 2AC --- No Impact – Africa War

#### No African War

Burbach and Fettweis 14 – [David T. Burbach, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Christopher Fettweis, Associate Professor in International Relations at Tulane University, 2014, The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security, http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-35-3%20Burbach%20and%20Fettweis.pdf] Jeong

Anarchy has not come to Africa – at least not in the expanding, all-encompassing way meant by the pessimists of a decade or two ago. The continent is far from uniformly peaceful, and current outbreaks of violence are reminders of the need for more progress. On the whole, however, Africa is less war-torn than at any time in the past, which runs contrary to widespread perceptions that exist even among foreign policy experts. Kaplan remains unchanged, claiming recently that his most important predictions have actually been borne out.95 However, the evidence suggests that despite neo-Malthusians fears, by most measures life on the continent is improving. War is becoming less of a threat to the life of the average African than emerging middleincome threats like traffic accidents or diabetes. Nor have realist fears of predatory wars and wholesale remaking of the map of Africa come to pass. That is not meant to dismiss the suffering of residents of the Central African Republic, South Sudan or northern Nigeria, nor to suggest that all is well. There are hundreds of millions of Africans who do not face as great a threat of armed conflict as they once did, however. It is important to see Africa as more than 50 distinct countries, some – and by historical standards, relatively few – of which are beset by warfare, even if they continue to face other, even greater challenges. Nothing guarantees that these trends will continue. Indeed, several require active maintenance. If the outside world stops responding to African hotspots, at least with diplomatic resources and avoiding support to plunder-financed armed groups, conflict becomes more likely. Intense American –Chinese competition could encourage internal conflict or spur vicious circles of tension between neighbours. The United Nations, former colonizers and AFRICOM have all been useful in helping to bring stability to the continent, but their long-term interest is hardly assured. A global recession or a wave of protectionism could dash optimism about economic growth. But for now, for the first time in quite some time, there is reason for optimism about the decline of warfare in Africa. What the United States and other outsiders should not do, however, is continue to look at Africa though a lens that overemphasizes conflict and a few crisis-afflicted nations. Additional American support for African peacekeeping capability is welcome, but an increase in American investment in African economies would do even more good for more people. Policymakers should emphasize to the business community how much is now going right in Africa. The Obama Administration has taken useful steps in that direction, but at other times shows signs of the ‘Africa-as-Anarchy’ mindset. Programmes to help African governments build capacity outside the military-security sphere could be expanded, such as police and judicial systems, or the infrastructure and service delivery needs of large cities in which a growing share of Africans live. Africa faces many problems. Peace does not necessarily bring freedom, justice, or prosperity. But today a far greater percentage of people on the continent live without serious risk of dying due to warfare than pessimists expected. On the contrary, ‘end of war’ optimists may prove to be right about Africa too, if on a slower time scale than most of the world. Perhaps a rising generation of leaders and citizens are being influenced by both global norms and expectations of greater opportunities. Africa is surely the hardest test of the global trend away from international conflict. If conflict can no longer find a home there, will it be welcome anywhere?

### 2AC --- No Impact – Latin Am War

#### No Latin America war

Cárdenas 11 (Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think\_again\_latin\_america?page=full)

**"**Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

### 2AC --- No Impact – NoKo War

#### No noko war

Campbell 17 (Charlie Campbell - Beijing Correspondent for TIME – “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Are Not Reason Enough to Start a War” – 4/28/17 - http://time.com/4759066/north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/)/TK

But even if North Korea were not to retaliate, there’s no guarantee strikes would achieve their goal of permanently retarding the regime’s nuclear program. Plus there would be dire strategic consequences. Beijing would be livid. The U.S. would have started yet another 21st Century war, utterly alienating international public opinion, tearing up its hard-fought Asian security alliance and inviting Chinese hardliners to push it out of the region. According to an August 2016 study by Brown University, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan — in which the U.S. military has been involved — have directly cost 370,000 lives since 2001. (Not that we’ve stopped counting.)¶ Read More: Can North Korea Actually Hit the U.S. With a Nuclear Missile?¶ However, the broader point is that North Korea, for all its many and egregious faults, is a state hell-bent on survival. It might have nuclear weapons, but the regime cannot use them without guaranteeing its own destruction. That’s how nuclear deterrents work. North Korea is not ISIS with an “end of days” deathwish, wreaking jihad across the globe in its quest for a global caliphate.¶ “Why are people panicking about North Korea?” asks Daniel Pinkston, an East Asia expert at South Korea's Troy University. “It’s secular, they want to survive and they are very cognizant of power balances. They are not suicidal.”

### 2AC --- No Impact – China War

#### No China war

Shifrinson 19—(assistant professor of international relations at Boston University). Joshua Shifrinson. 2/8/19. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/08/there-isnt-a-new-cold-war-with-china-for-these-4-reasons/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f8ca8195c4e4>)

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds. 3. The Cold War had just two major powers The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful, compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany. In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S. unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs. Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different. 4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-backed communism. But that’s not the whole story. The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle. The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today. Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the private sector and semi-free markets.

### 2AC --- No Impact – EU Soft Power

#### Soft power is impossible

Wunsch 19—(post-doctoral researcher in the European Politics Group at the Center for Comparative and International Studies). Natasha Wunsch. Sept 7 2019, "The European Union in Times of Crisis: Internal Challenges and a Changing Global Order", European Consortium for Political Research, <https://ecpr.eu/Events/SectionDetails.aspx?SectionID=842&EventID=123>)

Since 2009, the EU appears to be operating in a context of permanent crises. Internally, it is grappling with the crisis of the Eurozone and economic governance, the migration crisis, the negotiations surrounding Brexit, and a creeping but no less dangerous challenge to democracy as the core of the Union’s shared values. The manifestations of these crises have been so prolonged and recurring that they raise the question whether they represent systemic flaws that call into question the long-term prospects of European integration. This question has been posed with relation to European economic and eurozone governance, but is equally relevant when it comes to Eurosceptic trends among EU citizens and the rise of populist and nationalist governments that explicitly challenge core institutions and values of the Union. Brexit negotiations and the enduring difficulties in finding a workable form of future cooperation with the UK after the deadline for leaving the Union further illustrate how some of the core tenets of the EU’s order, including the free movement of people in the internal market, are coming under pressure. At the same time, the EU faces a multitude of external challenges. These range from the strained transatlantic relationship due to the increasingly isolationist stance of the United States, the rise of a stronger China, and an increasingly assertive Russia. The EU’s ability to bring positive change to its neighbourhood is challenged by the enduring instability and outright political crises in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and those that experienced the Arab Spring. These multiple crises challenge the EU’s emphasis on soft power as its privileged mode of engagement with third countries and risk fostering ever deeper Euroscepticism among the EU’s citizens.